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Abstract
From May 31 to June 13, 1999, the Joseph R. Crowley Program in International Human
Rights (or “delegation”) conducted a mission in Hong Kong in conjunction with the Committee
on International Human Rights of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (‘Associa-
tion‘ or ‘ABCNY ‘). The purpose of the mission was to examine the status of the rule of law in
Hong Kong two years after the transition from British to Chinese rule. This Special Report doc-
uments the delegation’s investigation, summarizes its findings, and sets forth its conclusions and
recommendations. Part I considers the rule of law as a foundation of international human rights
and China’s obligations under international law to protect the rule of law in Hong Kong. After
recounting the right of abode decisions themselves, it examines both the legality and prudence of
the HKSAR administration’s request for a reinterpretation, including the alternatives that it could
have pursued. This Part concludes by analyzing the reinterpretation that Beijing issued and the
effect it has had, or is likely to have, on subsequent related cases. Part II examines Hong Kong’s
progress towards full democracy, measuring that progress against the Basic Law and international
law. It begins by reviewing the relevant international obligations applicable to the PRC and the
HKSAR. Next, this part details the electoral system and limits on legislative power, including the
composition of LegCo, Hong’s Kong’s legislature, the selection of the Chief Executive, and the
separation of powers within the HKSAR government. Finally, this Part assesses the development
of democratization in Hong Kong in light of the international standards previously discussed. The
third and final part of this Special Report explores the status and implementation of Hong Kong’s
basic international human rights obligations under its domestic law. It then focuses on two areas,
labor rights and anti-discrimination protection, as case studies in which fundamental rights pro-
tected under international law have been eroded or underenforced by the HKSAR administration.
SPECIAL REPORT
ONE COUNTRY, TWO LEGAL SYSTEMS?*
Report of the Joseph R. Crowley Program**
* AUTHOR'S NOTE: This Special Report is based on ajoint mission undertaken
by the Joseph R. Crowley Program in International Human Rights and the
International Human Rights Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York. The views expressed in this version of the Special Report are solely the views of the
Joseph R. Crowley Program in International Human Rights and do not represent the
views of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. For the purposes of this
Special Report, any reference to the views of the delegation refers to those of the
Joseph R. Crowley Program in International Human Rights. A modified version of this
Special Report will appear, in part, in a forthcoming re-publication of the Joseph R.
Crowley Program/International Human Rights Committee of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York. One Country, Two Legal Systems?, THE RECORD (forthcoming
February 2000). As this Special Report went to press, two of the cases described under
the heading in Part 1.4.a., Pending Cases, infra notes 218-28 and accompanying text,
were decided by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Court of Final Appeal
(or "CFA"). In In the case of Lau Kong Yung and 16 others v. Director of Immigration, Nos. 10
and 11 of 1999, HKSAR Court of Final Appeal (Dec. 3, 1999), the CFA upheld the
plenary authority of the National People's Congress Standing Committee ("NPCSC") to
uphold the Basic Law and interpretation. In the second recently decided case, HKSAR
v. NgKungSiu and Lee Kin Yun, No. 4 of 1999, HKSAR Court of Final Appeal (Dec. 15,
1999), the CFA upheld Hong Kong's flag desecration ordinances, overturing the Court
of Appeal's decision, and affirming convictions in the lower court. Further treatment
of these two new cases in the context of this Special Report will appear in the
forthcoming RECORD.
** The joint delegation to Hong Kong benefited from the contributions, support,
and advice of many individuals and organizations. We are indebted to numerous offi-
cials, judges, lawyers, scholars, activists, and other informed individuals who met and
consulted with the delegation during our visit and the drafting of this Report. We
would specifically like to thank Christine Loh, of the Citizen's Party, the Hong Kong
Human Rights Monitor, especially Dr. Stephen Ng, and LawYuk Kai, the Asian Migrant
Resource Center, especially Apolel Ung and Chan Ka Wai, the Law Society of Hong
Kong, especially Patrick Moss, and the Hong Kong Bar Association, especially Philip
Dykes, SC, Denis Chang, SC, Margaret Ng, SC, Ronnie Tong, SC, and Audrey Eu, SC.
None of the above named individuals or organizations bears any responsibility for the
views and opinions expressed in this Special Report.
The administration of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (or "HK-
SAR") merits special mention for its help and cooperation in facilitating the delega-
tion's access to officials and in providing information during our mission. In particular,
we are grateful to Mrs. Anson Chan, Chief Secretary for Administration, Mrs. Elsie
Leung, the Hong Kong Secretary of Justice, Robert Alcock, Assistant Secretary of Jus-
tice, and Michael Suen, Secretary of Constitutional Affairs Bureau.
The directors of the Crowley Program would like to thank Dean John Feerick, the
alumni of Fordham law school for their unwavering support of the Crowley Program
and Luke McGrath, the 1999-2000 Crowley Fellow, for his efforts in the publication of
this report. They would also like to thank the Hon. Leonard B. Sand, Mae Hsieh, Esq.,
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INTRODUCTION
In January 1999, the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal (or
"CFA") for the first time exercised its power of judicial review
under the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region ("Basic Law"). The Basic Law effectively serves as Hong
Kong's constitution within the People's Republic of China
("China" or "PRC") and implements the idea that Hong Kong
and the PRC will function as "One Country, Two Systems." The
CFA's decisions interpreted the Basic Law's guarantee of "the
right of abode," or permanent residency, within the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region (or "HKSAR"). The CFA's rul-
ings, which interpreted the right to apply broadly to persons cur-
rently residing in mainland China, immediately generated con-
troversy. So too did the CFA's assertion of the authority to strike
down measures restricting that right or otherwise inconsistent
with the Basic Law.
The HKSAR administration, itself facing the exercise of ju-
dicial review for the first time, came to resist'the CFA's rulings in
various ways. Initially, the administration sought and obtained a
"clarification" of those aspects of the court's opinions dealing
with its authority to exercise judicial review over measures of the
PRC's national legislature, the National People's Congress
("NPC"). The administration then circulated figures suggesting
that the CFA's rulings, if they should stand, would have grave
economic and social implications for Hong Kong's populace.
Especially in the wake of the 1998 Asian financial crisis, these
figures became a source of great concern within Hong Kong,
even as the numbers themselves were challenged as inflated or
unsubstantiated.
The administration's most important response, however,
was yet to come. Citing concerns about the projected flood of
mainland Chinese, the Chief Executive of the HKSAR, the Hon.
Tung Chee Hwa, announced the administration's intention to
request the Standing Committee of the NPC (or "NPCSC"),
through the State Council, to review the CFA's decision and pro-
vide a "reinterpretation" of the relevant provisions of the Basic
Law that would result in a significantly more narrow application
of the right of abode. Two months later, in June 1999, the
and the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, in particular, the Committee on
International Human Rights and its chair, David Nachman, Esq.
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NPCSC issued a reinterpretation that granted the administration
virtually everything it requested.
Hong Kong's so-called right of abode controversy has re-
sulted in substantial concern, criticism, and commentary both
within Hong Kong and around the world. Critics have asserted
that the actions of both the HKSAR and PRC governments fun-
damentally undermine the independence of Hong Kong's judi-
ciary and traditional common law system and are thus inconsis-
tent with China's commitment to its pledge to maintain One
Country, Two Systems, as well as other obligations under interna-
tional law. Government officials have defended their actions by
arguing that these dire effects on the rule of law in Hong Kong
are either minimal or illusory, especially in light of the social and
economic disaster that would result if the original CFA holdings
were enforced.
Yet the implications of the right of abode controversy do
not end with the rule of law. The dispute also illustrates chal-
lenges facing Hong Kong as it attempts to realize the Basic Law's
promise for increased democratization. As the reinterpretation
request in part shows, the Chief Executive, who is not popularly
elected, wields substantial power in relation to both the courts
and the legislature. The legislature, known as the Legislative
Council ("LegCo")-only a minority of directly-elected-gener-
ally cannot initiate legislation without approval by the adminis-
tration. In similar fashion, the right of abode controversy raises
questions about how fundamental rights will be safeguarded
within Hong Kong generally. In this regard, guarantees con-
cerning discrimination, labor rights, and access to legal and so-
cial services merit special attention.
From May 31 to June 13, 1999, the Joseph R. Crowley Pro-
gram in International Human Rights (or "delegation")1 con-
1. The Joseph R. Crowley Program in International Human Rights ("Program" or
"Crowley Program") at Fordham University School of Law promotes teaching, scholar-
ship, and advocacy in international human rights law. Principal elements of the Pro-
gram include an annual fact-finding mission to an area of the world with significant
human rights concerns, a student outreach project involving students in course work,
research and human rights internships, both domestically and abroad, and a speaker
series, bringing many of the world's foremost experts in the field onto campus, stimu-
lating dialogue and promoting scholarship. The Crowley Program approaches its work
in these areas in light of the school's commitment to public service, its widely recog-
nized strength in the field of international law, and its close proximity to the world's
leading centers for human rights advocacy. For more information about the Crowley
1999]
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ducted a mission in Hong Kong in conjunction with the Com-
mittee on International Human Rights of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York ("Association" or "ABCNY').2 The
purpose of the mission was to examine the status of the rule of
law in Hong Kong two years after the transition from British to
Chinese rule. The project included extensive study of the Hong
Kong's history, legal framework, and political structures, includ-
ing preliminary course work and research by the Fordham Law
students in the Crowley Program. This mission, which in signifi-
cant part follows up a 1995 mission by the ABCNY, consisted of a
thirteen-person delegation' assisted by ten law students from the
University of Hong Kong.4 The delegation spent two weeks in
Hong Kong meeting with members of the Hong Kong govern-
ment, judges, legislators, leaders of the Hong Kong Bar (barris-
ters and solicitors), law professors, human rights advocates, con-
sular officials, and business leaders.
This Special Report documents the delegation's investiga-
tion, summarizes its findings, and sets forth its conclusions and
recommendations. Part I considers the rule of law as a founda-
tion of international human rights and China's obligations
under international law to protect the rule of law in Hong Kong.
After recounting the right of abode decisions themselves, it ex-
amines both the legality and prudence of the HKSAR adminis-
Program, visit its website at <http://www.fordham.edu/law/centers/crowley/
home.htm>.
2. The Association is one of the oldest and largest bar associations in the United
States. It serves not only as a professional association, but also as a leader and advocate
in the legal field on a local, state, and national level. Through its International Human
Rights Committee, the Association has conducted a number of significant human rights
factfinding missions, including a mission to Hong Kong in 1995 lead by the Honorable
Leonard B. Sand, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York.
For more information about the International Human Rights Committee or the Associ-
ation generally, see <http://www.abcny.org>.
3. The members of the delegation from the Crowley Program were Professors
Tracy Higgins and Martin Flaherty (Co-Directors of the Crowley Program), Robert
Quinn (Crowley Fellow), and Elizabeth Crotty, Nate Heasley, Roger Hurley, Kara Irwin,
Andrew Kaufman, Nadine Moustafa, Alain Personna, and John Rothermich (Crowley
Scholars). The representatives from the Association were the Hon. Leonard B. Sand,
United States DistrictJudge for the Southern District of New York, and Mae Hsieh, Esq.,
member of the Association's Asian Affairs Committee and Committee on International
Human Rights.
4. The students were: Charlotte Tse, Felix Ng, Jonathan Chang, Josiah Chan, Lee
Lap Hang, Marina Tony, Sarah Cheng Po San, Scarlett Cheung, Susan Li ShuiJing, and
Szeto Wing Chi Annie. The delegation is indebted both to them and to Prof. Andrew
Byrnes for arranging their participation.
[Vol. 23:1
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tration's request for a reinterpretation, including the alterna-
tives that it could have pursued. This part concludes by analyz-
ing the reinterpretation that Beijing issued and the effect it has
had, or is likely to have, on subsequent related cases.
Part II examines Hong Kong's progress towards full democ-
racy, measuring that progress against the Basic Law and interna-
tional law. It begins by reviewing the relevant international obli-
gations applicable to the PRC and the HKSAR. Next, this part
details the electoral system and limits on legislative power, in-
cluding the composition of LegCo, Hong's Kong's legislature,
the selection of the Chief Executive, and the separation of pow-
ers within the HKSAR government. Finally, this part assesses the
development of democratization in Hong Kong in light of the
international standards previously discussed.
The third and final part of this Special Report explores the
status and implementation of Hong Kong's basic international
human rights obligations under its domestic law. It then focuses
on two areas, labor rights and anti-discrimination protection, as
case studies in which fundamental rights protected under inter-
national law have been eroded or underenforced by the HKSAR
administration.
I. PRESERVING THE RULE OF LAW
The right of abode controversy most directly affects the rule
of law as Hong Kong has known it. Under the "One Country,
Two Systems" pledge, Hong Kong was to retain its autonomous
common law framework, including an independent judiciary to
exercise the power of final adjudication. Beijing's reinterpreta-
tion 5 of the Basic Law provisions, on which the Court of Final
Appeals based its right of abode judgments, has dealt these guar-
antees a severe blow.
The threat to Hong Kong's legal system stems from the
readiness of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region gov-
5. There is a controversy over the use of the term reinterpretation over interpreta-
tion. Those who are more sympathetic to the NPCSC's power, usually use interpreta-
tion because that term is used in Article 158 or because it reflects mainland legal con-
cepts. Those who harbor greater concern over the NPCSC's role, generally use reinter-
pretation, at least when the NPCSC is interpreting provisions that Hong Kong courts
have already interpreted. We will employ reinterpretation, with regard to the right of
abode controversy because we believe this term more accurately reflects what the
NPCSC did and was asked to do in that situation.
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ernment to seek relief from the PRC, having lost in Hong Kong's
highest court. In so doing, it not only undermined the finality of
CFA decisions, but also exposed the territory to mainland legal
principles that are often antithetical to the common law. In this
way, the right of abode controversy poses a danger that was
largely unanticipated at the time of the Association's mission
prior to the handover. Contrary to the fears expressed at the
time, the Hong Kong judiciary has remained highly qualified
and independent. The mainland government, moreover, had
demonstrated a desire to leave Hong Kong alone. Instead, main-
land intervention has come at the invitation of the Hong Kong
executive. Government officials argued that turning to Beijing
was the best way to meet the pressing crisis arising in the context
of trying to implement an untried judicial system. Nevertheless,
the potential cost to the rule of law is high. By effectively cir-
cumventing the Court of Final Appeal's interpretation of the Ba-
sic Law, the HKSAR Administration's actions have undermined
judicial independence. These actions have also introduced Chi-
nese legal concepts into Hong Kong that could further threaten
Hong Kong's common law system.
Part I of the report will first consider the importance of the
rule of law as a foundation for international human rights and
China's obligations under international law to protect the rule
of law in Hong Kong. After recounting right of abode decisions,
it examines both the legality and the prudence of the Hong
Kong government's request for a reinterpretation, including the
alternatives that the HKSAR government could have pursued.
This Part will conclude by analyzing the reinterpretation that
Beijing issued and the implications of its action for cases that are
likely to raise similar issues in the near future
A. The Rule of Law
1. General International Standards
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights6 (or "Declara-
tion") enshrines an international commitment to "the rule of
law" as fundamental to the protection of international human
rights. No fewer than six of the Declaration's first twelve articles
6. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. GAOR 3d.
Sess. Pt. 1, Pmbl., at 1, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
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speak to the integrity of a nation's law and legal system.7 Both
the Declaration and subsequent international instruments spell
out the meaning of the phrase "international integrity" by guar-
anteeing an array of specific rights8 as well as mandating various
procedures and institutions.9 Many of these instruments are di-
rectly binding on Hong Kong, including the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights1" ("ICCPR"). Although na-
tions are free to implement the rule of law in any number of
ways,11 certain general principles must be honored. In particu-
lar, the U.N. Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judici-
ary12 ("Basic Principles") set forth guidelines to safeguard the
integrity and autonomy of courts throughout the world.
The Basic Principles state that "[t] he independence of the
7. Id. at arts. 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12.
8. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
on Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 9 with reservation in 999 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered
into force Mar. 23, 1976 with reservations upon ratification by United Kingdom and
Northern Ireland) [hereinafter ICCPR] (defining right to liberty).
9. See, e.g., id. at art. 13 (stating that everyone shall be entitled to fair and public
hearing by competent, independent, and impartial tribunal established by law).
10. See generally id.; see also International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966), reprinted in 999 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]; International Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, art.l, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(1984) reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027; International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106A, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14
at 66 (1965), 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25,
U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49 at 174, U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (1989); Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, U.N. GAOR, 48th
Sess., Supp. No. 38, at 1,2, U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1993), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 487
(1996), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. These documents originally became applicable to Hong
Kong through accession by the United Kingdom and continue to apply despite the
change of sovereign. In addition, the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administra-
tive Region ("Basic Law") provides that the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights ("ICCPR"), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights ("ICESCR"), and all labor conventions "as applied to Hong Kong ... shall re-
main in force and shall be implemented" through local legislation. Basic Law of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (Mar. 4,
1990), at art. 39, para. 20, [hereinafter Basic Law].
11. See Reed Brody, Introduction: The Independence of Lawyers and Judges, A Compila-
tion of International Standards, CENTRE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF LAWYERS AND JUDGES
BULLETIN, Apr.-Oct. 1990, at 3.
12. Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, G.A. Res. 40/32, Nov. 29, 1985
& 40/146, Dec. 13, 1985 [hereinafter Basic Principles]. The Basic Principles, while not
comprising a treaty, have received the approval of the U.N. General Assembly and re-
flect a considered global consensus that provides evidence of customary international
law.
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judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the
Constitution or the laws of the country. It is therefore the duty
of all governmental and other institutions to respect and observe
the independence of the judiciary.' 3 They further provide that
the judiciary shall decide matters, "without any restrictions, im-
proper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interfer-
"114ences, direct or indirect from any quarter or for any reason.
In addition, the Basic Principles declare that "[t] he judiciary
shall have jurisdiction over all issues of ajudicial nature and shall
have exclusive authority to decide whether an issue submitted
for its decision is within its competence as defined by law."' 5 Fi-
nally, the Basic Principles prohibit "any inappropriate or unwar-
ranted interference with the judicial process .... nor shall judi-
cial decision by the courts be subject to revision." 6 In these
ways, the Basic Principles make clear that legal controversies
must be settled by authorities that are not beholden to policy-
makers who might ordinarily have a vested or biased interest in
the outcome. In the eyes of the world community, therefore,
judicial independence is a cornerstone principle for the rule of
law.
2. The Sino-British Joint Declaration
In the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Govern-
ment of the People's Republic of China on the Question of
Hong Kong' 7 (the 'Joint Declaration"), China has undertaken
specific obligations to preserve Hong Kong's legal structure be-
yond its obligations to respect the rule of law as an aspect of
international human rights. The Joint Declaration makes it
clear that for Hong Kong, "rule of law" means the common law.
13. Id. at No. 1.
14. Id. at No. 2.
15. Id. at No. 3.
16. The provision adds: "This principle is without prejudice to judicial review or to
mitigation or communication by competent authorities of sentences imposed by the
judiciary." Id. at No. 4.
17. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the
Question of Hong Kong ('joint Declaration"), Sept. 26, 1984, (signed Dec. 19, 1984), 23
I.L.M. 1371 [hereinafter Joint Declaration]. The Joint Declaration entered into force
on May 27, 1985.
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This statement expressly includes judicial independence and fi-
nality of judicial decisions.
Despite its name, the Joint Declaration is a treaty. Although
China initially resisted the idea of a binding international agree-
ment, it reversed itself, partially because of the belief that such a
commitment would provide the world community greater assur-
ance."8 Accordingly, the Joint Declaration mandated that the
United Kingdom restore Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty on
July 1, 1997 and, in turn, obligated China to establish the terri-
tory as a "Special Administrative Region." As such, the territory
would "enjoy a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and
defense affairs, which are the responsibilities of the Central Peo-
ple's Government. '"19 In this way, China bound itself in interna-
tional law to implement the formula of "One Country, Two Sys-
tems" originally envisioned by Deng Xiaoping.
The Joint Declaration makes it clear that the high degree of
autonomy that Hong Kong currently enjoys extends to its legal
system. The main document declares that the HKSAR "will be
vested with executive, legislative, and independent judicial power,
including the power of final adjudication." It further states that
"the laws currently in force in Hong Kong will remain basically
unchanged."2 °
A series of Annexes, which are also binding, elaborate these
commitments. Annex II states that "laws previously enforced,"
specifically "the common law" as well as "rules of equity, ordi-
nances, subordinate legislation, and customary law," will remain
in effect. 21 Turning to the judiciary, Annex III preserves "the
judicial system as previously practiced in Hong Kong except for
those changes consequent upon vesting the courts of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region of the power of final adjudi-
cation."22 This provision actually reflects the strengthening of the
Hong Kong judiciary since the Joint Declaration elsewhere vests
"the power of final judgment" for the HKSAR in a new "court of
final appeal" for cases that previously had gone to the Privy
18. YASH GHAI, HONG KONG'S NEw CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: THE RESUMPTION OF
CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BASIC LAW 53 (1999). See also id. at 70-72 (discussing
status of Joint Declaration).
19. Joint Declaration, supra note 17, at art. 3, para. 2.
20. Id. at art. 3, para. 3 (emphasis added).
21. Id. at annex I, para. II.
22. Id. at annex I, para. IIl.
1999]
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Council in the United Kingdom for final adjudication.23 Annex
III further provides that "the courts shall exercise judicial power
independently and free from any interference... and may refer
precedents in other common law jurisdictions."24 In addition,
the Court of Final Appeal "may as required invite judges from
other common law jurisdictions" to adjudicate cases. 25 By acced-
ing to the Joint Declaration, China has expressly committed it-
self to respecting the independence of the Hong Kongjudiciary,
including the finality of its decisions. Any compromise of this
commitment would accordingly place China in violation of inter-
national legal obligations that it both sought and accepted.
B. Implementing International Commitments: Hong Kong and the
Basic Law
The PRC sought to implement its obligations under the
Joint Declaration through the Basic Law. The Basic Law was en-
acted by the NPC on April 4, 1990 under Article 31 of the PRC
Constitution, which grants the NPC broad authority to institute
the systems within such regions "in light of the specific condi-
tions."" This document, which took effect on July 1, 1997, en-
joys a legal status that remains to be fully defined and integrated.
The Basic Law partially derives its legitimacy from, and is in-
tended to comply with, the Joint Declaration. It is also a main-
land statute. Finally, it serves as Hong Kong's "constitution," re-
placing the Letters Patent, which was the document issued by
the British Crown that established the framework for the colo-
nial government.
27
The Basic Law provides that Hong Kong will maintain its
own legal system, as it will also enjoy distinct political and eco-
nomic systems, for fifty years. Toward this end, it authorizes
Hong Kong "to exercise a high degree of autonomy and enjoy
executive, legislative, and independent judicial power, including
that of final adjudication." 21 More specifically, the Basic Law
safeguards the existing common law framework, declaring that
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. XIANFA [Constitution of the People's Republic of China] art. 31, (1982).
27. See GHAI, supra note 18, at 14-17; PETER WESLEY-SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN HONG KONG 42, 72-76 (1994).
28. Basic Law, supra note 10, at art. 2.
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"the laws previously in force in Hong Kong, that is, the common
law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and cus-
tomary law shall be maintained, except for any that contravened
this Law, and subject to amendment by the [Hong Kong] legisla-
ture.
2 9
The Basic Law also elaborates its guarantee of the judicial
independence that characterizes common law systems. After re-
peating the Basic Law's grant of independent judicial power to
Hong Kong, "including that of final adjudication," Article 19
grants the HKSAR courts 'Jurisdiction over all cases in the Re-
gion, except that the restrictions imposed by the legal system
and principles previously in force in Hong Kong shall be main-
tained."3"
Notwithstanding its commitment to preserving the common
law system, the Basic Law itself contains provisions that threaten
to erode judicial independence and the rule of law. Specifically,
the Basic Law's treatment of its own interpretation and amend-
ment includes deference to mainland legal concepts that
threaten to subordinate the courts to oversight by the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress.31
Article 158, which deals with interpretation, begins by de-
claring that "It]he power of interpretation of [the Basic Law]
shall be vested in the [NPCSC] ."32 The meaning of this state-
ment has generated considerable debate. Some analysts argue
that the statement merely notes the existence of a general power
that the NPCSC enjoys as a preface to the paragraphs that follow,
directing the NPCSC to divide this authority between itself and
29. Id. at art. 8
30. Id. at art. 19, para. 1 & 2. The Basic Law does, however, arguably deviate from
the Joint Declaration on various matters, including judicial authority. The same article
that guarantees an independent judiciary, for example, denies the Hong Kong courts
"jurisdiction over acts of state such as defense and foreign affairs." Id. at art. 19, para. 3.
Not only is this restriction not mentioned in the Joint Declaration, but it is also poten-
tially overbroad if interpreted under mainland, rather than common law, principles.
GHAI, supra note 18, at 318-20. This deviation from the Joint Declaration is but one of
many that resulted from the Basic Law drafting process. Many of these changes reflect
a hardening of Chinese attitudes in the wake of the crackdown at Tiananmen Square
and Hong Kong's strong public support for the suppressed pro-democracy movement.
GtAi, supra, at 63-64.
31. See GHAj, supra note 18, at 68, 149; PETER WESLEY-SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN HONG KONG 69 (1994).
32. Basic Law, supra note 10, at art. 158.
1999]
12 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
the Hong Kong courts. 3 Others contend that this provision
grants the NPCSC a general power to "clarify" the Basic Law
whenever it sees fit.
The rest of Article 158 discusses who interprets the Basic
Law in the context of actual cases. The next paragraph of the
provision directs the NPCSC to authorize the HKSAR courts "to
interpret, on their own, in adjudicating cases, the provisions of
this Law which are within the limits of the autonomy of the Re-
"134gion.
The next paragraph of Article 158 specifies matters that
must be referred to Beijing. It first provides that the Hong Kong
courts may also interpret other provisions of the Basic Law when
adjudicating cases. If, however, a court: (1) needs to interpret
Basic Law provisions that both concern "affairs which are the re-
sponsibility of the Central People's Government or concerning
the relationship between the Central Authorities and the Re-
gion;" and (2) if such interpretation will "affect the judgment of
the case; and (3) the judgment to be rendered will not be ap-
pealable (typically the Court of Final Appeal) the court must
seek an interpretation of the relevant provision" from the
NPCSC. Should the NPCSC interpret the provisions concerned,
the Hong Kong courts must follow that interpretation. Judg-
ments previously rendered, however, "shall not be affected."3 5
The ambiguity of the NPCSC's role in interpreting the Basic
Law under Article 158 has prompted significant concern from
the beginning. Ironically, government officials generally assured
the Association's 1995 mission that the NPCSC's power of inter-
pretation through referral,36 as well as its general power of inter-
pretation, were specified mainly as a symbolic gesture to Beijing
and would never actually be used.3 7 Fewer than five years later,
33. See Margaret Ng, Time for the Next Test To Begin, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July
16, 1999, at 1; interview with Denis Chang, Lead Counsel for Appellants in NgKa Ling,
in Hong Kong (June 8, 1999). In part this argument depends on the Chinese version of
the provision, which bears a meaning closer to "possesses" rather than "vests."
34. Basic Law, supra note 10, at art. 158, para. 2.
35. Id. at art. 158, para. 3. Paragraph 4 adds that the NPCSC "shall consult its
Committee for the Basic Law"-a group of 12 individuals, six from the mainland and
six from Hong Kong, most of whom are not legal experts-"before giving its interpreta-
tion of this Law." Id. at para. 4.
36. See supra note 5 for discussion of interpretation versus reinterpretation/contro-
versy.
37. Honorable Leonard B. Sand, notes from the 1995 Hong Kong Delegation of
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Article 158 is at the center of the right of abode controversy.
Disagreement arises over the circumstances that might jus-
tify the Hong Kong government's request for a reinterpretation.
Opponents argue that the difficulty of the Article 159 amend-
ment process demonstrates that the Basic Law is entrenched
against reinterpretations, or even NPC statutes,3" that alter the
Basic Law. 9 Supporters respond that reinterpretation is a legiti-
mate alternative to amendment, at least in unusual circum-
stances.4 ° For its part, mainland legal culture apparently views
legislative interpretation as a potentially broad elaboration of
constitutional documents while viewing amendment almost as
an embarrassing admission that the original constitutional docu-
ment was seriously flawed.41
C. The Right of Abode Decisions
The right of abode controversy in Hong Kong began with a
challenge to the constitutionality of certain restrictive immigra-
tion legislation passed by the Provisional LegCo.4 2 In two cases,
Ng Ka Ling (an infant) & Ors v. Director of Immigration,43 and Chan
Kam Nga (an infant) & Ors v. Director of Immigration,44 the appel-
lants challenged two ordinances that controlled the right of
mainland children of Hong Kong permanent residents to immi-
grate to the HKSAR as unconstitutionally restricting the rights
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the author). Reference was made to the infrequency with which the Standing
Committee's interpretative role had been invoked with regard to mainland issues. Id.
38. This argument came mainly in response to the HKSAR v. Ma Wai Kwan David
& Ors, [1997] 2 HKC 315 (Court of Appeal). In Ma, the Hong Kong Court of Appeal
in dicta stated that the National People's Congress ("NPC") could change the Basic Law
through a normal statute rather than exclusively through amendment.
39. Id.
40. See CHIEF EXECUTIVE'S SUBMISSION To LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL HOUSE COMMITr-
TEE, RIGHT OF ABODE: THE SOLUTION (May 18, 1999) [hereinafter RIGHT OF ABODE:
THE SOLUTION].
41. See ALBERT H.Y. CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEO-
PLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 95-102 (1998); interview with Denis Chen, lead counsel for
petitioners in Ng Ka Ling (an infant) & Ors v. Dir. of Immigration, [1997] 1 HKC 291 in
Hong Kong (June 8, 1999); interview with Margaret Ng, Legislative Counselor, in Hong
Kong. (June 7, 1999).
42. See Ma, [1997] 2 HKC at 337-44 (discussing formation and legality of Provi-
sional Legislative Council (or "LegCo")).
43. See Ng Ka Ling, [1997] 1 HKC 291.
44. See Chan Kam Nga & Anore v. Director of Immigration, [1999] 1 HKC 347.
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guaranteed by Article 24 of the Basic Law.45
1. Background
Immediately after China's resumed sovereignty over Hong
Kong, the Provisional LegCo enacted two immigration ordi-
nances that defined the categories of eligibility for the right of
abode and outlined an administrative scheme of permits for al-
lowing mainland Chinese citizens with the right of abode to emi-
grate to Hong Kong. The Immigration Amendment No. 2 Ordi-
nance ("No. 2 Ordinance"), enactedJuly 1, 1997, set out the cat-
egories of individuals entitled to the right of abode, adding two
requirements not stated in Article 24 of the Basic Law.46 First,
the No. 2 Ordinance provided that a child of a parent with the
right of abode in Hong Kong was entitled to the right of abode
only if her parent already had the right when the child was
born.47 Second, the No. 2 Ordinance added a requirement that
those claiming the right of abode on the basis of their fathers'
right of abode must not have been born out of wedlock.48
The Immigration Amendment No. 3 Ordinance ("No. 3 Or-
dinance"), enacted by the Provisional LegCo on July 10, 1997,
established an administrative "Certificate of Entitlement
Scheme" under which mainland Chinese with the right of abode
would be allowed to immigrate to Hong Kong.49 The immigra-
tion scheme required mainland residents claiming a right of
abode through their parents to obtain a one-way exit permit
from the mainland authorities before being allowed to emigrate,
as well as a "Certificate of Entitlement" from the HKSAR Direc-
45. Article 24 outlines six categories of individuals entitled to the right of abode in
the Hong Kong Special Administration Region or to have the status of permanent resi-
dent. These categories include: (1) Chinese citizens born in Hong Kong, (2) Chinese
citizens who have resided in Hong Kong continuously for seven years, (3) Chinese Na-
tionals "born outside Hong Kong of those residents" in the first two categories, (4)
Non-Chinese who have legally resided in Hong Kong continuously for seven years, (5)
children under 21 years old born of a person in category (4), and (6) people who had
the right of abode in Hong Kong only before the handover. See Basic Law, supra note
10, at art. 24.
46. See Hong Kong Immigration (Amendment No. 2) Ordinance (1997); Ng Ka
Ling, 1 HKC at 294.
47. See Hong Kong Immigration (Amendment No. 2) Ordinance, schedule 1,
para. 2 (1997). Children falling outside this category have been referred to as
"afterborn."
48. See id. schedule 1, para. 1(2).
49. See Hong Kong Imnigration (Amendment No. 3) Ordinance (1997).
[Vol. 23:1
ONE COUNTRY, TWO LEGAL SYSTEMS?
tor of Immigration.50 The Mainland Bureau of the Exit-Entry
Administration limited the issuance of such permits to 150 per
day.51
In Ng Ka Ling, the HKSAR courts considered three consoli-
dated challenges to these ordinances on behalf of four individu-
als claiming the right of abode as the natural children of Hong
Kong permanent residents. 52 Although all four had immigrated
illegally in contravention of the No. 3 Ordinance, one had been
born outside of marriage, and therefore denied the right of
abode entirely under the No. 2 Ordinance. 53 Their combined
cases were heard as a test case on behalf of more than a thou-
sand named immigrants claiming the right of abode. The peti-
tioners challenged both immigration ordinances as unconstitu-
tionally restricting their right of abode as guaranteed by Article
24 of the Basic Law.54
In Chan Kam Nga, eighty-one children born of parents who
obtained the right of abode only after their birth challenged the
No. 2 Ordinance's requirement that a parent hold the right at
the time of the child's birth. As in Ng Ka Ling, the children ar-
gued that the requirement unconstitutionally denied them the
right of abode granted by Article 24. Thus, while Ng Ka Ling
involved a challenge to the No. 3 Ordinance's permit scheme
and the No. 2 Ordinance's legitimacy requirement, Chan Kam
Nga involved a challenge to the No. 2 Ordinance's limitation of
the right of abode to afterborn children.
2. The Court of Final Appeal's Decisions
The right of abode cases presented the Court of Final Ap-
peals with its first occasion to exercise its power ofjudicial review
under the Basic Law.56 The CFA seized this opportunity in Ng
Ka Ling by asserting the power to review not only acts of the
50. See id. schedule 1, para 2(c); NgKa Ling, 1 HKC at 314-16.
51. See Ng Ka Ling, 1 HKC at 317.
52. See id. at 319.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 294-95.
55. See Chan Kam Nga & Anore v. Director of Immigration, [1999] 1 HKC 347, at
352.
56. The Hong Kong Court of Appeal had previously considered the power ofjudi-
cial review in HKSAR v. Ma Wai Kwan David & ORS, [1997] 2 HKC 315. Ma dealt with
the legality of the establishment of the mainland appointed Provisional LegCo as Hong
Kong's first post-handover legislative body. See id. at 333.
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HKSAR, but also acts of China's NPC.5 7 The Hong Kong Court
of Final Appeal supported these assertions through reference to
China's basic policy, as enunciated in the Joint Declaration, that
the HKSAR courts should have the jurisdiction to enforce and
interpret the Basic Law, "which necessarily entails [ ] jurisdiction
... over acts of the National People's Congress and its Standing
Committee to ensure consistency with the Basic Law."58 This
strong language planted the seed of the first political crisis to
grow out of the decision.59
a. Article 158: The Reference Issue
At the time the first right of abode decision was issued in Ng
Ka Ling, it appeared that the most controversial question that
the CFA faced was the scope of Article 158 of the Basic Law,
requiring the HKSAR courts to refer questions of interpretation
of the Basic Law to the NPCSC.6 ° Specifically, the CFA had to
decide first who should determine whether an issue fell within
the scope of the referral provisions and second whether Articles
22 and 24 should be referred in this case. The CFA resolved this
issue in a manner that was consistent with the language of Arti-
cle 158, and at the same time minimized the threat to judicial
independence.
The CFA approached this issue employing a "purposive"
analysis that emphasized the second paragraph of Article 158,
which provides that the NPCSC "'shall authorize' the courts of
the Region 'to interpret on their own, in adjudicating cases, the
provisions of this Law which are within the limits of autonomy of
the Region." 6' The Court read the phrase "on their own" to
"emphasize the high degree of autonomy of the Region and the
independence of its courts. '6 2 The opinion did, however, ac-
57. See Ng Ka Ling, 1 HKC at 322-23. This assertion represented a radical depar-
ture from the Hong Kong Court of Appeals decision in the Ma case. There, the Court
of Appeals in dicta suggested that the HKSAR courts had no reviewjurisdiction over the
"sovereign" NPC by analogy to the unreviewability of acts of the British Parliament prior
to the handover. See SAR v. Ma Wai Kwan David & ORS, [1997] 2 HKC 315, 333-34.
58. See Ng Ka Ling, 1 HKC at 322-23.
59. See infra notes (accompanying text section I.C.3) 88-102 and accompanying
text.
60. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text (discussing Basic Law, Article
158).
61. Ng Ka Ling, 1 HKC at 327 (quoting Basic Law Article 158).
62. Id.
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knowledge the limitation on its jurisdiction stated in the third
paragraph of Article 158, which requires mandatory referral to
the NPCSC of interpretations "concerning affairs which are the
responsibility of the Central People's Government, or concern-
ing the relationship between the Central Authorities and the Re-
gion .. .if such interpretation will affect the judgments on the
cases."
63
Although Article 158 does not state who determines which
provisions must be referred to the NPC and which may be inter-
preted solely by the courts of the HKSAR, the CFA reasoned that
it held this power exclusively:
In our view it is for the Court of Final Appeal and for it alone
to decide [what interpretations must be referred] .... It is
significant that what has to be referred to the Standing Com-
mittee is not the question of interpretation involved gener-
ally, but the interpretation of the specific excluded provi-
sions.6 4
Having established its jurisdiction over referral, the CFA con-
cluded that interpretation of Article 24, guaranteeing the right
of abode, was a matter for its determination rather than the
NPCSC.
65
The interaction between Articles 22 and 24 raised a more
difficult question. Though counsel for the Director of Immigra-
tion conceded that Article 24 was a provision "within the limits
of autonomy of the Region,"66 and thus did not mandate refer-
ral, he argued that a proper interpretation of Article 24 requires
interpretation of Article 22, which did mandate referral. 67 Arti-
cle 22 provides that immigrants to Hong Kong "from other parts
of China" must apply for approval and that an immigration limit
will be determined by the Central People's Government
("CPG").68 On this basis, the Director argued that because Arti-
63. Id. (quoting Basic Law Article 158, paragraph 3).
64. See id. at 328-29.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 331.
67. See id. at 329.
68. Article 22 of the Basic Law states:
For entry into the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, people from
other parts of China must apply for approval. Among them, the number of
persons who enter the Region for the purpose of settlement shall be deter-
mined by the competent authorities of the Central People's Government after
consulting the government of the Region.
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cle 22 specifically deals with the relationship between the Cen-
tral Authorities and the HKSAR, and because interpretation of
Article 22 is required to interpret properly Article 24, the CFA
should have referred the whole case in the beginning.69
The CFA rejected this argument and instead held that if the
"predominant provision" at issue in the case is within the juris-
diction of the HKSAR, then it is unnecessary to refer any subsidi-
ary provisions to the NPCSC, even if they are arguably within the
mandatory referral categories of Article 158.7o The Court again
justified its conclusion on "purposive" grounds, reasoning that
this "predominant provision" test properly effectuates Article
158's division of interpretive authority between the HKSAR
courts and the CPG.71
The CFA's choice of interpretive method cannot be overem-
phasized. Reliance on a "purposive" constitutional interpreta-
tion as one that carefully considers context and "underlying poli-
cies" of China toward Hong Kong did more than legitimize the
CFA's focus on the HKSAR's political autonomy and the primacy
of individual rights. The purposive approach, in the Court's
view, further represented a commitment to traditional common
law principles of adjudication as previously practiced in Hong
Kong. This commitment led the CFA to declare that "the courts
must avoid a literal, technical, narrow or rigid approach. ' 72 It
would later become clear that the CFA's reliance on common
law methods conflicted with the approach employed by the
NPCSC, which emphasizes the true "original intent" of a given
provision.73
b. Articles 22 and 24 of the Basic Law
The CFA next considered the right of abode restrictions
themselves. Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga, when examined to-
gether, presented three basic challenges: (1) whether the re-
Basic Law, supra note 10, at art. 22, para. 4. It could be argued that a literal reading of
Article 22 directly conflicts with the right of abode guarantee in Article 24.
69. See Ng Ka Ling, 1 HKC at 329.
70. See id. at 330.
71. See id. at 331.
72. See Ng Ka Ling, 1 HKC at 326.
73. See GaHi, supra note 18, at 225-26; MICHAEL C. DAVIS, WRITrEN TESTIMONY FOR
THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL ON THE QUESTION OF MECHANISMS FOR SEEKING NPCSC STAND-
ING COMMITTEE INTERPRETATION (June 12, 1999).
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quirement of a mainland certificate of entitlement could
abridge the right under Article 24; (2) whether the right could
be limited to legitimate children only; and (3) whether children,
born before the right of abode had vested in at least one parent,
could likewise claim that right. The CFA invalidated all three
restrictions.
With regard to the first issue, the Director of Immigration
had argued that because Article 22 of the Basic Law"4 qualifies
the exercise of the right of abode for mainland Chinese resi-
dents, the certificate of entitlement scheme was constitutional
under the Basic Law."5 The Court in Ng Ka Ling unequivocally
rejected this argument, holding that the right of abode was a
"core right," without which all of the other rights guaranteed in
Chapter III of the Basic Law would be useless.76 Accordingly, the
CFA ruled that Article 22 does not apply to those who are perma-
nent residents under the categories in Article 24."
The CFA did, however, hold that the Director of Immigra-
tion must be able to verify an individual's claim to permanent
resident status.7" The court therefore ruled that the No. 3 Ordi-
nance's requirement that a potential immigrant obtain a certifi-
cate of entitlement from the HKSAR government was constitu-
tional, so long as the Director of Immigration operated the
scheme in a "fair and reasonable manner" without "unlawful de-
lay."79
The Court in Ng Ka Ling next addressed the illegitimacy is-
sue.8 ' The CFA held that the No. 2 Ordinance's restriction of
the right of abode to children born within marriage violated the
Basic Law for two primary reasons. First, the Court reasoned
that the No. 2 Ordinance's discrimination between legitimate
and illegitimate children was antithetical to the "principle of
equality" enshrined in both the Basic Law and the ICCPR. l Sec-
ond, the CFA found that the "plain meaning" of Article 24's lan-
guage was to grant the right without restriction: "[a] child born
74. See Basic Law, supra note 10, at art. 22.
75. See Ng Ka Ling, 1 HKC at 331.
76. See id. at 332.
77. See id. at 332-33.
78. See id. at 334.
79. See id. at 334-35
80. See id. at 339.
81. See id.
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out of wedlock is no more or less a person born of [a perma-
nent] resident than a child born in wedlock. '8 2
Issued the same day as the decision in Ng Ka Ling, Chan Kam
Nga addressed the remaining restriction on the right of abode
imposed by the No. 2 Ordinance: that only children born after
their parents acquired permanent residency status could claim
the right of abode under Article 24(3) .83 Following the pattern
of Ng Ka Ling the CFA also found this restriction on the right of
abode unconstitutional.8 4 Echoing its analysis of the legitimacy
requirement, the CFA held that the "natural meaning" of the
wording of Article 24(3) included all children born of perma-
nent residents regardless of when the parents acquired such sta-
tus. 5 The CFA also justified its holding under a purposive inter-
pretation of Article 24, reasoning that an unrestricted right of
abode "serves the purpose of enabling that child to be with that
parent [in Hong Kong], thereby securing the unity of the fam-
ily."86
Together the holdings of Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga
overturned all of the major restrictions that the No. 2 and No. 3
Ordinances had placed on the enjoyment and exercise of the
right of abode by mainland children born of Hong Kong perma-
nent residents.
3. The Clarification Controversy
The CFA's unequivocal assertion of the power ofjudicial re-
view and its narrow interpretation of the mandatory referral pro-
visions of Article 158 assuaged some commentators' fears that
the autonomy granted by the Basic Law was little more than an
empty promise.8 7 The CPG and others close to Beijing, however,
perceived the decision as a threat to its sovereignty, and an usur-
82. See id. at 340.
83. See Chan Kam Nga v. Director of Immigration, [1999] 1 HKC at 352.
84. See id. at 348, 354-55.
85. Id. at 354.
86. Id. The CFA also noted that the ICCPR defines the family as "the natural and
fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the
State." Id. at 355 (quoting ICCPR art. 23(1)).
87. See, e.g., Editorial, Landmark Ruling, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 30, 1999
(referring to right of abode decision as "restor[ing] the public's flagging confidence,
following months of anxiety that Hong Kong's most cherished institutions were being
slowly eroded"); Yash Ghai, Abode Verdict a Resounding Victory for the Rule of Law, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Feb. 3, 1999.
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pation of the NPCSC's ultimate interpretive authority over the
Basic Law. The possibility that the HKSAR administration's fear
of increased immigration might lead it to disregard the ruling
further tempered celebration of the ruling.8" This possibility be-
came more likely when Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa ex-
pressly supported the deportation of overstayers claiming the
right of abode until a new immigration scheme could be negoti-
ated with the mainland. 80
The most critical responses to the CFA decision initially
came from Beijing. Dr. Raymond Wu Wai-yung, a professor and
leading advisor to the CPG, argued that the CFA's decision was
wrong, that the issue should have been referred to the NPCSC
for interpretation, and that the Basic law should be interpreted
according to the mainland legal system, not according to com-
mon law principles. ° In the first official comment of the main-
land government on the abode ruling, Zhao Qizheng, a senior
official of the State Council, claimed that the decision was
against the Basic Law and should be changed.9 ' Importantly,
this criticism of the right of abode ruling had less to do with the
substance of the CFA's ruling than with its statement in dicta in
Ng Ka Ling that the Basic Law gave it authority to review acts of
the NPC. In statements widely perceived to reflect Beijing's offi-
cial position, four prominent mainland legal scholars emphati-
cally denied that the Hong Kong courts had any authority to in-
validate mainland legislation that applied to Hong Kong. 2
In response, Tung dispatched the HKSAR's Secretary for
Justice, Mrs. Elsie Leung, to Beijing to discuss the right of abode
decision with mainland government authorities on February 12,
88. See Margaret Ng, Right of Abode Justice Speaks with a Clear Voice, S. CHINA MORN-
ING POST, Feb. 5, 1999. LegCo member Margaret Ng warned that "[a]ny suggestion of
maintaining policies calculated to frustrate the judgment of the court will be a serious
challenge to the rule of law in the SAR and will shock the world." Id.
89. See Arrests Pave Way for Test Case on Right of Abode, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb.
8, 1999.
90. See No Kwai-Yan, Beijing Adviser Rejects Calls for His Resignation, S. CHINA MORN-
ING POST, Feb. 5, 1999, at 5.
91. See Ruling Against Basic Law, Senior Official Says, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 8,
1999. Zhao Qizheng later publicly clarified this statement, saying that these were his
personal views only and not necessarily those of the Central Authorities. See also Tung
Sends Justice Chief to Beijing To Smooth Out Row, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 10, 1999.
92. See Mark O'Neill, Bejing Says Abode Ruling Was Wrong and Should Be Changed, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 9, 1999, at 1; Chris Yeung, Pressure on Abode Court for Rethink,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 30, 1999, at 1.
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1999.13 On February 24, she filed an "application for clarifica-
tion" of the right of abode judgment with the CFA. The Secre-
tary also directly telephoned the Chief Justice of the CFA, An-
drew Li Kwak-nang, to request an early hearing date for the clari-
fication process.94 Additionally, the Hong Kong Deputies to the
NPC proposed submissions for the NPC's next plenum meeting
asking the NPCSC to interpret Articles 22, 24, and 158 of the
Basic Law in order to "rectify" perceived "errors" in the right of
abode judgments.9 5
The CFA responded with a terse opinion "clarifying" its de-
cision in the right of abode cases on February 26, 1999, less than
one month after the original judgment. The Court acknowl-
edged that it was following "an exceptional course" by reconsid-
ering its prior judgment.9 6 It then briefly noted that its judicial
power is "derived from and is subject to" the Basic Law, and for
the first time acknowledged that the first paragraph of Article
158 vests the power of interpretation of the Basic Law in the
NPCSC.9 7 The most important aspect of the clarification ad-
dressed the CFA's authority relative to the NPCSC:
[T]he Court'sjudgment... did not question the authority of
the Standing Committee to make an interpretation under
art[icle] 158 which would have to be followed by the courts of
the Region. The Court accepts that it cannot question that
authority. Nor did the Court's judgment question ... the
authority of the National People's Congress or the Standing
Committee to do any act which is in accordance with the pro-
visions of the Basic Law.
98
Nowhere in the clarification did the CFA actually recant or mod-
ify any of its conclusions from its original opinion. The clarifica-
tion simply tracked Article 158's initial grant of interpretive au-
thority to the NPCSC. The one area where the CFA may have
made a concession beyond the Basic Law's language was its state-
ment that the courts of the HKSAR would have to follow an
93. See Justice Chief Leaves for Hong Kong Talks on Friday, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Feb. 11, 1999.
94. See Angela Li, 'Over-Anxious': Elsie Leung, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 6,
1999.
95. See Ng Ka Ling (an infant) v. Director of Immigration, [1999] 1 HKC 425-26
(factual background in case reporter explaining the CFA's clarification).
96. See id. at 427.
97. See id.
98. See id.
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NPCSC interpretation in adjudicating cases, which is nowhere
provided for expressly.'9
The clarification apparently had the desired political effect
on Beijing: the NPC chose neither to address the right of abode
ruling at its annual plenum session eleven days after the CFA
issued its "clarification,""' nor refer the matter to the NPCSC.
Beijing had received adequate assurance of the CPG's sover-
eignty and authority under the Basic Law and seemed content to
let Hong Kong deal with a potentially large influx of mainland
immigrants on its own.101 The possibility that the NPC would
authorize the NPCSC to override the CFA's decision by reinter-
preting the Basic Law was defused and a constitutional crisis was
narrowly averted. Chinese President Jiang Zemin signaled the
ostensible end of the controversy when he poetically declared
that "the ripples in the pond have become calm. 10
2
D. Challenge from Within: The Request for NPCSC Reinterpretation
Hong Kong's constitutional crisis instead came from within.
Claiming that the CFA decision would produce dire social conse-
quences, the HKSAR administration approached the mainland
seeking an NPCSC reinterpretation of the Basic Law provisions
on which the court had relied. Questions first arose regarding
both the legality and the wisdom of the administration's request.
As to the latter, the administration clearly failed to adequately
explore alternatives to reinterpretation, including amendment
of the Basic Law, which would have far better accorded the goal
of preserving the rule of law as Hong Kong had known it. By
refusing to implement the CFAjudgment, pursuing a request for
reinterpretation despite the questionable legality of that course,
and ignoring more democratic and legally sound alternatives,
the HKSAR administration damaged the Court's status and inde-
pendence and undermined the rule of law in Hong Kong.
99. See interview with Denis Chang, Lead Counsel for the Petitioners in Ng Ka
Ling, in Hong Kong (June 8, 1999).
100. See Mark O'Neill, Abode Ruling 'Not on NPC Agenda', S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Mar. 5, 1999, at 8.
101. See No Kwai-yan, Beijing No Longer 'Gatekeeper' On Abode, Warns Lu Ping, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 5, 1999.
102. See interview with Denis Chang, Lead Counsel for the Petitioners in Ng Ka
Ling, in Hong Kong (June 8, 1999).
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1. The HKSAR's Failure To Implement the CFAJudgment
The administration expressed its concern about implement-
ing the CFA decision even before the clarification was issued.
Soon after the CFA's original ruling, the HKSAR government ar-
rested numerous mainlanders who had overstayed their two-way
travel permits and were claiming the right of abode under the
Court's judgment.' °3 The government did agree, however, to ex-
pedite the immigration process for 13,000 mainlanders who had
already been issued one-way permits but were delayed by the 150
person-per-day immigration quota.10 4
The HKSAR government, together with mainland authori-
ties, also conducted a survey of mainlanders to determine the
likely number of immigrants generated by the CFA's decision.
The preliminary results, which were issued on April 28, 1999,
were ominous and controversial. According to the government's
figures, enforcement of the CFA decision would result in 1.67
million additional mainlanders acquiring the right of abode over
the next seven years. 10 5 The study indicated that 200,000 of the
potential immigrants were illegitimate children and that the re-
maining 1.4 million were "afterborn" or children of Hong Kong
residents who would acquire the permanent right of adobe after
seven years. 10 6 The analysis, which assumed that all mainlanders
who were eligible for permanent residence would claim this
right, further indicated that 690,000 would be immediately eligi-
ble and the remaining 980,000 would come in within the next
seven years. Some critics reacted to the government's analysis,
claiming that these figures were grossly inflated and that the ac-
tual numbers were as low as half the administration estimate. 10 7
103. See Arrests Pave Way, supra note 89.
104. See Billy Wong Wai-yuk & Audrey Parwani, Joint Surveys To Tally 'Huge' Influx
Total, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 2, 1999.
105. See HONG KONG HUMAN RIGHTS MONITOR, PRESENTATION TO THE LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL ON THE RIGHT OF ABODE (May 10, 1999); THE STATE COUNCIL: THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, REPORT ON ASSISTANCE FROM THE PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT IN SOLVING
PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 3 (May 20, 1999).
106. See Chris Yeung, Pressure on Abode Court for Rethink, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Apr. 30, 1999, at 1; HONG KONG HUMAN RIGHTS MONITOR, supra note 105.
107. See interview with Dr. Stephen Ng, Director, Hong Kong Human Rights Moni-
tor, in Hong Kong (May 31, 1999) (noting that survey methodology has been widely
criticized and that there is little evidence that all right of abode holders would actually
want to permanently immigrate to Hong Kong); remarks of Gladys Li, Barrister, at
Crowley Mission Wrap-Up Session No.1, in Hong Kong (June 10, 1999).
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Repeated and alarming government statements stressed
that "social resources could hardly meet the immediate needs of
this large group of immigrants for education, housing, medical
and health, social welfare, etc., thereby triggering severe social
problems."' ' Not surprisingly, the government's survey results
and dramatic pronouncements of economic doom generated
widespread public concern that Hong Kong would be over-
whelmed by new immigrants and a demand that a solution be
found.' 0 9
The administration soon made its belief clear that only an
effective reversal or nullification of the CFA's judgment could
avert the imminent socio-economic catastrophe that the govern-
ment's study promised. The administration accordingly consid-
ered three possible options for undoing the CFA's interpretation
of Articles 22 and 24 of the Basic Law: 1) asking the CFA to
reconsider its interpretation in the upcoming overstayer test
cases; 2) amending the Basic Law; and 3) asking the NPCSC to
give their own interpretation of Articles 22 and 24 of the Basic
Law." o After brief deliberation the administration determined
that the third choice, requesting an interpretation from the
NPCSC, was the only feasible alternative. This decision ignored
substantial concern from the Hong Kong legal community about
the price of such a step to Hong Kong's autonomy and the avail-
ability of alternative solutions.111 The administration was none-
theless able to obtain a resolution supporting its plan from
LegCo, after "nineteen members, led by Democratic Party chair-
man Martin Lee and dressed in black" walked out prior to the
vote.' 2 In the meantime, many of the Hong Kong Deputies to
the NPC, who are themselves not directly elected, made public
108. See RIGHT OF ABODE: THE SOLUTION, supra note 40 (stating that government's
opinion polls show that "public is very concerned about these unbearable conse-
quences").
109. Id. Many in Hong Kong opined that government statements were essentially
.scare tactics" to draw criticism away from the proposed NPCSC interpretation solution.
SeeJason Felton, President, American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong, Remarks
at the Crowley Mission Breakfast with the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong
Kong (June 4, 1999); Interview with Dr. Stephen Ng, Director, Hong Kong Human
Rights Monitor, in Hong Kong (May 31, 1999).
110. See RIGHT OF ABODE: THE SOLUTION, supra note 40.
111. See Hong Kong Bar Association, Press Release, Open Letter to the Chief Executive
on the Right of Abode Case (May 5, 1999); HONG KONG HUMAN RIGHTS MONITOR, supra
note 105.
112. See Chris Yeung, LegCo Walkout on Abode Vote, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 20,
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their view favoring reinterpretation over amendment. 113
On May 20, 1999, the Chief Executive formally submitted a
report to the State Council in Beijing. Among other things, the
report observed that the CFA's interpretation differed from the
administration's understanding of the wording, purpose, and
legislative intent of these provisions, that the control of main-
land resident immigration into Hong Kong has a bearing on the
relationship between the Central Authorities and the HKSAR,
that the HKSAR is no longer capable of resolving the problem
on its own, and that the CFA was compelled to approach Beijing
in the face of exceptional circumstances. 1 4 The Chief Executive
therefore concluded his report by suggesting that the State
Council should ask the NPCSC to interpret, under the relevant
provisions of the Constitution and the Basic Law, Article 22(4)
and 24(2) (3) of the Basic Law according to the true legislative
intent. 115
2. Legality of the Reinterpretation Request
The request for reinterpretation generated a controversy
that dominated Hong Kong political life for weeks. As a thresh-
old matter, prominent members of the Hong Kong bar and
academy argued that the Chief Executive's action was flatly in-
consistent with the Basic Law. The administration, with some
support from the legal community, contended that the Basic
Law all but mandated the request.
Led by the Hong Kong Bar Association, administration crit-
ics first contended that the request was ultra vires. As the critics
pointed out, the Basic Law nowhere authorizes the Chief Execu-
tive to seek an interpretation. To the contrary, it expressly
grants to the CFA alone, the power to refer interpretive matters
1999, at 1; Interview with Rita Fan, President, HKSAR Legislative Council, in Hong
Kong (June 7, 1999).
113. See Chris Yeung, Balance Between Legality and Reality, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
May 1, 1999, at 13 (noting that key local NPC deputies have insisted that sacred consti-
tution should not be altered simply because of "wrong ruling" by CFA); Interview with
Margaret Ng, Legislative Councilor, in Hong Kong (June 7, 1999).
114. C.H. TUNG, CHIEF EXECUTIVE, HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION,
REPORT ON SEEKING ASSISTANCE FROM THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT IN SOLVING
THE PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BASIC LAW OF THE HONG
KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 4 (May 20,
1999).
115. Id.
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to the NPCSC and then only in the context of adjudicating
cases. 116 The structure of the Basic Law, moreover, contem-
plates that NPCSC interpretations will be issued before the CFA
interprets a provision, thus according respect both to the inter-
pretive authority of the NPCSC and the finality of CFA adjudica-
tion. Article 159 complements this structural argument by pro-
viding a mechanism to change CFA interpretations through
amendment to the Basic Law, which, like many common law sys-
tems, reconciles the need for judicial finality and the need to
modify fundamental legal provisions in extraordinary circum-
stances.
1 1 7
As opponents further note, a government request for rein-
terpretation is in tension with the Basic Law's central commit-
ments to Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy, common law
system, judicial independence, and adjudicative finality.118 Ask-
ing a higher mainland authority to correct the judgment consid-
ered by Hong Kong's highest court, has substantially the same
effect as appellate review by the mainland over the CFA. The
HKSAR authorities counter that, in accord with Article 158, the
reinterpretation cannot alter the judgment as it affects the 4000
named appellants. This technical argument ignores the reality
that overturning the CFA's interpretation eviscerates any prece-
dential authority that the decision would ordinarily have in a
common law system.119 This consequence in turn undermines
values of predictability, reliance, and fairness that the doctrine
of stare decisis promotes. This point is particularly important in
connection with a court, such as the CFA, with jurisdiction over
constitutional cases. 120
116. Basic Law, supra note 10, art. 158, para. 2.
117. See Michael C. Davis, Written Testimony for the Legislative Council on the
Question of Mechanisms for Seeking NPC Standing Committee Interpretation (June
12, 1999); HONG KONG HUMAN RIGHTS MONITOR, supra note 105; interview with Mar-
garet Ng, Legislative Councilor, in Hong Kong (June 7, 1999).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 25-34.
119. See Margaret Ng, Time for the Next Test To Begin, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, July
16, 1999; Hong Kong Bar Association, Press Release, Open Letter to the Chief Executive on
the Right of Abode Case (May 5, 1999). The absence of a class action device worsens this
problem by making it difficult if not impossible for individuals with similar claims to
preserve their rights by joining a suit in which the CFA would issue an initial judgment.
120. Critics add that this particular request further undermined Hong Kong's au-
tonomy in seeking a reinterpretation of both Articles 22 and 24, when before the Court,
the government had conceded that Article 24 was not a referable matter dealing with
the relationship between the HKSAR and the mainland. See, e.g., interview with Denis
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28 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
The Hong Kong administration justified the request by as-
serting the NPCSC's general power of interpretation together
with the Chief Executive's general powers and duties arise under
the Basic Law. Based on this view, Article 158's broad grant of
interpretive power "may be exercised by [the NPCSC] in the ab-
sence of any reference to it by the CFA ... [and] ... may also be
exercised in respect of any provision of the Basic Law.' 12' This
part of the argument turns on the mainland legal distinction be-
tween interpretation and adjudication. Assuming this dichot-
omy exists, legislative interpretation by the NPCSC neither
usurps the rightful powers of the Hong Kongjudiciary, nor does
it interfere with Hong Kong judges' freedom to decide future
cases in accordance with the NPCSC's interpretation. 22 Critics
have pointed out that this argument assumes that Article 158 af-
firmatively grants a general power of interpretation rather than
merely alluding to such a power as a prelude to dividing inter-
pretive authority between the NPCSC and the CFA.123 They fur-
ther contend that relying on a distinction between interpreta-
tion and adjudication subjects the Basic Law to mainland legal
conceptions rather than to the common law principles it was
designed to protect.'12
Assuming the NPCSC's interpretive authority, the adminis-
tration locates its own power to approach that body in Basic Law
Articles 43 and 48. Article 43 makes the Chief Executive the
head of the HKSAR and provides that he or she shall be account-
able to the CPG as well as to Hong Kong.' 25 Article 48 enumer-
ates the Chief Executive's powers, including the responsibility
Chang, lead counsel for practitioners in NgKa Ling, in Hong Kong (June 8, 1999); see
also Ng Ka Ling (an infant) v. Director of Immigration, [1999] H.KC. 291, 329-31 (dis-
cussing whether Article 158 of Basic Law mandates referring to Article 22 or 24 for
interpretation).
121. Elsie Leung, Secretary for Justice of the HKSAR, Statement to the House
Committee of LegCo (May 18, 1999).
122. See id.; see also RIGHT OF ABODE: THE SOLUTION, supra note 40 (arguing that
NPCSC interpretation of Articles 22 and 24 does not undermine judicial indepen-
dence).
123. See Ng, supra note 119; interview with Denis Chang, lead counsel for petition-
ers in Ng Ka Ling, in Hong Kong (June 8, 1999).
124. See Hong Kong Bar Association, Press Release, A Constitutionally Acceptable So-
lution (May 14, 1999); see also GHAI, supra note 18, at 198-207 (discussing scope of
NPCSC interpretation under Article 158 and increasingly blurred distinction between
adjudication and legislation in mainland Chinese law).
125. Basic Law, supra note 10, art. 43.
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for the implementation of this law.'2 6 According to the adminis-
tration, these general powers encompass the specific authority to
request a reinterpretation. The Law Society 27 and at least one
prominent academic are among those who support this view. 12 1
For practical purposes, the NPCSC's decision to issue a rein-
terpretation 129 renders arguments over the legality of the Chief
Executive's request moot. In theory, the referral could be chal-
lenged in the context of a subsequent right of abode case. How-
ever, the issue of the Chief Executive's power to refer to the
NPCSC would itself require referral. The NPCSC, in turn, ap-
parently views the course as legal, having already granted such a
request.
The resulting situation does not mean that the request was
legitimate. The authorities' general arguments effectively un-
dermine the Basic Law's specific allocations of authority as well
as its general goal of preserving Hong Kong's legal system. At
the very least, the request raises questions about the depth of the
administration's own commitment to this same goal.
3. The Amendment Alternative
The prudence of the reinterpretation request generated
even greater controversy than the question of its formal legality.
Even assuming that the social impact of the right of abode deci-
sion had to be contained,3 0 leaders of the Hong Kong legal
community pointed to alternative solutions that were not only
undoubtedly legal, but also better comported with Hong Kong's
rule of law, autonomy, and evolving democracy. The HKSAR ad-
126. Id. art. 48(2).
127. In contrast to the Hong Kong Bar Association, the Law Society declared its
views in a terse one paragraph statement without supporting legal analysis. Law Society
Press Release, Right of Abode: The Solution, May 17, 1999.
128. Peter Wesley-Smith, The Options (May 3, 1999) (Draft paper for the seminar
organized by the Central Policy Unit).
129. See The Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress of Articles 22(4) and 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, June 26, 1999 [hereinafter
NPCSC Reinterpretation of Articles 22 and 24]; Margaret Ng, Interpreting the Reinterpreta-
tion, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 16, 1999, at 3-4.
130. Though widespread, this assumption was by no means universal. During the
delegation's stay, the Catholic Cardinal of Hong Kong made front page news declaring
that the HKSAR could and should accommodate all right of abode claimants even ac-
cepting the 1.6 million figure. See Jo Pegg, Cardinal Slams Tung Abode Moves, S. CHINA
MORNING PosT, June 6, 1999, at 1.
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ministration itself acknowledged that other possible solutions ex-
isted and merited consideration. Of these alternatives, the most
widely urged was amending the Basic Law under Article 159. In
contrast to legislative interpretation, amendment is the formal
mechanism employed by most common law systems for chang-
ing constitutional rules. 131 The Hong Kong amendment proce-
dure, however, severely limits the role of the HKSAR's populace.
As set forth in Article 159, the power to amend the Basic Law
"shall be vested in the . .. National People's Congress." 13 2 Bills
for amendments may be proposed by the NPCSC, the State
Council, or the Hong Kong government. In the last instance,
the Hong Kong deputies who represent the HKSAR in the NPC
shall submit an amendment bill only after clearing three hur-
dles; a bill must: 1) receive the consent of two-thirds of the dep-
uties themselves; 2) the consent of two-thirds of all the members
of LegCo; and 3) the approval of the HKSAR's Chief Execu-
tive.133
Within Hong Kong, nearly all sides agree that overturning a
judicial interpretation of the Basic Law through amendment
would generate substantially less concern about maintaining the
rule of law than does a reinterpretation. Advocates based the
superiority of the amendment route on several grounds. First,
an amendment would fully accord with the "power of final adju-
dication" guaranteed by both the Joint Declaration 13' and the
Basic Law.'3 5 Instead of asking the NPCSC to "correct" a pur-
portedly erroneous interpretation by the HKSAR's highest court,
an amendment would simply alter the relevant constitutional
provision. In this way, an amendment would address the ostensi-
ble crisis created by the CFA's action while avoiding the appear-
ance of undermining the finality of the CFA's judgement or its
131. The main exception is, of course, the British Constitution, which remains un-
written. See ALBERT VENN DIcEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF LAW OF THE CONSTITU-
TION 330 (1889).
132. Basic Law, supra note 10, art. 159, para. 1.
133. Id. art. 159, 2. Before the NPC considers an amendment bill, the Commit-
tee of the Basic Law shall study it and submit its views. Id. 3. In addition, no amend-
ment shall contravene the established policies of the [PRC] regarding Hong Kong. Id.
14.
134. Joint Declaration, supra note 17, at art. 3. See supra text accompanying notes
17-25 (discussing Joint Declaration's guarantee of judicial independence and finality).
135. Basic Law, supra note 10, arts. 2, 19. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30
(discussing Basic Law's guarantee of judicial independence and finality).
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independence. The amendment alternative would thus preserve
the integrity of the common law system, under which the con-
cept of final adjudication and the practice of interpretation are
united.
Second, an amendment would better accord with the HK-
SAR's "high degree of autonomy," especially as reflected in Arti-
cle 158. Article 158 expressly assigns Basic Law provisions
"within the limits of the autonomy of the Region" for interpreta-
tion by the Hong Kong courts while allocating provisions that
deal with such matters as the relationship between the HKSAR
and the CPG to the NPCSC. By requiring the general agreement
of Hong Kong's representatives and institutions, the amendment
process would preserve the HKSAR's autonomy over provisions
like Article 24 by allowing it to make its own decisions about who
should and should not be granted the right of abode. In con-
trast, an NPCSC correction of a considered judgement of the
CFA, even at the request of the HKSAR government, com-
promises the HKSAR's autonomy and consolidates power in the
CPG.
In addition, the amendment process assures at least a for-
mal role for Hong Kong's representative institutions, and
greater public debate and democratic participation than was evi-
dent with the reinterpretation option as pursued by the HKSAR
administration.136 Under Article 159, amendment bills may be
forwarded to the NPC only after gaining approval by the Chief
Executive, two-thirds of the LegCo, and two-thirds of the Hong
Kong deputies to the NPC.1"7 These requirements not only in-
sure some degree of public deliberation, but also guarantee that
Hong Kong's fundamental law, including its protections of
rights, can only be altered only after overwhelming public sup-
port within the HKSAR has been formally acknowledged.
In contrast, the HKSAR administration did not make the
text of the request public until over three weeks after it had been
submitted to the State Council."'8 Moreover, when two LegCo
members attempted to fly to Beijing to make the case against
reinterpretation, they were barred from boarding the plane at
136. The government could have created opportunities for greater democratic
participation in the decision to request reinterpretation, but failed to do so.
137. Basic Law, supra note 10, art. 159, para. 2.
138. The request was submitted on May 20 and not released until June 11. See
Margaret Ng, Wrapped Up in Secrecy, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, June 4, 1999, at 1.
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the Hong Kong airport at the direction of mainland authori-
ties. 139 These episodes tended to confirm criticisms that the
hasty and secretive reinterpretation process effectively precluded
a considered discussion about whether the CFA decision may
have created a potential demographic crisis in the first place,
much less the best legal means to resolve it.
Stung by opposition to the request, the HKSAR administra-
tion went to great lengths to refute accusations that the decision
was made out of sheer expediency.14 ° Among other defenses, it
argued first that the process would take too long, and second
that the amendment lacked support politically.' 4 '
As a practical matter, the administration asserted that an
amendment could not be enacted in time to avert the impend-
ing immigration crisis even if sufficient political support ex-
isted. 4 2 Officials pointed out that since Article 159 vests the
power of amendment solely in the NPC, and since the NPC had
recently concluded its sole plenary meeting for 1999 in March,
the HKSAR would face a potentially massive influx of immi-
grants claiming the right of abode for almost a full year.'43 The
administration also expressed concern that, as long as it re-
mained good law, the CFA judgment would encourage main-
landers asserting the right of abode to immigrate illegally and
then claim the right once in Hong Kong.14 4
This argument, however, contradicts the reality of the situa-
tion. On one hand, the HKSAR government remained in nego-
tiations with the mainland about enforcement of the CFAjudg-
ment for almost six months after it had been issued.' 45 This de-
139. See Angela Li, Legislators Barred from Beijing Flights, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
June 11, 1999, at 1.
140. See, e.g., Elsie Leung, Secretary forJustice of the HKSAR, Statement at the House
Committee Meeting of the Legislative Council (May 18, 1999) ("In deciding between an inter-
pretation and an amendment, the Administration has been guided by firm principle,
not expediency.").
141. See Right of Abode: The Solution, supra note 127.
142. See id. (arguing that before amendment could be passed, many Mainland resi-
dents will have exercised or obtained [the Right of Abode] under the CFA ruling).
143. See id.
144. See id; interview with Jason Felton, American Chamber of Commerce in Hong
Kong (June 4, 1999) (suggesting that government was afraid that illegal immigrant
smugglers would spread the word that once immigrant arrives in Hong Kong, they can-
not be sent back).
145. See interview with Robert Alcock, HKSAR Dep't of Justice, in Hong Kong
(June 4, 1999).
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lay meant that the allegedly impending flood of immigration
had yet to materialize.
On the other hand, the HKSAR government apparently
failed to consider the possibility of interim legislation as a means
to control the flow of mainlander immigration while abiding by
the CFA'sjudgment pending an amendment.14 Some observers
argued that such legislation could mitigate the problems attrib-
uted to the alleged immigration influx, thereby making an
amendment feasible and eliminating the need to request an
NPCSC reinterpretation. 147 Neither the legality nor feasibility of
this option was ever widely addressed, in large part because the
HKSAR administration never seriously pursued it. 4 ' The au-
thorities were made aware of this possible approach, however,
both in public statements by the Hong Kong Bar Association and
in testimony before LegCo.1
49
The CFA's judgment implicitly endorses legislative meas-
ures that would implement the right of abode in light of the
exigent circumstances that might result. 5 ° First, the CFA up-
held the "certificate of entitlement scheme" aspect of the No. 3
Ordinance and thus allowed the HKSAR authorities some de-
gree of control over the process of verifying immigrant's claims
to the right of abode. 51 Second, the CFA expressly noted that
such a verification scheme was subject to a "reasonableness" re-
146. In this regard, this option presents a legislative analogy to the U.S. Supreme
Court's remedial decision in Brown v. Board of Education ("Brown II"). Brown v.
Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). There, the Court ruled that equitable princi-
ples permitted enforcement of the fundamental constitutional right to equal protection
of laws "with all deliberate speed," rather than immediately, in light of the massive so-
cial dislocation that immediate enforcement of that right might entail. Id.
147. See HONG KONG BAR ASSOCIATION, SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF MASS IMMI-
GRATION (May 16, 1999); Michael C. Davis, Home To Roost, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May
16, 1999, at 10.
148. See interview with Robert Alcock, HKSAR Department of Justice, in Hong
Kong (june 4, 1999); interview with Albert Chen, Dean of the University of Hong Kong
Law Department, in Hong Kong (June 7, 1999).
149. See HONG KONG BAR AsSOCIATION, supra note 147; Michael C. Davis, Written
Testimony for the Legislative Council on the Question of Mechanisms for Seeking NPC
Standing Committee Interpretation Uune 12, 1999).
150. See, e.g., interview with Denis Chang, Lead barrister for the petitioners in the
right of abode cases, in Hong Kong (June 8, 1999) (noting that CFA's judgment is
subject to "reasonableness" requirement which "gives a window" for administrative miti-
gation of impending influx); interview with Albert Chen, Dean of University of Hong
Kong Law School, in Hong Kong (June 7, 1999) (observing that CFA's judgment left
the certificate of entitlement scheme intact, lessening urgency of immigration crisis).
151. See NgKa Ling, 1 HKC at 334 (stating that "[i]t is reasonable for the legisla-
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quirement. 152 By allowing the HKSAR "reasonable" control over
the verification of permanent resident status, it follows that the
HKSAR could legally take legislative and administrative meas-
ures to implement the decision in an orderly fashion.1
5
Administration authorities initially rejected the idea of in-
terim measures as a way to pursue an amendment, but later indi-
cated that the idea merited consideration should a similar crisis
occur. Initial resistance was based on the conclusion that any
administrative or legislative measure to implement the CFAjudg-
ment in anything less than a total and immediate fashion was
illegal. 54 Some language in the decision can be read to support
this view. The CFA warned, for example, that any immigrant
who experiences "unlawful delay" in the acceptance or rejection
of her permanent resident application could "invoke public law
remedies in our courts."155 Despite this position, senior officials
at the Department of Justice ("DOJ") told our delegation that
the alleged immediacy of the immigration crisis prevented them
from looking into this option fully. The DOJ also stated its in-
tention to explore the possibility in the event of a future CFA
interpretation of the Basic Law would lead to dire social conse-
quences.' 56
For the most part, opponents of reinterpretation did not ad-
vocate interim measures as a possible way forward toward a possi-
ble amendment either.1 57 If anything, they expressed even less
interest in the idea than administration officials.1 5 ' Administra-
ture to introduce a scheme which provides for verification of a person's claim to be a
permanent resident." (emphasis in original)).
152. See id. at 335 ("[A]s a matter of statutory construction, the courts would im-
port the requirement of reasonableness into a number of provisions for operating such
verification scheme.").
153. See interview with Denis Chang, lead barrister for the petitioners in the right
of abode cases, in Hong Kong (June 8, 1999).
154. See interview with Robert Alcock, HKSAR Dep't of Justice, in Hong Kong
(June 4, 1999) (arguing that under CFA's actual abode order, no partial implementa-
tion of judgment would have been legal).
155. NgKa Ling, 1 HKC at 335. Additionally, the CFA decision granted a statutory
right of appeal to the HKSAR Immigration Tribunal for any rejected abode applicants
applying for a certificate of entitlement. Id.
156. See interview with Elsie Leung, HKSAR Secretary of Justice, and Robert Al-
cock, HKSAR Dep't of Justice, in Hong Kong (June 10, 1999).
157. One exception was Professor Michael C. Davis of the City University of Hong
Kong, who proposed this type of approach in testimony before LegCo. See supra notes
147 and 149.
158. See interview with Denis Chang, Counsel for Petitioners in Ng Ka Ling, in
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tion opponents, however, declined to pursue the idea in the
right of abode context for different reasons than the administra-
tion. First, the HKSAR administration, not individual LegCo
members, controlled the introduction of such legislation given
the limits on private member bills. 15 9 Second, most defenders of
the CFA decision believed the administration was committed to
reinterpretation almost from the beginning, making attempts at
compromise superfluous.16 ° Finally, the lawyers who argued the
right of abode cases faced the problem of whether agreeing to
delay in the implementation of the CFA's decision could be
squared with their ethical obligation to represent their clients
zealously.
Despite concerns on both sides, reasonable steps that would
address any genuine crisis precipitated by a CFA decision should
be explored so long as those steps are tied to seeking an amend-
ment of the Basic Law. Certainly the legal obstacles do not ap-
pear so great as to preclude further exploration of this type of
approach. Administration arguments that the CFAjudgment re-
quired complete and immediate implementation might carry
more weight but for the government's failure even to begin en-
forcement by the time the NPCSC issued its reinterpretation al-
most five months later.161 Severaljudges with whom the delega-
tion met, moreover, informally indicated that a reasonable im-
plementation scheme might include a range of possibilities.
While the legal obstacles to interim legislation do not ap-
pear significant, the potential benefits are substantial. Assuming
that the CFA'sjudgment could have been implemented in a rea-
sonable, orderly, and gradual manner, the purported socio-eco-
nomic crisis could have been averted in the short term.1 62 The
delay would have allowed a public debate about the scope of the
problem, permitted the formulation of a politically feasible
amendment if one were deemed necessary, and would have con-
Hong Kong (June 8, 1999); interview with Elsie Leung, HKSAR Secretary ofJustice, and
Robert Alcock, HKSAR Department of Justice, in Hong Kong (June 10, 1999).
159. See infra notes and accompanying text 290-92.
160. See, e.g., interview with Denis Chang, Counsel for Petitioners in NgKa Ling, in
Hong Kong (June 8, 1999).
161. See interview with Robert Alcock, HKSAR Department of Justice, in Hong
Kong (June 4, 1999). To the contrary, the administration had in the meantime contin-
ued to arrest illegal immigrants claiming the right of abode without a certificate of
entitlement. See Arrests Pave Way, supra note 89.
162. See HONG KONG BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 147.
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trolled the situation pending the next plenum meeting of the
NPC in March of 2000.163 If the Basic Law had then been
amended, the controversy would have been satisfactorily re-
solved. The authority of the CFA would have remain unchal-
lenged, the rule of law would have remain unquestioned, and
Hong Kong's autonomy would have been preserved. If, how-
ever, the amendment had been defeated, then the administra-
tion would have been certain that a request for NPCSC reinter-
pretation was the only long-term solution to a genuine immigra-
tion crisis. The rule of law would still have been preserved since
the principle does not compel a society to endure hardships
when a source of redress is available and other legal avenues are
exhausted.
Beyond the urgency of the situation, HKSAR authorities
contended that the amendment commanded insufficient sup-
port in both LegCo and among the Hong Kong deputies to the
NPC to meet Article 159's two-thirds requirement in each
case.' 64 Others argued that the Hong Kong deputies to the NPC
doomed any potential amendment when they signed a unani-
mous statement stating that they would not support amend-
ment.'65 Moreover, a resolution supporting the request for
reinterpretation in LegCo was voted upon, albeit without the
participation of the directly elected members.'66 Some reinter-
pretation opponents, however, were also confident that the NPC
delegation would not stand in the way of an amendment if the
administration seriously pursued the option.167 On a more gen-
eral note, at least one prominent lawyer observed that amend-
ments were supposed to be difficult to obtain, especially when
163. See id. (stating that though administrative measures could "alleviate the threat
of an immediate or sudden influx of mainlanders" that "[i]n the long term, the only
acceptable solution would be to introduce amendments to the Basic Law.").
164. But see interview with Rita Fan, LegCo President, in Hong Kong (June 7,
1999). The members had walked out to protest the government's maneuvers under-
mining the authority of the CFA and the integrity of the common law. See Yeung, supra
note 111, at 1.
165. See interview with Margaret Ng, LegCo Member, in Hong Kong (June 7,
1999). In Ms. Ng's analysis, these deputies supported the reinterpretation alternative
because an amendment to the Basic Law would be equivalent to the admission that the
NPC and the drafters of the Basic Law had made a mistake, not the CFA. Id.
166. See interview with Margaret Ng, LegCo Member, in Hong Kong (June 7,
1999).
167. See Interview with Denis Chang, counsel for petitioners in Ng Ka Ling, in
Hong Kong (June 8, 1999).
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they would restrict rights. If society lacks the consensus to sup-
port such a change despite significant social consequences, then
the right should be preserved.1 68 Whatever the obstacles, the
amendment process provided the one possibility in which the
consequences of the CFA's rulings could have been addressed
without generating serious controversy about the court's inde-
pendence. As is now obvious, the same cannot be said of legisla-
tive reinterpretation.
4. Legislative Interpretation in a "Hybrid" System
The administration's argument that an NPCSC interpreta-
tion better reflects the hybrid legal system that the Basic Law
created may prove to have the most serious and far-reaching
consequences for the rule of law in Hong Kong.169 On this view,
legislative interpretation represents one of the mainland's pre-
ferred methods of determining the "true legislative intent" be-
hind a given law, including the Basic Law as a national law of
China itself.'7° The administration accordingly argued that be-
cause the CFA had simply misinterpreted the legislative intent
behind Article 24, the Article need not actually be amended, but
simply restored to the drafters' original intent.17' Though the
authorities recognized that " [i] t is natural for those familiar with
a common law system to object to a non-judicial body revising an
interpretation . . .given by a final appellate court," it nonethe-
less considered legislative interpretation proper because "Hong
Kong is part of the [PRC], which has a civil law system. ' 172
Such an erosion of the "One Country-Two Systems" ideal
168. See Gladys Li, Hong Kong Barrister, Remarks at Crowley Wrap-Up Session,
No. 1, in Hong Kong (June 10, 1999)
169. See RIGHT OF ABODE: THE SOLUTION, supra note 40, at para. 1; Elsie Leung,
Secretary for Justice of the HKSAR, Statement at the House Committee Meeting of the
Legislative Council (May 18, 1999); Interview with Gu Min Kang, Professor, City Univer-
sity of Hong Kong, in Hong Kong (June 9, 1999).
170. See RIGHT OF ABODE: THE SOLUTION, supra note 40, at para. 1; Elsie Leung,
Secretary for Justice of the HKSAR, Statement at the House Committee Meeting of the
Legislative Council (May 18, 1999); interview with Gu Min Kang, Professor, City Univer-
sity of Hong Kong, in Hong Kong (June 9, 1999).
171. See RIGHT OF ABODE: THE SOLUTION, supra note 40, at para. 24; Elsie Leung,
Secretary for Justice of the HKSAR, Statement at the House Committee Meeting of the
Legislative Council (May 18, 1999); interview with Gu Min Kang, Professor, City Univer-
sity of Hong Kong, in Hong Kong (June 9, 1999).
172. Elsie Leung, Secretary for Justice of the HKSAR, Statement at the House
Committee Meeting of the Legislative Council (May 18, 1999).
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threatens to supplant Hong Kong's common law framework with
the very different approach to law practiced in the mainland. A
number of Hong Kong officials with whom our delegation met
nevertheless appear either to welcome this prospect or view it to
some extent as inevitable. Both in our meetings and public
statements, Mrs. Elsie Leung, the Hong Kong Secretary of Jus-
tice, indicated that resistance to mainland legal ideas reflected
"arrogance" on the part of those steeped in the common law.'73
The fact remains, however, that a central purpose of the main-
land's pledge to maintain "two systems" stems from the basic fact
that the mainland legal system-in contrast to Hong Kong's
framework-has yet to command anything approaching the con-
fidence of the legal and investment communities outside
China.1
74
The differences begin with the Chinese constitutional
framework. In contrast to liberal constitutions, China's socialist
constitution serves not to constrain state power, but to enhance
it in service of the policies and goals of the Chinese Communist
Party ("CCP").175 The most recent constitution, adopted in
1982, accordingly rejects the separation of powers and instead
concentrates authority in the NPC, which meets annually, 176 the
much smaller NPCSC, which meets bimonthly,17 7 the State
Council, which acts as the administration, 78 and the Central Mil-
itary Commission, which directs the armed forces.' 79 The Con-
stitution does confer an impressive array of rights although it
equally imposes duties as well. None of these provisions are di-
rectly enforceable, however, since the Constitution is not justicia-
ble.
This framework reflects a highly distinctive approach to the
rule of law. The judiciary is nominally independent, but Chi-
nese judges typically lack legal training, do not enjoy high status,
and are often subject to improper influence by local government
and CCP officials. In light of the Constitution's nonjusticiability,
173. See Chris Yeung & No Kwai-yan, Anson Pushes Two Systems, S. CHINA MORNING
PosT, June 30, 1999; interview with Elsie Leung, Secretary for Justice of the HKSAR, in
Hong Kong (May 18, 1999).
174. See CHEN, supra note 41, at 121; GHAi, supra note 18, at 213-14, 323-34.
175. See CHEN, supra, note 41, at 40; GAI, supra note 18, at 84-86.
176. X1ANFA art. 2, (1982).
177. Id. at art. 67.
178. Id. at art. 85.
179. Id. at art. 92.
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judicial review of constitutional claims is unknown. 180
The Chinese approach further draws a functional distinc-
tion between legal interpretation, in the sense of determining
the meaning of a given provision, and adjudication, defined as
hearing and resolving cases. In the mainland system, the power
of interpretation may be "legislative" and "administrative" as well
as judicial. This conception formally contrasts with the common
law tradition, in which courts generally exercise interpretive and
adjudicatory authority together. Moreover, mainland interpre-
tive methods also differ from common law approaches by,
among other things, rejecting the idea of stare decisis.
Employing mainland conceptions, Article 158 attempts to
divide the functions of adjudication and interpretation by ac-
knowledging the NPCSC's ultimate power of interpretation
while also according the CFA the power of final adjudication as
mandated in the Joint Declaration. The Joint Declaration, how-
ever, appears to have proceeded on the common law assumption
that any power of "final adjudication" in practice means inter-
pretation as well.181
It has often been said that the Chinese system reflects the
CCP's "rule by law," rather than the rule of law. This situation
nominally changed in 1999, when the NPC adopted a constitu-
tional amendment committing the mainland to the "rule of
law."18 2 This amendment reflects vast changes in the mainland
legal tradition. During the Cultural Revolution, the regime
sought to dispense with the law outright, purging the nation of
judges, lawyers, and law schools. Under Deng Xiaoping, the
mainland recommitted itself to building a legal system, making
strides that have paralleled its economic progress. 183 Notwith-
standing these achievements, that system remains fundamentally
different from the common law framework that Deng's pledge
of "One Country, Two Systems" was designed to protect.
180. CHEN, supra note 41, at 46; Griml, supra note 18, at 306.
181. GI, supra note 18, at 198.
182. Article 5 was adopted at the second session of the Ninth National People's
Congress, on March 15, 1999.
183. CHEN, supra note 41, at 33-34.
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E. The NPCSC's Reinterpretation and the Implications for the Rule of
Law in Hong Kong
Notwithstanding the legal and prudential objections, the
Chief Executive made the reinterpretation request in the form
of a report to the State Council in Beijing. Several features of
the actual request confirmed concerns put forward by members
of the Hong Kong legal community. In procedural terms, the
process was far from transparent. Although submitted on May
20, 1999, the contents of the request were not made public until
June 11. No formal mechanism was established, moreover, for
opponents of reinterpretation to formally submit their views. To
the contrary, when two LegCo members attempted to fly to Bei-
jing to present the opposition case, they were not permitted to
board the plane at the behest of mainland authorities.184
On the merits, the request sought reinterpretation of Arti-
cles 22(4), 24(2) and (3) by relying primarily on mainland legal
principles. In particular, the Chief Executive sought to have the
provisions restored to their "true legislative intent," citing
among other things a 1996 "opinion" issued by Preparatory
Committee for the HKSAR of the NPC, a mainland body that
had been involved in drafting the Basic Law, which was approved
in an NPC resolution the next year. Conversely, the request did
not ask the NPCSC to consider whether the CFA should have
initially referred the two articles in question to Beijing under Ar-
ticle 158.1"5
As many commentators had suggested it would do,' 8 6 the
NPCSC granted the Chief Executive's request, issuing its own re-
interpretation of Articles 22 and 24 on June 26, 1999 ("NPCSC
Reinterpretation")." 7 This section briefly examines the merits
of the NPCSC Reinterpretation and explores some of its implica-
184. See Li, supra note 139, at 1.
185. See HKSAR Chief Executive, Report on Seeking Assistance from the Central
People's Government in Solving Problems Encountered in the Implementation of the
Basic Law of the, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of
China (May 20, 1999) (translation of HKSAR government's submission to PRC State
Council.)
186. See interview with Denis Chang, Lead Barrister for the Petitioners in the Right
of Abode Cases, in Hong Kong (June 8, 1999).
187. See NPCSC Reinterpretation of Articles 22 and 24, supra at 129; Ng, supra note
33, at 3-4.
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tions for the increasingly hybrid legal system that Hong Kong
may be facing.
1. The NPCSC Reinterpretation: Merits
In contrast to a common law opinion, the substance of the
NPCSC Reinterpretation is short and conclusory. The NPCSC
Reinterpretation sets the stage for what will follow by exceeding
the Chief Executive's request and repudiating the CFA's deter-
mination that the abode cases did not require referral of Articles
22 and 24 to the NPCSC for interpretation under Article 158.188
Instead, the NPCSC, without analysis, concluded that Articles 22
and 24 "concern the relationship between the Central Authori-
ties and the [HKSAR]" and so should have been referred initially
under Article 158.189 At no point, however, does the NPCSC Re-
interpretation address the CFA's "predominant provision" test,
or any other aspect of the court's analysis concerning the divi-
sion of interpretive authority under Article 158.
The NPCSC Reinterpretation proceeds, in an equally con-
clusory fashion, to overturn the CFA's interpretation of Articles
22 and 24, stating that "the interpretation of the Court of Final
Appeal is not consistent with the legislative intent."19 ° The
NPCSC Reinterpretation briefly notes the grant of interpretive
authority to the NPCSC under Article 67(4) of the PRC Constitu-
tion and Article 158(1) of the Basic Law, giving it the power to
restore the true legislative intent.
The NPCSC Reinterpretation then construes Article 22(4)
as requiring approval for entry into the HKSAR,' 91 and contin-
ues by proclaiming, without explanation, that there are no ex-
ceptions to this approval requirement and that to enter Hong
Kong without such approval is "unlawful."'19 2 The NPCSC Rein-
terpretation neither makes an attempt to explain why such a re-
quirement should apply to those with the right of abode, nor
why the CFA's interpretation of the Article was incorrect.
The NPCSC Reinterpretation comprehends Article 24 ex-
188. See NPCSC Reinterpretation of Articles 22 and 24, supra note 129, at 1.
189. See id. at 2.
190. See id.
191. See Basic Law, supra note 10, at art. 22(4). Article 22(4) states that "for entry
into the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, people from other parts of China
must apply for approval." Id.
192. See id.
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actly the same way, quoting the relevant provisions of the article
that grants the right of abode to the children of permanent resi-
dents.193 It then states simply that these provisions "mean ...
such parents must have fulfilled the condition prescribed by cat-
egory (1) or (2) of Article 24(2) of the Basic Law... at the time
of [the child's] birth."194 As regards Article 24, the NPCSC Rein-
terpretation does offer a small glimpse into its rationale by not-
ing that its interpretation reflects the "legislative intent" as out-
lined by an opinion issued by the NPC's Preparatory Committee
for the creation of the HKSAR on August 10, 1996.195
The NPCSC Reinterpretation concludes by mandating that
the courts of the HKSAR "adhere to this Interpretation" in adju-
dicating all future questions under Articles 22 and 24.196 In def-
erence to Article 158's requirement that 'judgements previously
rendered shall not be affected" by any NPCSC reinterpretation,
the NPCSC Reinterpretation states that it "does not affect the
right of abode . . . under the judgement of the [CFA] on the
relevant cases dated 29January 1999 by the parties concerned in
the relevant legal proceedings." '197
2. The Hybrid System Realized
The NPCSC Reinterpretation highlights the radical differ-
ences between interpreting the law in the mainland legal system
and the common law, which is ostensibly guaranteed to Hong
Kong by Article 8 of the Basic Law. The NPCSC's terse state-
ments about the proper meaning of constitutional provisions,
overruling the first constitutional adjudication of Hong Kong's
highest court, are jarring to those accustomed to a common law
legal perspective. Instead of a constrained interpretive approach
characteristic of the common law, the NPCSC's declaration re-
flects an instrumental approach that enhances rather than
checks government power.
The conflict between the two interpretive methods follows
from the profoundly different legal traditions previously dis-
cussed. 98 The key document in mainland legal interpretation,
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 175-81 (discussing mainland legal system).
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the NPC Standing Committee's 1981 Resolution on Strengthen-
ing the Work of Interpretation of Laws ("1981 Resolution"), out-
lines a "concept of 'interpretation' . . quite different from that
accepted in the common law or even civil law jurisdictions ...
[and] clearly inconsistent with the principle of separation of
powers, judicial interpretation, and the rule of law as understood
in many countries in the contemporary world."'99 Most impor-
tantly, the 1981 Resolution gives the NPCSC power to provide a
"legislative interpretation" of any legal provisions that need to be
clarified or supplemented.20 0 Legal scholars have pointed out
that in practice, this idea of "legislative interpretation" is "tanta-
mount to legislative amendment in most legal systems."'20 1
There also seem to be no particular limitations on the NPCSC's
power of legislative interpretation, in either substance or form.
Where common law interpretation claims substantive fidel-
ity to the law, the NPCSC approach stresses deference to govern-
ment policy and ultimately the rule of the CCP. 2°2 Accordingly,
many legal commentators point out in general that mainland
legal interpretation is more concerned with the political correct-
ness of adjudicative or interpretive decisions than with their
legal correctness. As one leading scholar notes, " [t] he NPC and
the judicial and administrative bodies under it are instruments
of the Communist Party, and as their primary function is the im-
plementation of its policy, there has been little reason to develop
the science of autonomous legal interpretation. "20' Nothing in
the NPCSC Reinterpretation undermines this observation. To
the contrary, the only instance in which the document does not
follow the HKSAR's Chief Executive's request is its conclusion
that the matter should have been referred to Beijing in the first
place, thereby placing Hong Kong affairs more closely under the
supervision of mainland policymakers.
In formal terms, mainland legislative interpretations rarely,
if ever, reflect constraints that are a central feature of the com-
mon law or even civil systems. In particular, the NPCSC "does
not engage in any analysis of the law that it is supposed to apply
199. See CHEN, supra note 41, at 95.
200. See id.
201. See GHmI, supra note 18, at 225 ("The NPCSC has, in all instances, modified
law rather than interpreted it.").
202. GHAI, supra note 18, at 213.
203. Id.
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or interpret," and thus "gives a strong impression that it reaches
the conclusion that it desires politically. '20 4  Even mainland
courts do not typically provide rationales for their judgments.
According to one authority, " [t] he typical judgement of a Chi-
nese court is short and does not set out lines or steps of legal
reasoning and logical analysis in a way as detailed as in judg-
ments of common law courts."2 °5
The sole rationale that the NPCSC Reinterpretation does
suggest attempts to base its reading on Article 24's "true legisla-
tive intent," an argument previously made in the HKSAR govern-
ment's request.2° 6 Application of this approach, however, does
little to validate this basis of decision. For both the NPCSC and
the HKSAR Executive, the "true legislative intent" for at least Ar-
ticle 24 may be found in the NPC's resolution approving its Pre-
paratory Committee's report on the HKSAR, both issued in
1996. Reliance on these materials for legislative intent is prob-
lematic, among other reasons, because they were issued six years
after the NPC adopted the Basic Law and because the Prepara-
tory Committee did not draft the Basic Law. 20 7 This problematic
application of original intent is not surprising since there are no
rules or guidelines limiting an NPCSC legislative interpretation
to the "true legislative intent" of a provision.20 8 In this light, the
NPCSC Reinterpretation was effectively a legislative amendment,
204. Id.
205. CHEN, supra note 41, at 114.
206. See RIGHT OF ABODE: THE SOLUTION, supra note 40, at para. 15 (arguing that
"legislative interpretation is not equivalent to amendment, because such interpretation
must be faithful to the true legislative intent").
207. A related problem is that reliance on the NPC resolution would in effect per-
mit amendment of the Basic Law by means of post-hoc measures claiming to clarify the
ttue legislative intent.
208. See supra notes 198-205 and accompanying text (discussing lack of rules or
limitations on mainland conceptions of legal interpretation). The government also
supported its "true legislative intent" argument by referring to a 1996 resolution of the
Preparatory Committee and a 1993 agreement of the Joint Liaison Group, both of
which contradicted the CFA's interpretations of Articles 22 and 24. This argument is
disingenuous because the Basic Law was actually promulgated in 1990, several years
before any of these statements of allegedly "true legislative intent" were ever conceived.
Michael C. Davis, Legislative Intent and the CFA Right of Abode Judgment, Forum on Cur-
rent Issues Under the Basic Law, sponsored by JUSTICE, The Hong Kong Section of
the International commission of jurists (May 29, 1999); Hong Kong Bar Association,
Press Release, The Bar's Response to the Government Paper to LegCo, May 20, 1999. (noting
that CFA rejected Joint Liaison Group Agreement as indicative of meaning of articles
relevant to NgKa Ling, and that government never argued that Preparatory Committee
resolution had any legal effect in actual case).
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and undoubtedly an incursion of mainland legal principles into
Hong Kong's common law system. 20 9
For these reasons, Denis Chang, the lead counsel for the
petitioners in Ng Ka Ling, suggested that the NPCSC Reinterpre-
tation route was chosen by the Hong Kong government because
it was the most predictable way to achieve the desired result.21°
Exemplifying this mindset, HKSAR Chief Executive Tung stated
that the rule of law problem was a problem of perception, not a
problem of substance.2 1' More striking is Secretary ofJustice El-
sie Leung's defense of the NPCSC Reinterpretation as a neces-
sary infusion of mainland legal principles. 212 This conclusion
may follow on the assumption that Hong Kong should legiti-
mately develop a truly "hybrid" legal system. Yet, this result is
exactly what China pledged it would not institute under the
"One Country, Two Systems" formula.
3. The Question of Guidelines Governing Future
NPCSC Requests
Many observers suggested that some sort of constitutional or
legislative mechanism should be promulgated in order to con-
trol and limit the influence of mainland interpretation and its
undermining of the "One Country, Two Systems" ideal.213 Such
a mechanism might consist of legislative guidelines or a constitu-
tional amendment limiting HKSAR government requests for
NPCSC interpretation to circumstances of social emergency.
Presumably, such a mechanism would implement some kind of
procedure requiring legislative input and public debate on the
209. See interview with Denis Chang, lead counsel for the petitioners in Na Ka
Ling, in Hong Kong, (June 8, 1999). On the merits, our delegation was repeatedly told
that the right of abode was originally extended to offspring of Hong Kong residents to
mitigate pre-handover fears of elite "brain drain." The idea underlying this "true origi-
nal intent" apparently was that Hong Kong residents who settled in other jurisdictions,
such as Canada, waiting to see how Hong Kong would fare under Chinese sovereignty
would have additional incentive to return if their children automatically had a right of
abode. Only later did the problem of mainland offspring become apparent. Id.
210. Id.
211. See interview with Yash Ghai andJohannes Chan, Professors of Law, University
of Hong Kong, in Hong Kong (June 8, 1999).
212. Yeung, supra note 112, at 1.
213. See interview with Yash Ghai andJohannes Chan, Professors of Law, University
of Hong Kong, in Hong Kong (June 8, 1999); Interview with Albert Chen, Dean of the
University of Hong Kong Law School and Professor of Law, in Hong Kong (June 7,
1999).
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question, and perhaps requiring some super-majority vote of
LegCo. Such a convention, its proponents argue, would
'judicialize" NPCSC interpretation, and prohibit its overuse or
abuse simply to overrule court rulings unfavorable to the govern-
ment.
214
Conversely, others argue that such guidelines or rules gov-
erning NPCSC interpretation requests would legitimize the prac-
tice.2 15 As Denis Chang told the delegation, such guidelines or
conventions would actually legalize a "post-remedial mecha-
nism" by which to circumvent the rulings of the Hong Kong
courts.2 1 6 This perspective also views the legalization of such re-
quests as a legalization of the encroachment of mainland legal
norms as a legitimate method of legal interpretation, further un-
dermining the integrity of Hong Kong's common law system.
Whether guidelines or safeguards would best defend the
rule of law in Hong Kong depends on the frequency with which
the HKSAR government resorts to requests for NPCSC interpre-
tation in the future. If future requests are infrequent, then it
would arguably be best to avoid promulgation of explicit guide-
lines, leaving the government's strategy in the shadows of ques-
tionable legality under the Basic Law. In the words of Denis
Chang, "at this stage of political development in China, the less
said the better." '217 On the other hand, if HKSAR government
requests for NPCSC intervention become more frequent, then
guidelines would arguably better protect the rule of law, forcing
the government at least to clear some legal hurdles and open
such requests up to some kind of more meaningful public de-
bate.
4. Future Controversies
a. Pending Cases
A number of pending cases will determine the degree to
which Hong Kong as a hybrid system will become a reality. In
214. See interview with Yash Ghai andJohannes Chan, Professors of Law, University
of Hong Kong, in Hong Kong (June 8, 1999).
215. See interview with Denis Chang, lead counsel for the petitioners in Ng Ka
Ling, in Hong Kong (June 8, 1999).
216. Id. Mr. Chang suggested that Beijing originally wanted such a "post-remedial
mechanism" written into the Basic Law, but that Christopher Patten refused to accept
such a provision. Id.
217. See id.
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the fall of 1999, the CFA will decide the constitutionality of an
ordinance prohibiting desecration of the Hong Kong or Chinese
national flags. The National Flag and Emblem Ordinance,
which makes flag desecration a serious criminal offense, was one
of the eleven mainland laws specifically given effect in Hong
Kong through Annex III of the Basic Law.218 Two Hong Kong
citizens, who had been charged under the ordinance for flag
desecration as part of a non-violent protest about the
Tiananmen massacre, challenged the ordinance as unconstitu-
tional under the Basic Law.219 The defendants argued that the
ordinance was inconsistent with Article 19 of the ICCPR, which
guarantees freedom of expression, and thus was unconstitu-
tional under Article 39 of the Basic Law, which incorporates the
rights enumerated in the ICCPR.220 The trial court found the
ordinance constitutional under paragraph 3 of Article 19, which
allows restriction of speech rights that are for the protection of
"public order. ' 22 1 The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the
lower court's decision and held that the ordinance violated Arti-
cle 19, and was therefore unconstitutional under Article 39, be-
cause there was no evidence that such speech restriction was nec-
essary to preserve the public order.222
Commentators aligned with Beijing expressed dismay that a
Hong Kong court would so boldly invalidate a mainland law, es-
pecially one expressly written into the Basic Law. Maria Tam
Wai-chu, a Hong Kong deputy to the NPC and a member of the
Basic Law drafting committee, decried the ruling as inconsistent
with the Basic Law.223 Mainland legal scholar Dr. Raymond Wu
Wai-yung argued that "[i]nternational covenants ultimately
could not have greater legal authority than local legislation."224
In response to this mainland outrage, the HKSAR government
218. See Basic Law, supra note 10, at Annex III: National Laws Applied in the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
219. See HKSAR v. Ng Kung Siu (Stuart-Moore JA), [1999] 2 HKC 10, 18-20 (opin-
ion of Court of Appeals).
220. See id.
221. See Ng Kung Siu (Tong Man, Permanent Magistrate), [1999] 2 HKC 1 at, 15
(opinion of magistrate in trial court).
222. SeeNgKungSiu (Stuart-Moore JA), [1999] 2 HKC 1 at, 23 (opinion of Court
of Final Appeals).
223. See Tam Waves Flag at Court Ruling, HONG KONG STANDARD, Apr. 20, 1999.
224. May Tam & Lillian Kwok, Issue of Whether International Conventions Override Lo-
cal Laws, HONG KONG STANDARD, Apr. 20, 1999.
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publicly suggested that the CFA must refer the issue to the
NPCSC for interpretation under Article 158. On the other
hand, academics, the Hong Kong Bar Association, and the Hong
Kong Democratic Party insisted that the issue is entirely within
Hong Kong's autonomy as defined by Article 158.225 It remains
to be seen whether the CFA will approach the flag desecration
issue with an aggressively rights-protective approach, as it did in
Ng Ka Ling, or whether it will shy away from another constitu-
tional crisis and defer to mainland interpretation.
Another constitutional issue likely to confront the Hong
Kong courts deals with the definition of "ratable value" of prop-
erty for the purposes of assessing government rent-the rough
equivalent of property taxes in Hong Kong.2 2 6 The appellant
property developers in Agrila Limited v. Commissioner of Rating and
Valuation argued to the Lands Tribunal that the HKSAR govern-
ment's definition of ratable value under several local ordinances
was inconsistent with the government rent definition in Article
121 of the Basic Law.227 The Lands Tribunal agreed, finding the
government's rent regulations to be an unacceptable modifica-
tion of the valuation scheme set out by Article 121.228 A govern-
ment appeal is now pending. Since this ruling, if it stands it will
cost the HKSAR government substantial revenue in lost rents,
the Agrila case may well become another instance in which the
HKSAR administration will be tempted to make a request for
interpretation notwithstanding the potential cost to the rule of
law.
b. Other Issues Concerning the HKSAR/
Mainland Relationship
In addition to these pending case, other issues remain to be
resolved in the relationship between the mainland and the HK-
SAR, any of which could give rise to conflict. The most serious
of these issues include the absence of basic agreements on cross-
border legal processes, and serious concerns about the equal ap-
225. See Jurisdiction Controversy Looms, HONG KONG STANDARD, Apr. 20, 1999.
226. See Agrila Ltd. v. Commissioner of Rating and Valuation, [1999] 2 HKC 168;
interview with Johannes Chan & Yash Ghai, Professors of Law, University of Hong Kong,
in Hong Kong (June 8, 1999).
227. See Basic Law supra note 10, at art. 121; Agrila Ltd, [1999] 2 HKC at 168.
228. See Agrila Ltd., 2 HKC at 168.
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plication of HKSAR law to entities based, owned, or connected
with the mainland or HKSAR officials.
c. Agreements on Cross-Border Legal Processes
With the reversion of sovereignty to China, Hong Kong's
dealings ,with the mainland are no longer governed by treaty
agreements on standard legal processes that apply between na-
tions. Local agreements must be reached between the HKSAR
administration and Beijing. Mutually agreeable terms may be
difficult to establish, however, because any discussion of terms
will necessarily raise thorny questions about the adequacy and
fairness of mainland legal processes. In civil law matters, for ex-
ample, agreement is necessary on the enforcement ofjudgments
and arbitration awards and for mutual legal assistance in areas
such as the collection of evidence. 2' Any agreement in these
areas must show a respect for Beijing's sovereign authority on
the one hand and the legitimate concerns of Hong Kong's local
and international business community on the other.
The most potentially combustible issues will involve ques-
tions of the criminal jurisdiction of Hong Kong and mainland
courts. The Basic Law clearly provides that HKSAR courts shall
not apply mainland criminal law. 230 Less clear, however, are the
circumstances in which mainland courts may legitimately apply
229. See HUALING L. Fu, THE FORM AND SUBSTANCE OF LEGAL INTERACTION BETWEEN
HONG KONG AND MAINLAND CHINA: TOWARDS HONG KONG'S NEW LEGAL SOVEREIGNTY
(Jan. 1999) (describing many successful instances of cross-border cooperation, visits,
and communications, but that authorities must still work together in areas of mutual
legal assistance); see also Margaret Ng, Reciprocal Enforcement Between the Mainland and the
HKSAR, HONG KONG LAWYER, Feb. 1999, at 17 (reviewing progress on discussions re-
garding enforcement of arbitration awards). The HKSAR has already reached agree-
ment with Beijing on one area of cross-border process involving little controversy: ser-
vice of papers. In January 1999, after consultations between the Supreme People's
Court of the PRC and Hong Kong's High Court, the HKSAR and the mainland entered
an agreement that provides that mainland and Hong Kong courts may entrust to each
other the service in their respective jurisdictions ofjudicial documents in both civil and
commercial proceedings. See Arrangement for Mutual Service ofJudicial Documents in
Civil and Commercial Proceedings Between the Mainland and Hong Kong Courts.
This agreement is an important early step toward a fully functional relationship be-
tween the two legal systems and may provide a model for agreements on more difficult
areas.
230. See Basic Law, supra note 10, at art. 18. Article 18 of the Basic Law states that
only those PRC laws listed in Annex III of the Basic Law are applicable to the HKSAR.
Basic Law, art. 18. The PRC's criminal laws are not included in Annex II. See id. at
annex III.
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mainland criminal law to conduct committed in Hong Kong.
Two recent cases have raised this question.
In the Big Spender case, Hong Kong permanent resident,
Cheung Tze Keung, and thirty-five alleged accomplices were ar-
rested and put on trial in the mainland on charges including
kidnapping and armed robbery. The crimes allegedly occurred
in both Hong Kong and the mainland. 231 The mainland court
asserted jurisdiction under Article 6 of the PRC Criminal
Code,2 3 2 which provides jurisdiction over criminal acts commit-
ted in the "territory of the PRC" or having effect in the territory
of the PRC.2 3 Notwithstanding the allegation of mainland-
based conduct, a literal reading of Article 6 would suggest that a
231. See Kam C. Wong, Legal and Political Implications of a "Cross-Border Crime," 22
CHINA PERSPECTIVES 41 (1999) (providing detailed account of factual background and
legal implications of trial of legendary crime gang boss Cheung Tze Keung, also known
as "Big Spender"). Planning and preparation for the crimes allegedly occurred in the
mainland, including the smuggling of explosives and firearms. See also Hualing L. Fu,
The Battle of Criminal Jurisdictions, 28/3 HONG KONG L.J. 273 (1998); Elsie Leung, View-
ing the Jurisdictional Issue from a Proper Perspective, HONG KONG LAWYER, Jan. 1999, at 57
(claiming that case does not undermine Hong Kong's jurisdiction). The Hong Kong
government made no effort to bring Cheung back to face trial in Hong Kong, and the
Guangzhou Intermediate People's Court found all 36 defendants guilty and sentenced
Cheung and five others to death. Fu, supra, at 273.
232. Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted at the Second Ses-
sion of the Fifth National People's Congress on July 1, 1979, revised at the Fifth Session
of the Eighth National People's Congress on March 14, 1997, Peking, China Procurato-
rial Press, 1998 [hereinafter PRC Criminal Law]; Criminal Procedure Law of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, adopted at the Second Session of the Fifth National People's
Congress onJuly 1, 1979, revised in accordance with the Decision on Revising the Crim-
inal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China at the Fourth Session of the
Eighth National People's Congress on March 17, 1997, promulgated by Order of the
President of the People's Republic of China, No. 64 on March 17, 1998 and entered
into force as of date of promulgation, Peking, China Procuratorial Press, 1998 [herein-
after PRC Criminal Procedure Law].
233. See PRC Criminal Law, supra note 232, art. 6, para. 3 ("[i]f a criminal act or its
consequence takes place within the territory or territorial waters or space of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, the crime shall be deemed to have been committed within the
territory and territorial waters and space of the People's Republic of China"). Article
24 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law may also be relevant to the mainland court's
assertion of jurisdiction. See also Wong, supra note 231 (stating that PRC courts had
"clear and sufficient evidence to assume jurisdiction in the case as a matter of law");
PRC Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 232, art. 24 ("[a] criminal case shall be under
the jurisdiction of the people's Court in the place where the crime was committed").
The PRC Criminal Law asserts a particularly wide basis of territorial jurisdiction, includ-
ing preparation of the instruments or conditions for a crime. Fu, supra, note 231, at
276-77 (1998) (claiming that "[i]t is clear that an independent state has the absolute
right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over a crime all the elements of which take place
within its territory"); PRC Criminal Law, supra note 232, art. 22 ("[p]reparation of a
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mainland court could assert jurisdiction over conduct commit-
ted exclusively within Hong Kong-insofar as the HKSAR is
within the territory of the PRC. That reading however would
undermine the authority of Hong Kong's courts, and may con-
flict with Basic Law Article 84, that provides for their exclusive
jurisdiction over Hong Kong crimes.234 Moreover, it raises con-
cern that a HKSAR resident could be criminally charged by
mainland authorities for conduct committed in the HKSAR and
wholly legal under HKSAR criminal law; for example, certain
conduct exercising rights of free expression or association.
The same concern was raised by the Telford Gardens case in
the context of Article 7 of the PRC Criminal Code. Article 7
provides jurisdiction in mainland courts for crimes committed
by Chinese nationals "outside of the territory of the PRC."235 In
that case, PRC national and mainland resident Li Yuhui was ar-
rested, tried, and convicted in the mainland on charges of mur-
der and robbery.236 The crimes were alleged to have occurred in
the Telford Gardens housing estates in the HKSAR.23 v In con-
trast the disposition of the Big Spender case, the mainland court
in the Telford Gardens case apparently determined that for juris-
dictional purposes the HKSAR was outside the territory of the
PRC, and therefore outside of the territoriality principle of Arti-
cle 6 jurisdiction. That view, however, does nothing to relieve
the concern that Hong Kong residents may face charges in the
mainland because the court found jurisdiction in Article 7's na-
tionality principle. Because most Hong Kong permanent resi-
crime refers to the preparation of the instruments or the creation of the conditions for
a crime").
234. See Wong, supra note 231 (citing mistakenly Basic Law Article 18); Basic Law,
supra note 10, art. 84 ("[t]he courts of the [HKSAR] shall adjudicate cases in accord-
ance with the laws applicable in the Region").
235. See PRC Criminal Law, supra note 232, art. 7 (stating that "[t]his law shall be
applicable to any citizen of the PRC who commits a crime prescribed in this Law
outside the territory and territorial waters and space of the PRC").
236. Li Yuhui was executed on April 20, 1999. See Stella Lee, Telford Gardens Killer
Executed, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 20, 1999 [hereinafter Lee I]. Deputy Dean of
Shantou University's Law Faculty, Zhou Wei, has announced that the Telford Gardens
case will become the subject of a case study at the University because of the conflicting
claims for jurisdiction. See Stella Lee, Telford Gardens Murder To Be Studied at Shantou
University, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 20, 1999.
237. See Lee I, supra note 286. Li was a self-proclaimed fung shui master. Fung shui
is the ancient Chinese art of geomancy, most frequently consulted before building con-
struction or renovation. Li allegedly killed three women and two girls and robbed them
of the HK$1.2 million they allegedly owed him for a "life-lengthening" ceremony. Id.
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dents are nationals of the PRC, the court's decision would seem
to extend mainland jurisdiction to conduct by HKSAR residents
in Hong Kong.
Compounding this concern that mainland courts are assert-
ing jurisdiction over Hong Kong-based conduct is the percep-
tion that the HKSAR administration has failed adequately to as-
sert Hong Kong's jurisdiction over such cases. In the Big Spender
case, the HKSAR administration explained that it did not seek
custody of Cheung for trial in Hong Kong because he had been
arrested in the mainland and the HKSAR lacks any agreement
with the mainland for rendition,238 or the transfer of prisoners,
suspects, or convicted persons from one authority to another
within the same sovereignty. 239 This explanation, if fully
credited, leaves the impression that the HKSAR administration
would not adequately assist HKSAR permanent residents who
may be detained in the mainland on other charges, such as
charges stemming from otherwise legal conduct committed
wholly in the HKSAR, merely because the defendants were ar-
rested during a visit to the mainland.24 °
238. Priscilla Leung, "Big Spender" Cheung Tze Keung: A Brief Analysis, HONG KONG
LAWYER,Jan. 1999, at 17; Elsie Leung, Viewing the Jurisdictional Issue from the Proper Perspec-
tive, HONG KONG LAWYER, Jan. 1999, at 57 (arguing that where there is concurrent juris-
diction, but no rendition agreement, Hong Kong has no legal basis for requesting sur-
render of alleged offenders). The administration also explained that the HKSAR did
not seekjurisdiction because the victims had not reported the crimes to the Hong Kong
police. Priscilla Leung, Big Spender, supra, at 17.
239. Rendition is the intra-state version of extradition. See BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY, 1996 (stating that rendition is "the return of a fugitive from one state to the state
where the fugitive is accused or convicted of a crime"). Before the handover, extradi-
tion of suspects between Hong Kong and other jurisdictions was governed by U.K. trea-
ties that had been extended to Hong Kong. See Albert Chen, Post-1997 Extradition and
Criminal Law, GAZETTE L. Soc. HONG KONG (May 1993) 41. These treaties ceased to
apply to Hong Kong after the handover, and while the mainland has returned many
suspects to Hong Kong under an informal administrative arrangement, Hong Kong has
not reciprocated. See Hualing L. Fu, The Form and Substance of Legal Interaction Between
Hong Kong and Mainland China: Towards Hong Kong's New Legal Sovereignty (Jan. 1999)
(stating that this has led mainland to regard Hong Kong as safe haven for people who
have committed crimes in mainland).
240. This concern applies not only to HKSAR democracy or free speech activists
who might be detained without cause during visits to the mainland, but also even to
business persons and tourists from the HKSAR. Cynthia Wan, Security Officials Insist
Sharp Increase Due to Wider Publicity, Not More, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 28, 1999
(stating number of HKSAR people detained on mainland had almost doubled since
May). For example, a permanent resident of the HKSAR is currently being detained by
authorities in Inner Mongolia in relation to a business debt. Cynthia Wan, Officials Play
Out Cruel Farce, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 4, 1999 (reporting on futile journey of
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A stronger assertion of Hong Kong's autonomy would have
required the HKSAR administration to have sought a Hong
Kong forum for the trial based on the comparative severity of the
conduct allegedly committed in the HKSAR as opposed to that
allegedly committed in the mainland. Such comparison clearly
warranted a Hong Kong forum for the Telford Gardens case, for
example, where the principle charge was the murder of Hong
Kong residents in the HKSAR. To date, however, the HKSAR
administration has merely stated its position that Chinese Crimi-
nal Code ("CCC") Article 6 does not apply to the HKSAR, that
the language of CCC Article 7 addressing conduct "outside the
territory of the PRC" should be interpreted to mean "outside the
jurisdiction of the mainland, 241 and that the language of CCC
Article 7 addressing "PRC citizen Is]" should be interpreted to
mean "Chinese nationals who are residents of the Mainland.
242
family of Lok Yuk-shing to bring him home after 387 days in detention on mainland).
The debt is not even that of the detained person, but the debt of an insolvent Hong
Kong business for which the person once worked. Local mainland authorities have
indicated the person's release could be secured upon payment of the debt. Glen
Schloss, Tycoon Ignores Plea Over Grandfather, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 6, 1999 (re-
porting that owner of company ignored pleas to pay off debt to secure release of em-
ployee). The HKSAR administration has failed to condemn publicly this official black-
mail. Glen Schloss, Tung Passed Up Chance To Raise Case with fang, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, July 11, 1999 (stating HKSAR Chief Executive failed to raise issue of Lok at key
meetings with Jiang Zemin).
241. Citing the "One Country, Two Systems" formula and Basic Law Article 19
(conferring independent judicial powers on Hong Kong courts over all cases in HK-
SAR), the HKSAR administration has argued that although "the HKSAR is an inaliena-
ble part of the PRC from the point of view of state sovereignty," the HKSAR and the
mainland are two distinct jurisdictional territories. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, INTER-
PRETATION OF "CITIZEN" AND "TERRITORY" IN ART. 7 OF THE CHINESE CRIMINAL CODE 3-4
(Dec. 1998) (citing also City University of Hong Kong professor and mainland practi-
tioner Wang Chenguang stating same concept). Cf Ling Bing, Applicability of Mainland
Criminal Law in Hong Kong SAR (Submissions to LegCo Panel on Administration of
Justice and Legal Services), LC Paper No. CB(2)1054/98-99(01),.Jan. 11, 1999 at 7-9
(arguing that HKSAR Government's interpretation is "fallacy" because jurisdiction is
"an attribute of state sovereignty" and state's scope ofjurisdiction is defined by scope of
state's territorial sovereignty).
242. See Basic Law, supra note 10, at art. 18. The HKSAR administration recog-
nizes that HKSAR residents are Chinese "nationals" under the PRC's Nationality Law,
which applies to HKSAR residents through its inclusion in Annex III to the Basic Law.
See id. (incorporating PRC laws listed in Annex III, including PRC Nationality Law).
Citing the absence of the PRC Criminal Law in Annex III, however, the HKSAR argues
that "a distinction must be drawn between SAR residents and Mainland residents for
the purposes of the [PRC Criminal Law]" because any reading that applied the PRC
Criminal Law to Hong Kong residents would be contrary both to the intent of the NPC
and the Basic Law. DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, supra note 241, at 2.
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Of course, these interpretations are not binding on Beijing, re-
gional, local, or mainland courts or executive authorities. 243
The apparent reluctance of the HKSAR administration to
confront mainland authorities over jurisdictional questions cre-
ates an impression that the administration is not adequately pro-
moting its autonomy and instead "ceding its powers" to the
mainland.244 This reluctance can only undermine the integrity
of Hong Kong's criminal justice system and the jurisdiction of
Hong Kong courts.245 Moreover, the HKSAR administration's
passive approach raises serious concern that any agreements that
may be reached in these areas will not adequately take into ac-
count Hong Kong's international obligations, leading to a wide
range of potential legal challenges and conflicts between the
HKSAR and Beijing.
For example, the HKSAR administration and mainland au-
243. This interpretation has not been universally adopted even within Hong Kong.
For example, although the Law Society of Hong Kong-the official professional associa-
tion of Hong Kong's 6000 plus solicitors-agrees that "the Mainland does not have
jurisdiction to prosecute or try a person under the PRC Criminal Law or any other law
in relation to an offence, the acts of which, were committed wholly in the HKSAR," it
has stated that "further discussions" are needed to determine jurisdiction in cases in-
volving multiple, continuing, and inchoate offenses (i.e., attempts or conspiracy). See
The Law Society of Hong Kong, The Law Society's Submissions on the Conflicts of Criminal
Jurisdiction Between the Mainland and the HKSAR Courts, LC Paper No. CB(2)1070/98-
99(01) (Jan. 14, 1999).
244. See, e.g., Gren Manuel, Justice on Trial in Big Spender Case, S. CHINA MORNING
PosT, Oct. 27, 1998 (stating that Secretary for Security Regina Ip Lau Suk-yee was put
under public pressure to answer why Hong Kong had not fought for jurisdiction over
Big Spender case). Secretary for Justice Elsie Leung, however, has called worries about
these jurisdictional questions "misconceived." See Elsie Leung, supra note 238, at 57
(stating that when put "in their proper context," Big Spender and Telford Gardens cases
should not cause alarm because "there is no question of undermining the judicial juris-
diction of the SAR," and "[a] llegations that SAR officials are not vigorously defending
the SAR system are unfounded and only discredit unjustifiably the integrity of our legal
system").
245. Another possible explanation for the HKSAR administration's reluctance to
seek jurisdiction in these cases is political expediency: unlike Hong Kong, capital pun-
ishment is regularly imposed in mainland China. In the Big Spender case in particular,
mainland prosecution and capital sentencing of the notorious leader of a violent gang
was popular with a significant sector of Hong Kong's general public despite condemna-
tion by legal scholars. See Fu, supra note 231, at 277 (stating that Big Spender trial was
popularly referred to as victory for cross-border liaison against organized crime, but
that legal figures argued that "One Country, Two Systems" demanded that case be
heard in Hong Kong). Of course any failure by the HKSAR administration to assert
jurisdiction for that reason would be a complete abdication of the HKSAR's obligations
under international and local law and a dangerous circumvention of legal process.
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thorities have begun discussions on a rendition agreement.246
There was no comparable agreement between the colonial ad-
ministration and the PRC,2 4 7 in large part due to concerns about
the mainland interrogation techniques, conditions of incarcera-
tion, lack of due process, failure to observe fair trial standards,
and frequent use of capital punishment. 248 These same con-
cerns should complicate efforts to reach a rendition agreement
between the HKSAR and the mainland, insofar as the interna-
tional treaties in force in the HKSAR through the Basic Law, as
well as the HKSAR's own Bill of Rights Ordinance (or "BORO"),
should preclude the HKSAR administration from entering into
any agreement that would require return of an individual under
circumstances in which the protected rights would be violated.
With this in mind, members of Hong Kong's legal community
have demanded that any agreement contain clear minimum
standards of treatment and process that satisfy international
standards as well as Hong Kong law.24 9 Any agreement that lacks
246. Interview with Elsie Leung, Secretary for Justice, June 10, 1999; see Elsie
Leung, supra note 238, at 57 (stating that both sides recognize need for agreement, but
that negotiations are "complex"). The HKSAR administration has also begun a study of
other countries' extradition rules. Study of Foreign Extradition Rules, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, May 25, 1999. The HKSAR administration is also pursuing an agreement on
criminal jurisdiction in cross-border cases. Interview with Elsie Leung, Secretary for
Justice, June 10, 1999 (stating that Hong Kong government is working on such agree-
ment). Article 95 of the Basic Law may provide a basis for a formal agreement. See
Basic Law, supra note 10, at art. 95 (providing forjudicial relations, including rendering
assistance, between HKSAR and mainland); see also Priscilla Leung, supra note 238, at
18 (discussing judicial assistance between Hong Kong and mainland and possible crite-
ria for determining proper forum in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, including
whether act in question is crime in both jurisdictions and locus of most injury).
247. See GHIAI, supra note 18, at 354. In fact, the PRC has extradition agreements
with relatively few states: Belarus, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Romania, the Rus-
sian Federation, and Thailand, and has a semi-formal arrangement with Taiwan. See Dr.
Hualing Fu, One Country and Two Systems: Will Hong Kong and the Mainland Reach an
Agreement on Rendition?, HONG KONG LAWYER, Jan. 1999, at 52 (discussing China's inter-
national extradition regime).
248. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT, THE DEATH PENALTY IN CHINA: BREAKING
REcORDS, BREAKING RULES, ASA 17/38/97, Aug. 1997 (discussing inadequate criminal
justice procedures, lack of due process and respect for legal rights of accused, cruel and
inhuman treatment of prisoners, and broad range of crimes for which death penalty is
punishment in China, all of which have raised international concern); supra note 247,
at 51-52 (stating that "the conclusion and operation of a rendition agreement is bound
to be a difficult and tortuous process").
249. See Margaret Ng, Rendition Negotiations Must Have a Bottom Line, HONG KONG
LAWYER, Jan. 1999, at 14 (discussing in particular need to include as bottom line safe-
guards cited in Hong Kong's Fugitive Offenders Ordinance). Under the Fugitive Of-
fenders Ordinance, which contains procedural safeguards for criminal justice, Hong
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such minimum standards will almost certainly be challenged in
the HKSAR courts, setting the stage for another right of abode
style crisis.
Moreover, even if an agreement could be reached that ear-
nestly addressed concerns of due process, interrogation tech-
niques, and conditions of incarceration, the mainland's use of
capital punishment would pose an obstacle to rendition in seri-
ous cases.250 Hong Kong effectively does not have capital pun-
ishment, while the mainland uses the death penalty exten-
sively.21 Rendition of HKSAR prisoners to the mainland in a
capital case may violate Hong Kong's obligations under the
ICCPR and the Basic Law. 252 Any agreement on rendition
should therefore contain a prohibition on the execution of pris-
oners returned under its terms.253
The mainland's use of criminal charges against acts of polit-
ical, religious, or moral character is another obstacle to an effec-
tive agreement. Serious conflict between the systems could re-
sult if a rendition agreement were to require the HKSAR to re-
turn to the mainland an acknowledged political dissident on
charges arising out of conduct that is not only not criminal in
Kong has created agreements with several countries, such as the United Kingdom and
Singapore, but not yet with the PRC. See Fugitive Offenders Ordinance, Cap. 503 (Apr.
25, 1997) (stating, for example, at 10(6) (b) (iii), that parties requesting surrender of
fugitive must prove that crime for which fugitive is wanted is also crime under Hong
Kong law). Others cite the need to balance the interests in preventing criminals from
escaping justice and the need to safeguard individual rights. Elsie Leung, supra note
238, at 57.
250. See Elsie Leung, supra note 238, at 57 (calling China's use of capital punish-
ment "important factor" in negotiations).
251. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 1999 ANNUAL REPORT ON CHINA (visited Aug. 5,
1999) <http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/ar99/asa17.htm> (on file with the Ford-
ham International Law Journal) (stating that at least 1067 people were executed in 1998,
and that 89 people were executed duringJanuary 1999 in Beijing alone).
252. ICCPR, supra note 8, at art. 6; see Basic Law, supra note 10, at art. 28 (prohibit-
ing unlawful deprivation of life of any resident). Analogous precedent for refusing
rendition in capital cases may be found in international law in the Soering case, where
the European Court of Human Rights refused the extradition of an accused murderer
to the United States. The Soering Case, 28 I.L.M. 1063 (1989).
253. This situation would of course create a dilemma in capital cases involving two
or more defendants, where one or more were apprehended in the HKSAR. If returned
under a rendition agreement containing a capital punishment exception, then the de-
fendants who reached the HKSAR prior to conviction may be spared execution without
regard to their culpability relative to those who never left the mainland. This result
would create an unwelcome incentive for serious criminals illegally to enter the HK-
SAR.
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the HKSAR, but may also be protected under the Basic Law. 254
Any agreement, therefore, would need to contain an exception
for such political offenses.
Finally, even if an agreement is reached that contains lan-
guage ensuring appropriate minimum standards and necessary
exceptions, it is likely that counsel representing clients facing
rendition to the mainland will challenge that effort with evi-
dence showing that those standards are not observed in practice
or that their client qualifies for the exceptions. Such arguments
will place the HKSAR courts in the potentially difficult position
of passing judgment on the fairness and adequacy of mainland
processes.
The delegation recognizes that reaching appropriate agree-
ments in these areas will be difficult. The delegation is con-
cerned, however, that given the handling of the right of abode
controversy, the HKSAR administration may be too willing to de-
fer to mainland authorities in the drafting of cross-border agree-
ments in the hope of avoiding these difficult questions. This ap-
plication would only invite more serious controversy in the fu-
ture.
d. Equal Application of Law
The HKSAR administration's apparent willingness to sacri-
fice Hong Kong's autonomy in order to avoid conflict with main-
land interests is not limited to the negotiation of cross-border
agreements, but may extend so far as to threaten the bedrock
principle of equality under the law. In its first two years, the HK-
SAR has seen a number of cases that raise questions of preferen-
tial treatment.
In the Xinhua case, Legislative Councilor Emily Lau filed a
request pursuant to Hong Kong's private information ordinance
with the New China News Agency ("Xinhua") to see any per-
sonal information file Xinhua possessed about her.255 Xinhua is
a private, Hong Kong-based company, which prior to the
254. See, e.g., Basic Law, supra note 10, at art. 27 (protecting Hong Kong residents
freedom of speech, press, publication, and association).
255. Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap. 486), enacted 1995 (stating that its
goal is to "protect the privacy of individuals in relation to personal data"). Ms. Emily
Lau requested the information from Zhou Nan, then director of Xinhua in Hong
Kong. Emily Lau, Vho Is Above the Law?, (Mar. 2, 1998) <http://www.emilylau.org.hk/
mar0298e.htm> (on file with the Fordham International LawJournal). The current direc-
19991
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handover, was the unofficial representative of Beijing in Hong
Kong. 256 Although the ordinance requires production of re-
quested information within forty days, Xinhua did not respond
until ten months later, stating it did not have her file.25 7 Ms. Lau
then filed a complaint with the office of the Privacy Commis-
sioner, who one year later referred the case to the Department
of Justice recommending prosecution.258 Secretary for Justice
Elsie Leung declined to prosecute without public explanation. 9
Chief Executive Tung publicly supported Mrs. Leung's decision,
stating that Xinhua committed only "a technical breach" of the
ordinance. 26 ° The concern is that Xinhua, having clearly vio-
lated the ordinance, was spared prosecution by the HKSAR ad-
ministration out of deference to its connections with Beijing.261
tor of Xinhua in Hong Kong is Jiang Enzhu, who is also a Hong Kong delegate to the
NPC. Id.
256. See Emily Lau, Letter to Hong Kong, broadcast on RADIO TELEVISION HONG
KONG on April 12, 1998 (visited May 6, 1999) <http://www.democracy.org.hk/
pastweek/may24_30/election/emily-plc.end.htm> (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal.) (explaining that Xinhua's multiple roles as news agency, Chinese
Government Department, and front for Chinese Communist Party, known in Hong
Kong as Hong Kong Macau Work Committee).
257. See Emily Lau, No One is Above the Law, supra note 255 (visited July 7, 1999)
<http://www.democracy.org.hk> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal.)
(providing factual background of her case).
258. Lau, supra note 255.
259. Id.
260. See Lau, supra note 256 (noting that although most of Hong Kong press ig-
nored Xinhua case, European media questioned Mr. Tung about it). Following the
Department of Justice's decision, Ms. Lau brought a private suit against Xinhua Direc-
tor Jiang Enzhou. On June 8, 1999, the High Court recognized that Ms. Lau had a
bone fide complaint but dismissed the case on procedural grounds including statute of
limitations and failure to identify a proper representative of the defendant unincorpo-
rated association. See Lau, supra, note 257 (calling it "regrettable" that hearing did not
focus instead on whether Xinhua violated Privacy Ordinance).
261. Although some argued that Xinhua should be considered an organ of the
PRC, and therefore immune from prosecution, no finding of immunity supported the
administration's decision. On April 15, 1998, the Provisional LegCo passed the Adapta-
tion of Laws (Interpretive Provisions) Ordinance, a predominantly technical ordinance
aimed at adapting the laws to reflect Hong Kong's new post-colonial status by, among
other things, substituting references to the "Crown" with references to the "State," in-
cluding not only the HKSAR Government and the Central Government in Beijing, but
also the Central Government's subordinate organs. See Adaptation of Laws (Interpre-
tive Provisions) Ordinance, Ordinance No. 26 of 1998, passed by PRC on April 15,
1998, section 24 [hereinafter Adaptation of Laws Ordinance]; see also CHEN, supra note
41, at 38 (stating that HKSAR Government has admitted that definition of "State" in-
cludes office of Commissioner of PRC Foreign Ministry in Hong Kong, Chinese military
forces in Hong Kong, and Hong Kong Branch of Xinhua News Agency). It is unclear
whether Xinhua should be considered a state organ and if it were, whether immunity
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This case raises questions about the HKSAR administration's
willingness and ability to preserve Hong Kong's autonomy and
equality of all parties before the laws of the HKSAR.
The Sally Aw case raises the same concerns about those affil-
iated with the HKSAR administration. That case involved an al-
leged conspiracy to defraud advertisers of the English-language
daily The Hong Kong Standard by inflating circulation figures.
The prosecution charged and convicted two senior executives
and a former employee.262 The owner of the paper, Ms. Sally Aw
Sian, was named in the charging instrument as a co-conspirator
but was neither charged nor compelled to testify at the January
1999 trial.263
The Department of Justice initially refused to explain why
Ms. Aw was named but not charged, stating that the case was
pending. The department then indicated that it was investigat-
ing the decision, with Secretary for Justice Elsie Leung stating
publicly that she would have to wait until the investigation was
complete before commenting. 26 4 This reply gave the impression
that either the Secretary for Justice did not know why the deci-
sion was made, or that the "investigation" was no more than an
attempt to discover an acceptable basis for the decision after the
fact. On February 7, 1999, Grenville Cross, the Director of Pub-
lic Prosecutions reported that the decision not to prosecute was
for Xinhua, as such, would not violate the Basic Law. Article 22 of the Basic Law pro-
vides that all governmental departments "shall abide by the laws of the Region." Basic
Law, supra note 10, at art. 22; Lau, supra note 256. Qualifying Xinhua as a state organ
may also violate Section 3 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance, which
provides that an organization that exercises commercial functions cannot be regarded
as a state organ. See Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance, Cap. 1, Section 3;
see also Xinhua Mocks the Law, press release of the Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor,
June 22, 1999 (discussing Xinhua's commercial activities).
262. The conspirators allegedly inflated circulation figures by forming a dummy
corporation through which they purchased and immediately destroyed thousands of
copies of the paper each day. Jimmy Cheung, Justice Chief Blasted over Sally Aw Decision,
S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Feb. 4, 1999. General manager Henrietta So Shuk-wa was
sentenced to six months in jail. Id. Finance manager Tang Cheong-shing and ex-circu-
lation director David Wong Wai-shing were each sentenced to four months in jail. Id.
263. Ms. Sally Aw is a member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Con-
ference and is reportedly a friend of Chief Executive Tung. Clive Buddle, Rich Handed
License To Break Law, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Feb. 5, 1999; Cheung Yi, The Sally Aw
Case: Fears for Faith in Judicial System, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Feb. 5, 1999; Cheung,
supra note 262.
264. See Cheung, supra note 262.
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"solely due to lack of evidence. 265  In subsequent remarks
before the LegCo's Panel on the Administration of Justice and
Legal Services, Secretary Leung added that although insufficient
evidence was the main factor, the "public interest" was also con-
sidered.2 66 She went on to explain that there was some fear that
prosecution of Ms. Aw would lead to the collapse of her media
enterprise, which would, in the eyes of the administration, send
a "very bad message to the international community. "267 These
comments were taken by many in Hong Kong as a startling ad-
mission that the HKSAR's prosecution policy was decided "not
by equality before the law but by how wealthy you are,"2 68 with
one standard for the wealthy and politically influential and an-
other for the poor.2 6 9
Equality under the law is a fundamental principle applica-
ble to Hong Kong through the Basic Law,270 the BORO, 271 and
the ICCPR.2 72 Taken together, the Xinhua and Sally Aw cases
raise serious concerns about the HKSAR administration's com-
mitment to that principle. Although the delegation recognizes
the HKSAR administration's desire to avoid conflict as it imple-
ments the "One Country, Two Systems" experiment, it must not
do so at the expense of fundamental legal principles and safe-
guards or without due regard for Hong Kong's autonomy, rule
of law, and international legal commitments.
265. See Aw Ruling: Solely Due to Lack of Evidence, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 8,
1999. This explanation begged the question of how the Secretary for Justice could
apparently not know the state of the evidence in the case until after the trial had con-
cluded, and further, failed to explain why Ms. Aw was not called to testify. Id.
266. Id.
267. See Cheung, supra note 262.
268. See Cliff Buddle, Leung Faces Wrath of Barristers, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb.
5, 1999 (quoting Senior Counsel Gerard McCoy).
269. See Buddle, supra note 263 (quoting multiple lawyers and lecturers on their
reactions to Secretary Leung's decision not to prosecute, citing multiple critical com-
ments of Hong Kong lawyers). Cf Grenville Cross, Secretary for Justice Acted with Integrity,
HONG KONG LAWYER, Mar. 1999, at 21 (defending Secretary Leung's decision and subse-
quent comments). Lawyers also claimed that the comments give license to other ty-
coons to commit crimes and then avoid prosecution by citing the damage it would do to
their business. The Hong Kong Bar Association has called for an independent counsel
to reconsider whether to prosecute Sally Aw. See Chueng, supra note 263.
270. See Basic Law, supra note 10, at art. 25 ("All Hong Kong residents shall be
equal before the law.").
271. Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Art. 22.
272. ICCPR, supra note 8, at Art. 26.
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e. Bilingualization
In at least one crucial respect, the resumption of Chinese
sovereignty promises to bring Hong Kong closer to international
rule of law standards by making the HKSAR's common law sys-
tem more accessible to the territory's vast Chinese-speaking ma-
jority. General international standards typically direct govern-
ments to provide adequate access to legal services regardless of
language. 27' The Joint Declaration in effect mandates adequate
linguistic access to the justice system by assuming that Chinese
shall be the HKSAR's official language while additionally permit-
ting the use of English.27 4 Implementing this obligation, Article
9 declares that "[i] n addition to the Chinese language, English
may also be used as an official language by executive authorities,
legislature, and judiciary" of the HKSAR.27 5
Approximately ninety-five percent of Hong Kong's popula-
tion speaks Cantonese, which is one of the main Chinese dia-
lects. 2 7 6 For most of the colonial period, however, Hong Kong's
executive, legislative, and judicial functions were conducted al-
most entirely in English.2 77 With the reversion of sovereignty has
come an effort to create a truly bilingual system of govern-
ance. 78 This effort should be commended for its ability to make
273. Article 2 of the U.N. Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, for example,
declares that:
Governments shall ensure that efficient procedures and responsive mecha-
nisms for effective and equal access to lawyers are provided for all persons
within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction, without distinction of
any kind, such as discrimination based on race, colour, ethnic origin, sex, lan-
guage, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth, economic or other status.
G.A. Res. 45/121, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess. (1990); G.A. Res. 45/166 U.N. GAOR, 45th
Sess. (1990) (emphasis added). As with the Basic Principles on the Independence of
the Judiciary, see Basic Principles, supra note 12. The Basic Principles, while not com-
prising a treaty, have received the approval of the General Assembly and reflect a con-
sidered global consensus that provides evidence of customary international law.
274. SeeJoint Declaration, supra note 17, at annex I, art. I.
275. See Basic Law, supra note 10, at art. 9. (Emphasis added.)
276. See Gum, supra note 18, at 347. Cantonese is the native language in Hong
Kong, while Mandarin (locally known as "Putonghua") is spoken in most of mainland
China. Id. The two languages have different written forms, as Hong Kong uses the
classical characters and China uses the simplified characters. Id.
277. See id. at 346-49 (noting also that in some lower level courts, such as juvenile
court or coroner's inquiries, courts could choose to hold proceedings in either lan-
guage).
278. In 1974, the colonial government passed the Official Languages Ordinance
that for the first time designated both English and Chinese the official languages for all
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the HKSAR government and Hong Kong's legal system in partic-
ular more accessible to the majority of Hong Kong's residents,
thereby strengthening the rule of law and Hong Kong's
fledgling democratic institutions.
Already significant steps toward this goal have been
achieved. All of the laws of the HKSAR have been translated and
published in equally authentic English and Chinese versions, 279
and the HKSAR judiciary is establishing a basic Chinese-lan-
guage version of the common law by translating significant prior
English-language court decisions from Hong Kong and other ju-
risdictions.28 ° The judiciary has also been developing a legal
glossary to establish and record accepted Chinese equivalents to
established English common law terms.28 1 As for court access,
sixty-five percent of lower-level court proceedings are now con-
ducted in Chinese.28 2 Although most upper level legal proceed-
ings are still conducted in English,8 3 recent legislation allows
government communications with the public. See Official Languages Ordinance (Cap.
5) 1974, Feb. 15, 1974, 3(1). In addition, this Ordinance provided that both lan-
guages "possess equal status and ... enjoy equality of use." Id. 3(2). In 1987, the
government amended the ordinance to require all legislation be enacted and published
in both English and Chinese and to provide for the translation of all prior ordinances
into Chinese. See Official Languages (Amendment) Ordinance, 1987, 4 (creating
Bilingual Advisory Committee to confirm authenticity of both versions); Interpretive
and General Clauses (Amendment) Ordinance (Cap. 1) 1987, 10(b) (providing that
English language text and Chinese language text of ordinance are equally authentic,
presumed to have same meaning, and where comparison of two versions discloses dif-
ference of meaning which rules of statutory interpretation do not resolve meaning
which best reconciles texts shall be adopted); see also Law Drafting Division of the De-
partment ofJustice, A Paper Discussing Cases Where the Two Language Texts of an Enactment
are Alleged to be Different, May 1998 (creating further explicit guidelines for reconcilia-
tion between two versions).
279. Id. § 1.5. Both language texts of all laws are also readily available on a website
attached to the Department ofJustice's website. See BLIS on the Internet, (visited May 6,
1999) <http://www.justice.gov.hk/blis.nsf> (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal).
280. See interview with Patrick Chan, Chief Justice of the High Court, in Hong
Kong (June 10, 1999). The Committee for a Bilingual Legal System is currently choos-
ing the most important common law cases from both Hong Kong and other common
law jurisdictions to translate into Chinese. Id.
281. HONG KONG COURT INTERPRETERS GRADE, JUDICIARY, A GLOSSARY OF LEGAL Ex-
PRESSIONS. See also interview with Patrick Chan, Chief Justice of the High Court, in
Hong Kong, June 10, 1999.
282. Interview with Patrick Chan, Chief Justice of the High Court, in Hong Kong,
June 10, 1999.
283. Id. Sixty-five percent of all cases in the magistrates courts are now heard in
Chinese, but only 35% of all cases in the district courts and 15% of cases in the High
Court are heard in Chinese. Id.
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members of the court, counsel, parties, and witnesses to any pro-
ceeding to use either or both languages.284
One serious concern, however, is that rather than develop a
truly bilingual system of co-equal languages, Hong Kong will in-
creasingly adopt the Chinese language and abandon English.285
The delegation met with members of the legal profession and
judiciary who expressed this concern, citing as evidence a per-
ceived decline in English-language fluency among members of
the bar and law students. 28 6 The gravity of this concern rests in
the understanding that English is the language of the vast body
of precedent and history that constitutes the common law tradi-
tion. This tradition includes not only the case law of pre-1997
Hong Kong, but also other common law systems like the Austra-
lia, Canada, Great Britain, and the United States. 287 A deteriora-
tion of English-language usage in Hong Kong risks weakening
reliance on this established body of jurisprudence. Moreover,
the common law is constantly evolving. A deterioration of Eng-
lish-language usage risks isolating Hong Kong's system not only
from its own past, but also from contemporary developments in
the common law.
The delegation nonetheless finds it surprising that two and
a half years after the turnover, there has yet to be a case argued
in Hong Kong's highest court in anything but English. In 1995
the perception among bar leaders was that the introduction of
Chinese would proceed at a more rapid pace. Indeed, several
prominent members of the bar, including native-born but Eng-
lish-educated barristers, advised us that they were brushing up
on their Chinese because they would not otherwise feel comfort-
able arguing in that language.
284. Official Languages (Amendment) Ordinance, Cap. 5, 5 (in force June 11,
1999). Finally, to combat the lack of proficiency in Cantonese among many members
of the judiciary, the judiciary has begun sending several judges to Beijing each year for
an intensive Chinese language training. See Interview with Patrick Chan, ChiefJustice
of the High Court, June 10, 1999.
285. Interview with Audrey Eu, Chair of the Hong Kong Bar Association, in Hong
Kong, June 10, 1999.
286. Id. Interview with Professor Albert Chen, University of Hong Kong, in Hong
Kong, June 7, 1999.
287. The Joint Declaration and the Basic Law recognize a role for the interna-
tional common law tradition in adjudication by Hong Kong courts. See Joint Declara-
tion, supra note 17, at § III (1984) (stating that HKSAR courts may refer to precedents
in other common law jurisdictions); see also Basic Law, supra note 10, at art. 84 (author-
izing courts to refer to precedents in other common law jurisdictions).
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Judges on the higher courts have told us that English is the
sole language used because some of the members of the Court,
including visiting judges sitting on the CFA, speak only that lan-
guage. But it is difficult to believe that Hong Kong can perma-
nently maintain a legal system in a language other than that of
its sovereign. It is of course difficult to evaluate how much of the
desire to continue litigating exclusively in English is motivated
by the sense that English and the common law are inexorably
entwined and how much is the desire to adhere to that which is
familiar and comfortable. Further, those that hope the in-
terchange of legal thinking between Hong Kong and the main-
land may have a salutary impact on China's legal system will find
that hope diminished if the belief prevails that the common law
is a legal system that is entirely dependant on a foreign tongue.
Modern simultaneous translation devices exist and are uti-
lized by many courts 'to enable proceeding to go forward among
participants who speak different languages. While we recognize
that using more than a single language creates difficulties, we
believe that gradual but accelerating adoption of the use of Chi-
nese in Hong Kong courts is necessary if the courts are to be
fully accessible to the populace.
Generally, the delegation strongly applauds the efforts that
the HKSAR has made towards greater bilingualization. In con-
trast to efforts that seek to make Hong Kong's legal system a
"hybrid" of common law and mainland principles, making the
common law system available in both Chinese and English
clearly comports with general international standards, the Joint
Declaration and the Basic Law. We note local concerns about
the diminution of the common law should Chinese supplant
English. Nonetheless, the delegation believes that greater access
to the system for the majority Chinese-speaking population
would not only enhance its fairness, but also would actually
broaden the support it currently commands through increased
understanding.
F. Conclusions
The delegation proceeds on the premise that the PRC's
pledge to maintain "One Country, Two Systems" seeks to pre-
serve the rule of law as Hong Kong has known it. This commit-
ment means respecting the common law legal system that makes
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Hong Kong among the most stable, open, and productive socie-
ties both in Asia and the world. The delegation concludes that
the right of abode controversy represents an assault on this sys-
tem that merits the attention and concern of lawyers around the
world. This assault came with unexpected swiftness, taking place
within two years of the resumption of Chinese sovereignty. It
also comes from an unexpected quarter, prompted not by the
mainland but by the Hong Kong administration itself.
Even in isolation, the right of abode controversy is signifi-
cant because it challenges Hong Kong's common law traditions
on several fronts at once. First, the HKSAR administration un-
dermined the rule of law by failing to implement the CFA'sjudg-
ment. Second, the request for a reinterpretation was at worst
illegal and at best inconsistent with alternative interpretations of
the Basic Law that would have better secured judicial indepen-
dence. Third, the administration's failure to pursue the amend-
ment process, including interim measures that might have al-
lowed that process to go forward, abandoned a course that
might have addressed the alleged immigration crisis while avoid-
ing significant costs to the rule of law. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, the request for reinterpretation helped introduce the
concept of Hong Kong as a "hybrid" legal system, a prospect that
certain HKSAR officials apparently view as an opportunity for
closer ties with Beijing rather than as fundamentally inconsistent
with the common law system that Beijing has pledge to uphold.
Although Beijing itself appears not to have instigated the
right of abode crisis, the delegation concludes that its subse-
quent actions largely confirm these concerns. Not only did the
NPCSC grant the HKSAR executive everything it requested, but
it also went further by castigating the CFA for not having re-
ferred all relevant provisions to it in the first place. In so doing,
the NPCSC engaged in an instrumental analysis that takes a sig-
nificant step toward realizing a "hybrid" system.
Ironically, the HKSAR administration's insistence that it
took these steps it did only to meet an unusual and compelling
crisis acknowledges that Hong Kong's legal system paid a price
for reinterpretation. Other cases working their way through the
Hong Kong judiciary may soon give the HKSAR leadership an
opportunity to demonstrate whether reinterpretation will be an
extraordinary measure. The need to conclude agreements with
the mainland with regard to jurisdictional conflicts will further
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give the administration the opportunity to defend Hong Kong's
high degree of legal autonomy. Should the right of abode con-
troversy turn out to have been an isolated event, as the adminis-
tration maintains, the delegation believes that the damage done
will prove neither fundamental nor lasting. If, however, further
requests lead to further reinterpretations, then Hong Kong's
common law traditions will continue to give way to mainland
legal conceptions, further undermining China's "One Country-
Two Systems" pledge.
II. INTERPRETATION V. AMENDMENT: LESSONS FOR THE
STATE OF DEMOCRACY IN HONG KONG
As discussed in Part I, the HKSAR administration bypassed
the response most democratic and consistent with the Rule of
Law when it dismissed the possibility of amendment of the Basic
Law as a means of addressing the right of abode crisis. Indeed,
some have suggested that the administration's reluctance to seek
an amendment was motivated in part by concern that the
amendment process might be used to accelerate the pace of de-
mocratization.288 Notwithstanding the merits of this claim, the
administration, in its quest for a quick response to the feared
crisis, ignored possible legislative options and discounted the
value of popular deliberation regarding the status and meaning
of the Basic Law.289 Its ability and willingness to do so reflects
the political and structural weaknesses of Hong Kong's emerging
democratic institutions.
This Part first examines the status of democracy in Hong
Kong through the lens of the right of abode controversy. The
first section discusses the HKSAR administration's attitude to-
ward democratization within the context of the debate over
amendment to the Basic Law. It also reviews the interaction be-
tween the Chief Executive and members of LegCo regarding the
decision to seek interpretation, highlighting missed opportuni-
ties for democratic participation in the referral process. Finally,
moving away from the right of abode controversy, this Part re-
288. See, e.g., Interview with Margaret Ng, Legislative Councilor, Hong Kong, (June
7, 1999) (suggesting that administration may fear that if Basic Law can be amended to
solve right of abode crisis, then it could be amended to accelerate pace of democratic
reforms).
289. See supra notes and accompanying text at 146-56.
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views the electoral system and the limits on legislative power in
greater detail. It assesses Hong Kong's progress towards full de-
mocracy, measuring that progress against the Joint Declaration,
the Basic Law, and Hong Kong's obligations under international
law.
A. Democracy, Amendment, and the Right of Abode
As Part I argues, in response to the Court of Final Appeal's
decision in the right of abode cases, the HKSAR administration
never seriously considered two legally sound options within a
common law jurisdiction: implementing the CFA decision, or
invoking the procedure under Article 159 of the Basic Law for
amendment of the Basic Law.2 0° Part I criticized the administra-
tion's decision to seek reinterpretation from the standpoint of
the Rule of Law.29 1 This section, in turn, considers what the de-
cision reveals about the status of democracy in Hong Kong and
what it may portend for the future of democratic institutions in
the HKSAR.
As a response to the right of abode controversy, any argu-
ment favoring amendment over interpretation must acknowl-
edge at the outset that the mechanism for amending the Basic
Law is not highly democratic. Indeed, the amendment proce-
dure severely limits the role of the HKSAR's citizenry. Article
159 of the Basic Law vests the power to amend in the NPC.21 2
Bills to amend the Basic Law may be proposed by the NPCSC,
the State Council, or by the Hong Kong government. 293 If the
bill to amend the Basic Law originates from the Hong Kong gov-
ernment, then Article 159 directs the Hong Kong deputies to
submit the bill to the NPC only after it has cleared three hurdles:
(1) the consent of two-thirds of the deputies themselves; (2) the
290. Basic Law, supra note 10, ch. VIII, art. 159.
291. See supra notes and accompanying text 115-30; 287-88.
292. See Basic Law, supra note 10, ch. VIII, art. 159. For a discussion of the amend-
ment process and its limitations, see Ga J, supra note 18, at 177-82. For an evaluation
of the amendment process in response to the right of abode controversy, see HONG
KONG HUMAN RIGHTS MONITOR, SUBMISSION OF THE HKHRM TO THE LEGISLATIVE COUN-
CIL PANEL ON CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS ON THE PROCEDURE FOR THE AMENDMENT OF THE
BASIC LAw (March 15, 1999) [hereinafter SUBMISSION OF THE HKHRM].
293. The Basic Law provides that "[t]he power to propose bills for amendments to
this Law shall be vested in the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress,
the State Council, and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region." Basic Law,
supra note 10, ch. VIII, art. 159.
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consent of two-thirds of all the members of LegCo; and (3) the
approval of the HKSAR's Chief Executive.294 After clearing
these hurdles, the proposal must then be adopted by the NPC in
order to amend the Basic Law.2 95
One practical implication of this procedure is that the citi-
zens of Hong Kong are not ensured direct participation in the
amendment process-there is no formal mechanism for popu-
lar approval of a proposed amendment. 296 Moreover, their indi-
rect participation through their popularly-elected representa-
tives in LegCo is guaranteed only when the bill to amend
originates from the HKSAR. 2 97  Should the NPC choose to
amend the Basic Law on its own proposal, the Hong Kong depu-
ties to the NPC would be the only direct voice of Hong Kong.29 8
Although the Basic Law gives the residents of the HKSAR the
right to elect deputies to the NPC,299 the Election Council nomi-
nated by the NPCSC chooses those deputies. °°
Despite these substantial limitations on the amendment
process, from a democratic standpoint, the process is superior to
reinterpretation in several respects. 3 1' First, because a bill to
amend Articles 22 and 24 of the Basic Law would have
originated from the HKSAR,3 °2 it would have required the ap-
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. For a discussion of the desirability of adopting such a mechanism, see SUBMIS-
SION OF THE HKHRM, supra note 292.
297. See Basic Law, supra note 10, ch. VIII, art. 159.
298. The power of the NPC to amend the Basic Law is qualified to some degree by
a requirement that the NPC must solicit and consider the views of the Committee for
the Basic Law ("CBL" or "Committee"), a group comprised of six mainland members
and six HKSAR members qualified to give expert advice on the interpretation and func-
tions of the Basic Law. The members of the CBL are not elected. See GiAi, supra note
18, at 196 (describing composition of Committee).
299. See Basic Law, supra note 10, ch. II, art. 21.
300. See GHAI, supra note 18, at 255 (suggesting that this process may not comport
with requirements of Basic Law).
301. From a common law standpoint, the amendment course is superior in the
sense that it is clearly legal under the Basic Law in contrast to the reinterpretation
route. Moreover, it comports with the preservation of the Rule of Law and with respect
for the finality of Court of Final Appeals interpretations of the Basic Law under a com-
mon law system of statutory interpretation. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying
text.
302. See Interview with Margaret Ng, Legislative Councilor, Hong Kong (June 7,
1999) (noting that, although possibility of interpretation was discussed in Beijing in
immediate aftermath of CFA decision, amendment was never raised). Legislative Coun-
cilor Margaret Ng suggested that the reluctance of the part of the NPC to propose (or
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proval of two-thirds of the members of LegCo.3 °3 The adminis-
tration cited the impossibility of achieving a supermajority of
members of LegCo or the Hong Kong delegates to the NPC as a
justification for seeking interpretation." 4 Yet, this supermajority
requirement is designed precisely to ensure considerable debate
and consensus among the directly elected representatives of the
citizens of Hong Kong, the representatives of the business and
professional communities, and the administration advocates of
the bill before any change to the Basic Law is made. °5
Second, the extended time frame for the amendment pro-
cess would have permitted a longer period of public education
on the issue and the consolidation of public support for or oppo-
sition to amending the Basic Law.30 6 Although this delay was
also cited by the administration as a reason to reject the amend-
307ment route, any problems created by the delay might have
been addressed through interim legislation °.3 0  As noted in Part
I, this possibility was apparently ignored by the administration.0 9
The amendment process also would have guaranteed a
more careful consideration of the implications of altering the
Basic Law to limit a fundamental right under Section III.
Although a consensus in favor of amendment might have
emerged, the process should have allowed for careful delibera-
tion before the scope of basic rights was restricted in favor of
accept proposals for) amendments to the Basic Law stemmed in part from unwilling-
ness to admit that change to the law might be necessary. Id.
303. See Basic Law, supra note 10, ch. VIII, art. 159.
304. See Interview with Mrs. Anson Chan, Chief Secretary for Administration,
Hong Kong (June 9, 1999).
305. Under the current composition of LegCo, the margin necessary for amend-
ment could be sustained by a combination of all of the functional constituency seats
(30) plus the Election Committee seats (10); however, it is likely, as a practical matter,
to require the support of many of the popularly-elected members. See Basic Law, supra
note 10, ch. VIII, art. 159; see also GtiAI, supra note 18, at 177-82 (discussing entrench-
ment of Basic Law). Cf Owen M. Fiss, Hong Kong Democracy, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 493 (1998) (noting tenuous status of entrenchment of Basic Law as national law of
China).
306. The CFA decision was handed down onJanuary 29, 1999. The administration
first announced its intention to seek interpretation at the end of April and submitted its
request on May 20th. In contrast, the earliest date on which an amendment could have
been considered was March 2000.
307. See Interview with Mrs. Anson Chan, Chief Secretary for Administration,
Hong Kong (June 9, 1999).
308. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (discussing interim legislation).
309. See id.
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economic or social considerations. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, the amendment process would have allowed for the
participation of the Hong Kong people in the constitutional law-
making process for the first time.31° In short, the procedure for
amending the Basic Law, though imperfect from a democratic
standpoint, would have afforded time for popular participation
in the process, public debate, and serious reflection by the citi-
zens whose rights were affected.
The procedure followed by the administration in seeking a
reinterpretation of Articles 22 and 24 included no comparable
provisions for public participation. In contrast to the relatively
clear procedures for its formal amendment, the Basic Law makes
no mention of the authority of the administration to seek an
interpretation from the NPCSC.31 Proceeding without a consti-
tutional framework, the administration was left to create its own
procedures for referral to the NPCSC. In so doing, it repeatedly
bypassed opportunities to engage the public in the process
through the public's elected representatives.
First, the administration was criticized for manipulating
public opinion rather than fostering informed public debate.31 2
At the end of April, the administration released the preliminary
results of a survey designed to measure the magnitude of the
immigration and almost simultaneously announced its decision
to seek interpretation. As a result, the administration's actions
left very little time for independent assessment of the survey re-
sults. It also did not account for necessity and wisdom of seeking
an interpretation from Beijing. Moreover, the administration's
emphasis on the dire consequences of the feared immigration
310. The Basic Law was a product of the negotiations between China and Great
Britain, its parameters set out in the Joint Declaration. SeeJoint Declaration, supra note
17. The role of the people of Hong Kong was rather limited, and the document was
never voted on or approved by them. See GRaI, supra note 18, at 41-43 (noting limited
role of Hong Kong people in negotiations and concluding that "leaders and people of
Hong Kong were used opportunistically and cynically by both sovereigns"); Fiss, supra
note 305 at 497 (noting that although "[a] number of prominent Hong Kong figures
participated in the drafting of the Basic Law.... they hardly dominated that process; in
any event they were chosen by Beijing, not by the people of Hong Kong").
311. For a discussion of the administration's justification of this authority, see
supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
312. See, e.g., JOINT STATEMENT OF HONG KONG HUMAN RIGHTS MONITOR, HONG
KONG HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, JUSTICE, AND SOCIETY FOR COMMUNITY ORGANIZA-
TIONS, (May 3, 1999) (calling upon administration " [ t] o stop indulging in propaganda,
and, instead to promote rational discussion on viable solutions").
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for social resources triggered an understandably panicked re-
sponse, primarily among the poorer economic segments of
Hong Kong society.313
Beyond manipulating public opinion, the administration
was also criticized for its failure to consult with LegCo regarding
the decision to seek an interpretation. 14 The administration
did seek and obtain a resolution from LegCo supporting the
plan to seek interpretation; however, the vote was taken only af-
ter the decision in favor of interpretation had been made by the
administration.115 Amendment was not presented as an alterna-
tive. In protest, almost one-third of LegCo members walked out
of the vote.816
As for public debate over the interpretation request, the ad-
ministration did not release the text of the request for interpre-
tation until over three weeks after it had been submitted to the
State Council.317 Mrs. Anson Chan, Chief Secretary for Adminis-
tration, explained this decision to the delegation as unfortunate
but necessary: "We would have liked to have published the text
of our request but felt that the State Council should make that
decision."31 8
The only formal legal channel for opponents to express
their disagreement with a request for interpretation by the ad-
ministration appears to be through communication with the
Committee for the Basic Law ("CBL" or "Committee") .319 The
Basic Law, however, neither provides a mechanism for consult-
ing with the CBL, nor does it oblige the CBL to take those views
313. See Interview with Dr. Stephen Ng, Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor, in
Hong Kong (May 31, 1999). This perception was reconfirmed through the two weeks
during which the delegation met with social service providers and advocacy groups.
314. See, e.g., Democratic Party Press Release, Democrats Urge Chief Executive to
Consult Democratically-Elected Re: Right of Abode (May 3, 1999) (reproducing text of
letter requesting meeting with Chief Executive Tung).
315. See Basic Law Under Question, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 8, 1999.
316. See id.
317. The request was submitted on May 20 and not released until June 11. See
supra note 138.
318. See Interview with Mrs. Anson Chan, Chief Secretary for Administration,
Hong Kong (June 9, 1999).
319. According to Anson Chan, this would have been the appropriate venue for
opponents to make their case. Id. Naturally, because the Basic Law does not explicitly
authorize such a request by the administration, it is not surprising that it does not pro-
vide a procedure for objecting to the request.
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into account.3 20 Furthermore, the Basic Law specifies no proce-
dure through which opponents might express their views di-
rectly to the State Council or the NPC.321
Having been largely foreclosed from the process within the
HKSAR and with no clear option for participating in the inter-
pretation process, members of LegCo sought to present their
views to Beijing directly. When two LegCo members attempted
to fly to Beijing to make the case against interpretation, however,
they were barred from boarding the plane at the Hong Kong
airport at the direction of mainland authorities.122 When a rep-
resentative of this same group attempted to present its views to a
visiting Beijing official, he was again prevented. 2 In short, after
rejecting the more democratic alternative of amendment, the
administration bypassed every opportunity to encourage demo-
cratic participation in the interpretation process.
The administration's decision to seek interpretation rather
than amendment does not by itself pose a serious threat to de-
mocracy in Hong Kong. Nor is it the contention of the delega-
tion that its failure to do so violated international obligations
regarding democratic participation per se. Rather, the govern-
ment's response to the crisis represents a missed opportunity to
strengthen democratic values in Hong Kong by encouraging
public participation in the debate over the status and meaning
of the Basic Law. Moreover, the deliberate foreclosure of repre-
sentatives of pro-democracy groups from participating in the re-
ferral process does not bode well for the development of demo-
cratic institutions in Hong Kong.
320. See GHMI, supra note 18, at 196-97 (discussing role of CBL and procedures
surrounding it).
321. Despite the lack of a formal channel, opponents of reinterpretation did at-
tempt such communication. See Democratic Party Press Release, Democratically-
Elected Members of LegCo Demand Meeting with State Council to Oppose Reinterpre-
tation of the Basic Law (June 3, 1999). As one LegCo member pointed out, however, at
least 12 LegCo members are not permitted to travel to Beijing. See Interview with Emily
Lau, Legislative Councilor, Hong Kong (June 1, 1999).
322. See Li, supra note 139, at 1. Ironically, a group of student protestors success-
fully presented a petition of 15,000 names opposing reinterpretation to the NPCSC
representatives in Beijing. See also Emily Lam, Legislators Barred from Mainland Soil, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, July 8, 1999.
323. See No Kwai-Yan, Beijing Chief Shielded from Petition, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
June 30, 1999, at 2.
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B. International Obligations and Domestic Structures
Although international law guarantees the people of Hong
Kong the right to shape and to participate in their government,
this right was realized only belatedly and partially under British
sovereignty3 24 and disregarded almost entirely in negotiations
over the terms of reversion to Chinese sovereignty. 325 Neverthe-
less, several important international human rights instruments
are relevant to Hong Kong and provide the standard against
which the democratic institutions of the HKSAR must be mea-
sured.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights enshrines a
strong commitment to democratic principles.3 26 Article 21(1)
states that "[e]veryone has the right to take part in the govern-
ment of his country, directly or through freely chosen represent-
atives. ' 327 It continues, "[t]he will of the people shall be the ba-
sis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in
periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent
free voting procedures. '328 Thus, the Declaration not only man-
dates that citizens be permitted a voice in their own government
but also requires, within broad parameters, the direct accounta-
bility of the government to the people in its exercise of power. 9
The ICCPR 30 which was ratified by Britain and applied to
324. The ICCPR was ratified by Britain and applied to Hong Kong in 1976 with an
express reservation regarding the obligation to create and elected legislature. See
ICCPR, supra note 8. The same reservation was included in the Hong Kong Bill of
Rights Ordinance (or "BORO"), which was intended to implement the ICCPR in Hong
Kong's domestic law. See Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Part III, § 13.
325. See GHAi, supra note 18, at 43.
326. See Universal Declaration, supra note 6. Although not legally binding when
adopted, much of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Declaration") is re-
garded as part of customary international law. Whether this status extends to the guar-
antee of Article 21 is less clear. See Hurst Hannum, The Status and Future of the Customary
International Law of Human Rights, 25 GA.J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 287 (1996). Nevertheless,
the Declaration does represent an international consensus regarding human rights as-
pirations and therefore provides a relevant standard of measurement. See NIHAL
JAYAWICKRAMA, HONG KONG AND THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
152-62 (Raymond Wacks, ed. 1995).
327. Universal Declaration, supra note 6, art. 21(1).
328. Id.
329. See Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17
YALE J. INT'L L. 539 (1992); HenryJ. Steiner, Political Participation as a Human Right, 1
HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 77 (1988).
330. ICCPR, supra note 8.
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Hong Kong in 1976, states that every citizen has the right "to
take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through
freely chosen representatives; to vote and be elected at genuine
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall
be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the
will of the electors."33 1 Article 26 adds that "[a]ll persons are
equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination
to the equal protection of the law."3 3 2
It is undisputed that the ICCPR continues to apply to Hong
Kong in some form. In the Joint Declaration, China undertook
to continue in force the human rights treaties to which the
United Kingdom was a signatory on behalf of Hong Kong.333
Moreover, because human rights treaties are increasingly re-
garded as surviving a change in sovereignty, the ICCPR and
other treaties may be viewed as applicable to Hong Kong under
international law even without this express commitment by
China. 3 4
The rights protected by these treaties are also incorporated
in the domestic law of Hong Kong regardless of the precise
source of international obligation. The Basic Law provides that
"the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the In-
ternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
and international labor conventions as applied to Hong Kong
shall remain in force and shall be implemented through the laws
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. ''33 ' The Bill of
Rights Ordinance also incorporates virtually all of the rights se-
cured by the ICCPR. 3 6
The scope of application and enforceability of these treaties
with respect to individual rights will be discussed in greater
331. Id. art. 25. The ICCPR also guarantees the right to self-determination. See
Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46
(1992) (defining self-determination as "the right of a people to determine its collective
political destiny in a democratic fashion").
332. ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 26.
333. The Joint Declaration states that "[t] he provisions of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force." Joint Declaration,
supra note 17, annex I, § XIII. For a discussion of democracy and human rights in
Hong Kong as an international obligation of China, see Michael C. Davis, International
Commitments To Keep: Hong Kong Beyond 1997, 22 S. ILL. L.J. 293 (1998).
334. See GrHi, supra note 18, at 418-19.
335. Basic Law, supra note 10, ch. IV, art. 39.
336. See Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Part II, arts. 1-23.
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length in Part 111.117 For the purposes of China's obligation to
establish a representative government in Hong Kong, however,
the critical issue is not the overall applicability of the ICCPR but
the status of the reservations entered by the United Kingdom
with respect to Article 25. Article 25, quoted above, guarantees
the right of citizens to participate in government through elec-
tions.3 8 When ratifying the ICCPR, the United Kimgdom en-
tered the following reservation: "The Government of the United
Kingdom reserves the right not to apply sub-paragraph (b) of
Article 25 in so far as it may require the establishment of an
elected Executive or Legislative Council in Hong Kong." '339
The issue of whether this reservation was incorporated into
the Basic Law to qualify the applicability of the ICCPR is a ques-
tion still open to debate. Some have argued that, by referring to
the ICCPR with the qualifying phrase "as applied to Hong
Kong," and by providing that the provisions "shall remain in
force,"34 ° the Basic Law incorporated the human rights treaties
only to the extent that they were implemented under British
rule.34 1 Thus, not only would reservations regarding the estab-
lishment of an elected legislature continue to limit the scope of
the treaty, but further legislation would also contravene the Ba-
sic Law.3 42
In the view of the delegation, however, the stronger argu-
ments weigh against recognizing the continuing effect of such
qualifications. This view points out that the validity of the reser-
vation under the ICCPR was questionable as applied to the
United Kingdom prior to the creation of the first legislative
council in 1985. In 1994, the Human Rights Committee (or
"HRC") issued a General Comment that reservations that dero-
gate from rights may be invalid. 43 Specifically, the HRC stated
337. See Part III, infra text accompanying notes 423-36.
338. See ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 25.
339. Id.
340. Basic Law, supra note 10, ch. IV, art. 39 (emphasis added).
341. The legal sub-group of the Preliminary Working Committee for the Joint Dec-
laration seemed to hold this view. See George Edwards & Johannes Chan, Hong Kong's
Bill of Rights: Two Years Before 1997 (reproducing views of this subgroup).
342. It is worth noting that the Bill of Rights Ordinance explicitly incorporates the
language of this reservation stating that Article 21 (Right to Participation in Public Life)
"does not require the establishment of an elected Executive or Legislative Council in
Hong Kong." Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Part III, 13.
343. See Human Rights Committee, General Comment on Issues Relating to Reservations
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that
[r]eservations that offend peremptory norms would not be
compatible with the object and purpose of the ICCPR.
Although treaties that are exchanges of obligations between
States allow them to reserve inter se application of rules of in-
ternational law, it is otherwise in human rights treaties, which
are for the benefit of persons within their jurisdiction. 44
Although the Human Rights Committee did not mention
Article 25 specifically, it did cite the right to self-determination
in Article 1 and made particular reference to aspects of the cove-
nant designed to guarantee rights. 345 Thus, to the extent that
Article 39 of the Basic Law incorporated not only the ICCPR but
its interpretive jurisprudence as well, the reservation regarding
the right to participate in one's own government through the
exercise of the franchise may have been questionable when en-
acted.
One need not view the reservation regarding Article 25 as
invalid when entered to conclude that it is no longer relevant to
Hong Kong. Rather, the intent of the reservation was to relieve
the immediate obligation to create an elected legislative body in
Hong Kong. Once the United Kingdom established such a body
in 1985, the reservation ceased to shield from scrutiny the un-
democratic or unequally democratic character of the legislature.
This was the view of the Human Rights Committee in its 4th Peri-
odic Report on Hong Kong.346 The HRC took the view that "once
an elected Legislative Council is established, its election must
conform to Article 25 of the Covenant. ' 347 It follows from this
view that the "preservation" of this reservation may not shield
China from the obligation to ensure full and equal representa-
tion in the legislative council.
In addition, the ICCPR's guarantee of equal protection
before the law is relevant to the latter point regarding unequal
representation. 348 Both the ICCPR and the Declaration evince a
Made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add.
6, Nov. 2, 1994.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. See U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 145th mtg. at 19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
79/Add. 57 (1995).
347. Id.
348. See ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 26.
[Vol. 23:1
ONE COUNTRY, TWO LEGAL SYSTEMS?
strong commitment to the formal equality of citizens with re-
spect to fundamental rights. 349 Thus, the ICCPR not only
obliges states to recognize its citizens' right to political participa-
tion, but also to ensure that its citizens enjoy this right equally. 35°
This commitment to an equal right of participation is also ex-
pressed in Article 21 of the BORO, notwithstanding the reserva-
tion regarding the creation of an elected legislature. 5 1 In short,
whatever the applicability of Britain's reservation concerning the
right to representation in Article 25, no such reservation applies
to the equality guarantee in Article 25 or the guarantee of equal
protection in Article 26. Consequently, the legislative body cre-
ated to represent the people of Hong Kong must do so in a way
that respects their equality as citizens "without distinction of any
kind."3 52
C. Areas of Concern
1. The Composition of LegCo
The Basic Law established a system of only partially direct
elections for selecting the legislature, a model based on the elec-
toral system of the pre-reversion legislature first established in
1985. 353 The current system utilizes a combination of functional
constituencies, defined largely by industry or professional
groups,354  geographic constituencies apportioned equally
349. See Universal Declaration, supra note 6, art. 1 ("All human beings are born
free and equal"); id. art. 2 (guaranteeing all rights to everyone without distinction); id.
art, 10 (stating that all are equal before law); id. art. 21 (granting equal access to public
service and universal and equal suffrage); ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 2 (guaranteeing
rights to all without distinction); id. art. 14 (granting equality before courts); id. art. 25
(granting equal right to participate in public affairs, to vote, and to public service); id.
art. 26 (granting equal protection of law).
350. See ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 25. Article 25 makes a specific point of guaran-
teeing rights to political participation without distinction, explicitly referring to the
principles in Article 2. Id.
351. Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Part III, § 13.
352. ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 2.
353. For a concise discussion of the establishment of an elected legislature in
Hong Kong under British rule, see Gii, supra note 18, at 260-61.
354. The 28 functional constituencies for the 1998 elections were: Provisional Ur-
ban Council; Provisional Regional Council; Heung Yee Kuk (rural village association);
Agriculture and Fisheries; Insurance; Transport; Education; Legal; Accountancy; Medi-
cal; Health Services; Engineering; Architecture, Surveying and Planning; Labour; Social
Welfare; Real Estate; Tourism; Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce; Chinese
General Chamber of Commerce; Federation of Hong Kong Industries; Chinese Manu-
facturers Association; Finance; Financial Services; Sports, Performing Arts, Culture, and
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among five districts,355 and members selected by the Election
Committee. 56 This section analyzes the electoral system and
composition of LegCo in some detail, particularly the inequali-
ties in the system of functional constituencies and their impact
on the distribution of political power among economic groups
in Hong Kong.
In the functional constituency system, industry or profes-
sional grouping rather than geographical apportionment de-
fines voting districts. Introduced by Britain in 1985, the system
was intended as a step toward greater democratic participation
by Hong Kong citizens in their government and replaced a pro-
cess of nomination and appointment of representatives from the
business and professional sectors.35 7 At the time, the govern-
mentjustified the creation of functional constituencies instead
of electoral districts by reference to a need for stability and pros-
perity.358 It was feared that "direct elections would run the risk
of a swift introduction of adversarial politics, and would intro-
duce an element of instability at a critical time.'' 359 Nevertheless,
after the signing of the Joint Declaration, Governor Chris Pat-
ten's administration expanded the scope of the various func-
tional constituencies in Hong Kong to include virtually all em-
ployed workers. 360  Though the Patten reforms still discrimi-
nated against homemakers, the unemployed, and the elderly,
Publication; Import and Export; Textiles and Garments; Wholesale and Retail; and In-
formation Technology. While the Labour constituency returned three members, the
remainder are single member districts. See Legislative Council Ordinance, CAP 542
(Sept. 28, 1997) [hereinafter LegCo Ordinance], Part III, § 20-21; Schedule (listing
functional constituencies and electors); see also HONG KONG HUMAN RIGHTS MONITOR,
REPORT ON 1998 LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL ELECTIONS (Dec. 1998) [hereinafter MONITOR
REPORT].
355. The five geographic districts are Hong Kong Island, Kowloon West, Kowloon
East, New Territories West, and New Territories East. Twenty seats are allocated among
these five districts according to population. See LegCo Ordinance, supra note 354, Part
III, § 18-19.
356. Ten members are returned by the Election Committee, which consists of 800
members representing four sectors composed of 200 members each. See LegCo Ordi-
nance, supra note 354, Part IV, § 22; Schedule 2, Part 1 (describing process for selecting
Election Committee).
357. See REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN HONG KONG, THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN HONG KONG (Hong Kong, The Government Printer
1984) (summarizing British government's position on electoral changes and creation of
democratic institutions in Hong Kong).
358. See id.
359. See id. at 9.
360. For a view of the Patten reforms and the response of the Chinese govern-
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the resulting system was considerably more representative of the
Hong Kong people.36'
In 1997, the Patten changes (embodied in the Electoral Pro-
visions Ordinance) were invalidated by the NPCSC as inconsis-
tent with the Basic Law.362 The Legislative Council Ordinance,
passed by the Provisional LegCo after the reversion to Chinese
sovereignty, established a new framework for the selection of
LegCo.363 Notwithstanding commitments to universal suffrage
in the Basic Law,3 64 the new ordinance significantly reduced the
representative character of Hong Kong's democratic institutions.
First, the ordinance substantially narrowed the functional
constituency electorate. In the 1998 elections, fewer than
200,000 voters constituted the full electorate for the thirty func-
tional constituency seats. 6 5 Moreover, the small fraction of the
electorate that voted in the functional constituencies was heavily
weighted in favor of the conservative pro-business and pro-Bei-
jing communities, which resulted in the reinforcement of eco-
nomic power through the political process.36 6
This wholesale exclusion of a majority of the electorate
ment, see David Carter, Regional Report: Hong Kong: Is Democracy in Its Future?, 3J. INT'L
L. & PRACTICE 551 (1994).
361. The scope of the Patten reforms was limited by a desire to conform to the
framework set out by the Basic Law so that the LegCo might remain in place through
the reversion to Chinese sovereignty. Ultimately, China rejected the reforms as incon-
sistent with the Basic Law and the "through train" was derailed. See Michael C. Davis,
Constitutionalism Under Chinese Rule: Hong Kong After the Handover, 27 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 275, 283 (1999). Although the Patten reforms moved the functional constituency
system toward universal suffrage, the apportionment of votes among the functional con-
stituencies was highly unequal. More than one million voters in the "broad" functional
constituencies returned only nine seats while 82,000 electors returned the remaining
functional constituency seats. See NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, HONG KONG REPORT No. 2, THE PROMISE OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN HONG KONG:
THE NEW ELECTION FRAMEwORK (Oct. 23, 1997).
362. See Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on
Treatment of the Laws Previously in Force in Hong Kong in Accordance with Article
160 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China (adopted by Standing Committee of Eight National People's Con-
gress at its 24"' Sitting on February 23, 1997), Annex 1 (listing Electoral Provisions Ordi-
nance among legislation previously in force that contravene Basic Law).
363. LegCo Ordinance, supra note 354.
364. See Basic Law, supra note 10, ch. IV, art. 68.
365. According to one estimate, the number of eligible functional constituency
voters was reduced from 2.7 million to 180,000. See Davis, supra note 361.
366. See Davis, supra note 361, at 284-85 (noting that "the design of this model
seemed clearly aimed at keeping the democratic camp in the minority").
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from the functional constituencies, though the most significant,
is not the only problematic aspect of the electoral system. Even
among the electorate comprising the functional constituencies,
voting is not equal and procedures are not uniform. First, the
size of the functional constituencies varies dramatically. For ex-
ample, in the 1998 election, the largest functional constituency,
the education functional constituency, had 61,290 registered
electors.367 The smallest, the urban and regional councils, had
fifty each. 6 ' Yet, each of these three constituencies determined
one LegCo seat. Second, some functional constituencies feature
individual voting, others corporate voting, and still others a com-
bination of the two. For example, in the legal functional constit-
uency, the electorate is made up of individual members of the
Hong Kong Bar Association and the Law Society.3 69 The finance
functional constituency, in contrast, has an electorate of banks
and related businesses. 70 Others, such as the real estate func-
tional constituency, have both individual and corporate vot-
ers.3 17 This complex composition of the functional constituency
electorate undermines transparency and creates an opportunity
for corruption. Indeed, according to one report, the practice of
multiple voting of corporations via their arms or subsidiaries in
the 1998 election resulted in an even greater concentration of
power in the hands of a small number of individuals.3 72
The combined effect of these inequalities in the electoral
system can be quite dramatic. According to one estimate, in the
1998 LegCo election, the five smallest functional constituencies,
most of which feature corporate voting, had an aggregate of only
837 voters. 73 These 837 voters determined five LegCo seats, the
same number of LegCo seats as one-quarter of the entire regis-
tered electorate in the geographical constituencies, or 698,843
367. See MONITOR REPORT, supra note 354, 9.01.
368. See id.
369. See LegCo Ordinance, supra note 354, Schedule 1, Part 2, § 8.
370. See id. Schedule 1, Part 2, § 22.
371. See id. Schedule 1, Part 2, § 16.
372. See Monitor Report, supra note 354, 9.03. The extent of this multiple voting is
difficult to determine with certainty because it must be done through a cross-referenc-
ing of elector roles and corporate ownership records. Nevertheless, the Hong Kong
Human Rights Monitor has highlighted some of the more egregious instances in which
a single individual controls anywhere from 6 to 20 votes in the functional constituency
elections. See MONITOR REPORT, supra note 354, 9.04-9.08; Gren Manuel, Tycoons Buy
Extra Ballots, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 22, 1998, at 2.
373. See MONITOR REPORT, supra note 354, 9.02.
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individuals. 4 The political impact was equally dramatic in that
the various pro-democracy candidates received sixty percent of
the popular vote but only one-third of the seats in LegCo.375
The ten seats chosen through the Election Committee only
exacerbate the inequality created by the functional constituency
system. The Basic Law provides for substantial overlap between
the functional constituencies and the Election Committee. 6
The Selection Committee, which determined the ten Election
Committee seats in the 1998 election, was even more heavily
weighted in favor of the pro-Beijing and pro-business sectors.3 77
The 400 members of the Selection Committee were selected by
the functional constituency voters plus designated local and na-
tional political figures. 8
Finally, Legislative Council Ordinance made significant
changes to the electoral process for the geographic districts.
Previously, these districts had been single member districts
where the candidate with the most votes prevailed.3 7 ' The new
ordinance created multi-member districts coupled with a com-
plex system for proportional representation. Under some cir-
cumstances, such a system yields a more representative body by
ensuring minority groups a voice in the legislature. In the con-
text of Hong Kong, however, where more than half of the legisla-
ture is chosen by an indirect process already calculated to repre-
sent various constituencies in society, the proportional represen-
tation argument is weak. Instead, the change from single-
member districts seemed calculated to reduce the number of
seats held by pro-democracy candidates.8 °
374. See id.
375. See Record Turnout Poised To Give Democrats Sweeping Victory, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, May 25, 1998, at 1.
376. See Basic Law, supra note 10, annex I, § 2 (defining composition of Election
Committee).
377. In addition to the functional constituency seats, members of the Provisional
LegCo and the Hong Kong delegates to the NPC of the Chinese central government
also had votes in the Selection Committee election. See Davis, supra note 361, at 284.
378. See id.
379. See Margaret Ng, Democrats the Losers in Tung's Game Plan, S. MORNING POST,
Sept. 19, 1997 at 29; Chris Yeung, Greater Uncertainty for Key Candidates, S. CHINA MORN-
ING POST, Mar. 2, 1998 at 6.
380. See Davis, supra note 361, at 285. The multi-member districts also had the
effect of pitting pro-democracy candidates against each other. See Linda Choy, Historic
Poll a Fight Among Friends; Revamped Multi-Seat Battlegrounds Pit Allies Against Each Other in
Scramble for Votes, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 23, 1998, at 6.
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2. The Selection of the Executive and the Balance of Power
Between LegCo and the Executive
In addition to the dramatic inequalities in the electoral pro-
cess, the democratic character of the HKSAR government is fur-
ther limited by restrictions on the functions and powers of
LegCo relative to the Executive. The Chief Executive is not di-
rectly elected but nominated by the Election Committee and ap-
pointed by the CPG, a process that is preserved by the Basic Law
at least until 2007.381 Because international law does not ex-
pressly dictate that the Chief Executive be popularly elected, this
system of indirect selection does not in itself constitute a viola-
tion. However, the combination of a powerful appointed or in-
directly elected Chief Executive and a weak legislature, in which
only a minority of seats is popularly elected, undercuts the right
of citizens to participate meaningfully in their government.
382
This Part explores several examples of restrictions on LegCo's
power relative to the Executive, including limitations on the in-
troduction of legislation by LegCo members and the bicameral
voting requirement for members' bills.
3. Restrictions on LegCo Member Bills
The power of LegCo members to introduce legislation is
limited in very significant ways. The Basic Law prohibits LegCo
members from introducing bills relating to the political struc-
ture or government operations, or bills requiring public spend-
ing."" Furthermore, in order to introduce bills "relating to gov-
ernment policy," LegCo members must obtain the consent of
the Chief Executive. 84
The scope of these restrictions is potentially very broad. In-
deed, the restriction on bills calling for government spending
could alone virtually eliminate private member bills having any-
381. See Basic Law, supra note 10, annex Il. After 2007, changes in the electoral
process for the Chief Executive and LegCo would not entail an amendment to the Basic
Law; however, they would require a two-thirds majority of the LegCo and the consent of
the Chief Executive. Id.
382. See supra text accompanying notes 362-64.
383. See Basic Law, supra note 10, ch. IV, art. 74 (providing that "[b]ills which do
not relate to public expenditure or political structure or the operation of the govern-
ment may be introduced individually or jointly by members of the Council.").
384. See id.
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thing but the most trivial impact."' 5 In an attempt to limit the
scope of this restriction, LegCo members have argued that the
prohibition of private member bills that require public spending
in Article 74 of the Basic Law refers only to bills that directly
require public expenditure.386 The HKSAR administration in-
sists, however, that the prohibition also covers private member
bills that indirectly or incidentally affect public spending.387 The
current LegCo Rules of Procedure apply a "charging effect" test
that would prohibit the introduction of a bill only if it has the
effect of increasing government expenditures. 88
Perhaps even more significantly, the Basic Law does not
elaborate the meaning of political structure, government opera-
tions, or government policy. 389 Taken together, these categories
385. See Standing by LegCo, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 21, 1999, at 14. Despite
this substantial limitation on private member bills, LegCo does exercise a measure of
budgetary power under the Basic Law. Article 73 provides that the government cannot
collect or spend public funds without the approval of the legislative branch. However,
because Hong Kong's legislative branch cannot introduce bills on public spending, the
executive branch has primary responsibility for planning revenue collection and spend-
ing, for fear of pork barrel spending by LegCo. LegCo's power over public expendi-
ture, then, largely derives from its power to reject the administration's spending pro-
posals. If LegCo does reject the administration budget, then according to the Basic
Law the Chief Executive may ask it to approve provisional appropriations. If the Chief
Executive and LegCo cannot agree on a budget, then the Chief Executive may dissolve
LegCo. New LegCo elections and new budget talks between the administration and the
next LegCo would then be necessary. The administration has some incentive to com-
promise, however, because if the new LegCo also refuses to pass the original administra-
tion budget bill, then the Chief Executive must resign. See GHAI, supra note 18, at 293-
94.
386. See Angela Li, Officials Stifling Private Bills, Says Unionist, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Mar. 2, 1999, at 4.
387. See Jimmy Cheung, Special Power Invoked To Halt Bills, Government Includes
LegCo and Judiciary, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 20, 1999, at 1 (explaining govern-
ment's expansive interpretation of limits on private member bills).
388. See Interview with Mrs. Rita Fan, President of the Legislative Council, Hong
Kong (June 7, 1999).
389. Nor does the Basic Law specify who determines whether a private member
bill falls within one of these prohibited categories. Under RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION 34 (amended
Apr. 28, 1999) [hereinafter LEGCo RULES OF PROCEDURE], the President of LegCo has
the power of decision on this issue. One influential constitutional scholar has sup-
ported this view by noting that exercising such authority is commensurate with the
LegCo President's duty under the Basic Law, art. 72, § 2, to decide on the legislative
agenda. See GHaI, supra note 18, at 282 n.34. The HKSAR administration, in contrast,
has stated that the Chief Executive should determine the scope of the restrictions. The
administration has argued that giving the LegCo President the power of decision would
defeat the Basic Law Article 74 purpose of restricting LegCo powers. See Tung Should
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could conceivably cover virtually all issues that LegCo might rea-
sonably address. Even under a relatively limited interpretation
of this language, these restrictions mean that most legislation
must originate with the Chief Executive, or, at a minimum, with
the permission of the Chief Executive. The administration's po-
sition is that "government policy" includes policies reflected in
legislation, making the definition seemingly circular and all en-
compassing. 390
Legislative Councilor Lee Cheuk Yan's attempt to introduce
legislation that would restore certain labor rights eliminated by
the Provisional LegCo illustrates the impact of these limitations.
His bill would expand the right to file a claim with the Labour
Tribunal under certain circumstances and would expand avail-
able remedies for violations of labor rights. 91 LegCo President
Rita Fan ruled that both bills violated Basic Law Article 74.392
Mrs. Fan ruled that the proposed bills would entail additional
public expenditure. Moreover, apparently adopting the admin-
istration's position regarding the definition of government pol-
icy, she determined that the bills affected government policy in
that they called for the repeal of existing legislation. 93
The limitations on LegCo members' powers to initiate legis-
lation may also apply to amendments to bills introduced by the
government, thereby further restricting the power of legislators
to affect government policy. The Tung administration has ar-
gued that amendments related to government policy also re-
quire consent from the Chief Executive when proposed by
LegCo.394 The administration insists that since the Basic Law re-
quires that private member bills related to government policies
Rule on Bills, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 29, 1999, at 6 (quoting Chief Secretary for
Administration Anson Chan).
390. See Cheung, supra note 387, at 1 (quoting representative of administration on
view that Government includes executive, legislature, and judiciary).
391. See infra at text accompanying notes 472-74.
392. SeeJimmy Cheung, Rita Fan "Conspiring to Kill Private Bills, "S. CHINA MORNING
POST, July 20, 1999, at 6.
393. See id. Councilor Lee Cheuk-yan is considering seeking judicial review of this
decision, however, the risk of prohibitive legal costs (because Hong Kong follows the
"British Rule" where the losing party may be required to pay costs for both sides, re-
gardless of the merit of the losing party's claim) may cut or even forestall the appeal
process. See Unionist Weighs Cost of Lawsuit, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, July 29, 1999, at 2.
394. See Danny Gittings, Close Encounters of a Political Kind, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
July 18, 1999.
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be approved by the Chief Executive before being introduced, 5
so too must private member amendments to government bills.3
96
The LegCo Rules of Procedure provide otherwise, subjecting
amendments to the "charging effect" test for public expenditure
but not to the requirement of obtaining the consent of the Chief
Executive for amendments affecting government policy.
3 97
Whether this rule violates Article 74 of the Basic Law has yet to
be determined.398
4. The Bicameral Restriction on Private Member Bills
Beyond these very severe limits on the introduction of legis-
lation by members, the Basic Law imposes different standards
for bills introduced by the administration and bills introduced
by members of LegCo. Administration bills require only a sim-
ple majority of all LegCo members to pass. 99 In contrast, bills
introduced by LegCo members must receive a majority of both
the votes of the functional constituency representatives and a
majority of the votes of the representatives of geographic dis-
tricts and the Election Committee combined.4 °°
This bicameral voting requirement has two important ef-
fects. First, the bicameral requirement for LegCo-sponsored
bills means that a simple majority of either group may block the
legislation. Thus, the functional constituency representatives-
who are selected by a process that overlaps considerably with the
selection process for the Chief Executive-may block the pas-
sage of a bill introduced by a legislator chosen from a geo-
graphic district. Of course, the converse is also true, such as
where, through the votes of the ten Election Committee seats, a
bill introduced by a member representing a functional constitu-
ency may be more likely to pass. Second, a bill introduced by
the administration may succeed with only the support of the
functional constituency and Election Committee representatives,
both of which are more likely to share the position of the admin-
395. Basic Law, supra note 10, ch. IV, art. 74.
396. See Paper for the Committee on Rules of Procedure of LegCo, Part A, §5
(1999) (describing Tung administration's position).
397. See LEGCo RULES OF PROCEDURE, supra note 389, Part K, rule 57.
398. See Gittings, supra note 394, (noting that, although time has passed for admin-
istration to invoke judicial review of rules as adopted, if LegCo passes amendment that
government believes violates Article 74, then it may bring legal challenge).
399. See Basic Law, supra note 10, annex II.
400. See id.
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istration. 1
In practical terms, these limitations have meant that, even
under the less restrictive LegCo Rules of Procedure, no private
member bill amending a government bill had passed as of June
1, 1999.402 Under the system of bicameral voting, only one pri-
vate member bill had passed LegCo as of June 1, 1999.403 In
short, the bicameral voting requirement, combined with the re-
strictions on the ability of LegCo members to introduce legisla-
tion, severely limit the ability of LegCo members to pursue a leg-
islative agenda that diverges in any way from the administration's
agenda.
D. International Obligations and the Pace of Democratization
Neither the Universal Declaration of Human Rights nor the
ICCPR prescribes in any detailed way the form a government
must take. On the contrary, the structure of government is an
issue largely within the scope of national sovereignty. 40 4 Never-
theless, by guaranteeing the right of citizens to equal and mean-
ingful participation in government, international law does im-
pose certain broad limitations on that structure. In view of these
standards, the delegation believes that the existing electoral sys-
tem in Hong Kong falls short of the standard for equal participa-
tion and raises serious concerns with respect to the rights of citi-
zens to participate in a meaningful way in their government.
First, the delegation agrees with the Human Rights Commit-
tee of the United Nations that the functional constituency sys-
tem violates the requirement of equal representation guaran-
teed by Article 25 and 26 of the ICCPR.40 5 In its pre-handover
4th Periodic Report on Hong Kong, the HRC noted that "only 20 of
60 seats in the Legislative Council are subject to direct popular
election."4 °6 It concluded that "the concept of functional con-
401. See GHu, supra note 18, at 262-64, 279 (discussing structure of legislature and
relationship to Chief Executive)
402. See Interview with Mrs. Rita Fan, President of LegCo, Hong Kong (June 7,
1999).
403. See Interview with Ms. Cyd Ho, Legislative Councilor, Hong Kong (June 1,
1999).
404. See supra note 326.
405. See ICCPR, supra note 8, arts. 25 & 26 (guaranteeing equal and meaningful
participation and equal protection of laws).
406. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 145th mtg. at 119, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/
Add. 57 (1995).
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stituencies, which give undue weight to the views of the business
community, discriminates among voters on the basis of property
and functions. This clearly constitutes a violation of articles 2,
1, 25(b), and 26. "47
Notwithstanding its requirement of equal participation, the
ICCPR does not prescribe a particular system of districting or
apportionment. In theory, an electoral system in which citizens
are classified and represented by occupation rather than (or in
addition to) geographic districts would not violate international
standards so long as representation is universal and equally ap-
portioned." 8 The functional constituency system in place in
Hong Kong, however, falls far short of this standard. As de-
scribed above, the functional constituencies are dramatically un-
equally apportioned and the majority of Hong Kong people are
excluded altogether from representation.40 9 Moreover, the rep-
resentation in LegCo is not merely unequal but unequal in a way
that reinforces an already powerful and indirectly elected Chief
Executive.41 0
One need not argue that the ICCPR precludes any depar-
ture from equal representation to conclude that the extremely
unequal system in Hong Kong violates the ICCPR. Article 25
may permit reasonable departures from equal apportionment;
however, the reasons for departing may not contravene the pur-
poses of the treaty.41 ' In contrast, the objective of providing a
disproportionate voice to the business community in order to
ensure economic stability and reduce the likelihood of political
change undermines the goal of meaningful popular participa-
tion protected by the treaty.
The coincidence of views that is likely among the adminis-
tration, the functional constituency representatives, and the
Election Committee representatives also exacerbates the effect
407. Id.
408. The requirement of equal representation in the ICCPR is not tied to geo-
graphic apportionment. Article 25 speaks of "unusual and equal suffrage," a require-
ment that may be met through a number of different districting plans. See ICCPR, supra
note 8, art 25.
409. See supra text and accompanying notes 364-378.
410. See supra text and accompanying notes 375-375.
411. Cf Human Rights Committee, General Comment on Issues Relating to Res-
ervations Made Upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
21/Rev. 1/Add. 6, Nov. 2, 1994 (involving central purpose of treaty as limitation on
reservations).
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of the limitations on the powers of LegCo members to introduce
legislation and the bicameral voting requirement for member
bills. Viewed through the lens of party politics in Hong Kong,
the restrictions can be seen as a deliberate constraint on the pro-
democracy agenda advanced by many of the members represent-
ing the geographic districts. 4 12
These restrictions on the powers of the legislature to influ-
ence government policy threaten to relegate it to a consultative
role, or worse, render its actions a mere rubber stamp of admin-
istration policy. This possibility contradicts the Basic Law's own
goal of gradual progress towards a fully representative democ-
411~Mrevracy. Moreover, by handcuffing the most democratic body,
and particularly the directly elected component of that body, the
restrictions undermine the right of Hong Kong citizens to par-
ticipate in their own government.414
The Basic Law implicitly acknowledges some of these
problems. Consistent with the goal of a movement toward uni-
versal suffrage, the Basic Law provides for a gradual decrease in
the number of Election Committee seats in LegCo.4 15 In the
LegCo elections in 2000, the number of Election Committee
seats will be reduced from ten to six, and the directly elected
seats will be increased correspondingly by four.4 1 6 In 2003, the
remaining Election Committee seats will be replaced by directly
elected seats, for the first time bringing the number of directly-
elected seats up to the level of the seats returned by the func-
tional constituencies.417
Unfortunately, the Basic Law provides no corresponding
timetable for the elimination of the functional constituencies.
Indeed, according to Annex II, the current system will remain in
place until 2007, after which any amendment will require ap-
proval by two-thirds vote of LegCo and approval by the Chief
Executive.418 At that time, the Basic Law provides for a review of
the selection method for the Chief Executive and LegCo.419
412. See supra note 380.
413. Basic Law, supra note 10, ch. IV, art. 68.
414. See supra text accompanying notes 368-74.
415. See Basic Law, supra note 10, annex II, Part I §1.
416. See id.
417. See id.
418. See id. annex II, § 3.
419. See id.
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Changes such as universal and equal voting for the Chief Execu-
tive and all LegCo seats may be instituted only upon approval of
a two-thirds supermajority of LegCo and approval of the Chief
Executive. 420 As a result, the functional constituencies and the
indirectly selected Executive are well entrenched even beyond
2007.
E. Conclusion and Recommendations
According to Article 68 of the Basic Law, "[t]he ultimate
aim is the election of all members of the Legislative Council by
universal suffrage."4 21 This commitment is echoed in Article 21
of the BORO that calls for "universal and equal suffrage."4 22 In
light of these aspirations and the requirements of international
law, the delegation recommends that the system of unequal rep-
resentation under the functional constituency framework be
eliminated either prior to 2007 by amendment to the Basic Law,
or immediately following according to the procedures specified
by the Basic Law. The delegation further urges the administra-
tion and members of the LegCo to support other measures that
would transform the institutions of government in the HKSAR
into ones more representative of the democratically expressed
will of the people of Hong Kong.
III. LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE OF LAW AND FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS IN HONG KONG
The right of abode controversy and reinterpretation process
suggests a significant change in the relationship between the
mainland system and the HKSAR, the impact of which extends
well beyond the cases itself. Looking toward the future of basic
rights in Hong Kong, two important lessons emerge. First, the
change in the mainland/HKSAR relationship came at the ex-
pense of the HKSAR's autonomy, particularly the independence
of its legal institutions. The change may have undermined the
ability of those institutions to safeguard fundamental rights. Sec-
ond, the change in the mainland/HKSAR relationship came at
the expense of a fundamental right explicitly included in the
420. See id.
421. See id. ch. IV, art. 68.
422. Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, art. 21.
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language of the Basic Law, raising concern that other rights con-
tamined in the Basic Law could be at risk.
In light of these concerns, this Part analyzes two areas, labor
rights and anti-discrimination protection, as examples in which
basic rights protected under international law have been under-
enforced by the HKSAR administration.
A. Association and the Workplace: Labor Rights Concerns
Hong Kong's pledge to respect the rights of workers is
found in the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, as well as the
ICCPR, ICESCR, and various international labor conventions.
Joint Declaration Article 3(5) recognizes the "rights of assembly
and association, the right to strike, and the right to choose one's
occupation. '4 23 Annex I also recognizes "the right to form and
join trade unions."4 24 The Basic Law echoes these provisions,
recognizing in Article 27 the freedom to form and join trade
unions and to strike,425 and recognizing in Article 33 the free-
dom of choice of occupation.426 The Basic Law also incorpo-
rates these pledges through Article 39's incorporation of the
ICCPR 2 7 and the ICESCR.4 28 The ICESCR, protects, inter alia,
the right to work,429 the conditions of workers,43 ° the right to
form trade unions,43 1 and the international labor conventions in
423. SeeJoint Declaration, supra note 17, at art. 3(5).
424. See id., at Annex I, "Elaboration by the Government of the People's Republic
of China of its Basic Policies Regarding Hong Kong," Art. XIII, line 151.
425. See Basic Law, supra note 10, at art. 27.
426. See id. at art. 33. Other relevant provisions of the Basic Law include Article
147 (stating that HKSAR shall on its own formulate laws and policies relating to labor),
Article 148 (stating that relationship between non-governmental organizations in Hong
Kong, including labor organizations, and their counterparts on mainland shall be based
on principles of non-subordination, non-interference, and mutual respect).
427. ICCPR, supra note 8. The ICCPR is important to a discussion of labor rights
in that it protects the right of freedom of peaceful assembly (Article 21) and association
(Article 22). Id.
428. ICESCR, supra note 10; Basic Law, supra note 10, at art. 39. Both the ICCPR
and the ICESCR were ratified by the British on July 20, 1976 and applied to Hong
Kong, with reservations. Britain ratified the ICESCR for Hong Kong on July 20, 1976,
but with a significant reservation concerning trade unions in Hong Kong. The reserva-
tion "disapplied the right of trade unions to establish national federations or confedera-
tions or their right to join international federations." See GHAI, supra note 18, at 412
(stating that reservation reflects Britain's concern that political forces from Taiwan or
mainland might attempt to use Hong Kong trade unions to cause unrest in colony).
429. ICESCR, supra note 10, at art. 6.
430. Id. at art. 7.
431. Id. at art. 8.
1999] ONE COUNTRY, TWO LEGAL SYSTEMS?
force in Hong Kong.432 Three of these Conventions warrant dis-
cussion. Convention No. 87 on the Freedom of Association and
Protection of the Right to Organize provides that both employ-
ers and employees shall have the right to establish and join orga-
nizations of their own choosing without interference.433 It fur-
ther ensures that participation in an organization or federation
will be free of interference by government authorities, and obli-
gates member states to take measures implementing its provi-
sions.4 34 Convention No. 98 on the Right to Organize and Col-
lective Bargaining aims to prohibit acts of anti-union discrimina-
tion, to protect both employers and employees from
interference, and to promote voluntary negotiation between
management and labor.43 5 Convention No. 154 on Collective
Bargaining defines collective bargaining and obligates signato-
ries of Convention No. 98 to establish legislation to implement
432. Forty-six international labor conventions are applicable to Hong Kong. See
HKSAR INFORMATION SERVICE DEPARTMENT, HONG KONG-A NEW ERA-REviEW OF 1997,
EMPLOYMENT 117 (1997). Pursuant to the Constitution of the International Labor Or-
ganization ("ILO"), the conventions were originally applicable to the HKSAR as a "non-
metropolitan territory" of the PRC. See INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION CONSTITU-
TION art. 35(4). China has since notified the ILO that the HKSAR is not to be regarded
as a non-metropolitan territory of China but as an "inseparable part" of China. GHAI,
supra note 18, at 417-18. The ILO Conventions continue to be recognized by the HK-
SAR. It is unclear what the Chinese meant by their declaration of inseparability, but no
other member state has objected and presumably the previous practice of Hong Kong
being subject to reporting and dispute resolution of the ILO continues. Id.
433. ILOLEX 04/07/50, Convention Number 87, Freedom of Association and
Protection of the Right Organize Convention, 1948 (ratified in 1963).
434. Id. Britain ratified Convention Number 87 with reservations designed to limit
the ability of Hong Kong's unions to expand, merge, and affiliate themselves with other
entities both in the territory and abroad, and the June 1997 ordinances were intended
to remove these limitations. The reservations included provisions: (1) requiring all
officers of a trade union or federation to be engaged or employed in the industry or
occupation with which the union is connected; (2) limiting use of union funds to ob-
jects specified in national laws or as approved by a public authority; (3) authorizing
public supervision of the accounts of trade unions and the application of union rules;
(4) requiring government consent for a union merger involving any union affiliated
with an entity outside the territory; (5) requiring government consent for a union affili-
ation with an international organization; and (6) authorizing the government to pre-
vent cross-industry federation of unions. See GIAd, supra note 18, at 413.
435. ILOLEX 18/07/51, Convention Number 98, Right to Organize and Collec-
tive Bargaining Convention, 1949 (ratified 1975); INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZA-
TION, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS 48 (4th Ed., 1998). Although Britain attached
no reservations to Convention Number 98, it failed to pass implementing legislation,
raising doubts about the convention's efficacy in the territory. Again, the June 1997
ordinances were intended to remove those doubts.
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collective bargaining if it is not widely practiced.436
Hong Kong's system for implementing these pledges con-
sists of three bodies: the Labour Department, 437 the Labour Tri-
bunal, 438 and the Labour Advisory Board ("LAB").4" The La-
bour Department is a part of the HKSAR administration and im-
plements policy and legislation for the HKSAR.4 40 The Labour
Department ostensibly promotes harmonious labor relations
and responsible trade unionism, focusing on conciliation of em-
ployer-employee disputes. The LAB is an independent twelve-
member board composed of six employees and six employer
representatives and chaired by the Commissioner for Labour.41
The LAB is charged with providing "guidance" on labor policies
and legislation. It operates through special committees dedi-
cated to particular areas of policy and legislation.4 4 2 The Labour
Department may consult the LAB on policy questions or pro-
posed legislative changes. The Labour Tribunal is an adjudica-
tive body designed to provide an informal venue for employers
and employees to settle monetary disputes.4 43 The Labour De-
436. ILOLEX 11/08/1983 Convention Number 154, Collective Bargaining Con-
vention (1981) (not ratified by United Kingdom and Northern Ireland).
437. HKSAR INFORMATION SERVICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 432, at 114-21 (outlin-
ing responsibilities of Labour Department and agencies within department). The La-
bour Department has five divisions principally responsible for the different aspects of
protection and promotion of worker's rights: Labour Relations Division (provides con-
ciliation service and advises on matters relating to conditions of employment and the
Employment Ordinance), the Workplace Consultation Promotion Unit (strengthens
the promotion of voluntary negotiation, consultation and effective communication be-
tween employers and employees), the Labor Relations Promotion Unit (organizes activ-
ities to promote harmonious labor-management relations), the Registry of Trade Un-
ions (registers trade unions and organize educational courses for unionists), and the
Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board ("MECAB") (adjudicating small labor
claims). Id.
438. LABOUR TRIBUNAL, GUIDE TO COURT SERVICES, JUDICIARY (May 1999).
439. See HKSAR INFORMATION SERVICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 432, at 114-21.
440. Id.
441. Id. at 117.
442. Id. Special Committees include: employees' compensation, employment
services, occupational safety and health, labor relations, and the implementation of in-
ternational standards.
443. Insofar as the Labour Tribunal is the principle adjudicative body for work-
place disputes, the fairness and efficacy of the procedures before the Labour Tribunal
are paramount. During the mission representatives of both employers and employees
criticized the Labour Tribunal as favoring the other's interest. Nevertheless, em-
ployer's prefer the Labour Tribunal as an alternative for dispute resolution to a
mandatory collective bargaining statute. See Interview with Dr. Eden Woon, Director of
Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, in Hong Kong (June 4, 1999). Union
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partment may refer cases to the Labour Tribunal after efforts at
informal conciliation have failed.444
The HKSAR administration argues that the system of pro-
tections implemented through the Labour Department, LAB,
and Labour Tribunal provide adequate legal protections for
workers rights and satisfy Hong Kong's treaty obligations. Never-
theless, several substantive gaps exist in these protections, gaps
that may pose a threat to workers' rights and a potential source
of controversy. These include inadequate protections for union
organizers, unnecessary limits on the right to strike, and inade-
quate measures to promote meaningful collective bargaining.
Significantly, these gaps had been closed in the June 1997 ordi-
nances repealed by the provisional LegCo immediately after the
reversion. The repeal of those ordinances suggests a hostility to
the rights of workers and a lack of commitment to meeting
Hong Kong's obligations under international treaties and labor
conventions. That hostility must be recognized as the principal
threat to association and related workers' rights.
The three labor ordinance amendments passed by the
LegCo in June 1997 were intended to implement Article 8 of the
ICESCR and International Labour Organization ("ILO") Con-
vention Nos. 87, 98, and 154.44' The Trade Union (Amendment
No. 2) Ordinance removed all restrictions on the use of union
funds and on the federation of cross-industry unions, removed
the ban on the elections of persons from outside the enterprise
or sector to the executive committee of unions and to the indi-
vidual union federation, and lowered the age limit for union of-
ficials from twenty-one to eighteen.446  The Employment
critics claimed that the tribunal presiding officers have too much unrestrained author-
ity and at times improperly force settlements. They also charge that there has been an
increase in workload and legislation but not personnel forcing many cases to be settled
out of court. See Interview with Elizabeth Tang, Hong Kong Confederation of Trade
Unions, in Hong Kong (une 1, 1999).
444. The Labor Relations Division refers over 90% of cases to the Labour Tribunal
after an unsuccessful attempt at conciliation. See HKSAR INFORMATION SERVICE DEPART-
MENT, supra note 432, at 118.
445. See HONG KONG HuMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION REPORT TO ICESCR 20-23 (April
1998) [hereinafter HRC Report]. It was seen that prior to the handover that training
and labor-market situations were insufficiently flexible and not really plugged in to the
needs of employers and would be workers.
446. See Trade Unions (Amendment No. 2) Ordinance 1997 (Appendix 44) (pro-
viding for regulation and control of trade union activities). The Trade Union Ordi-
nance was the only previously existing law, which had its origins in law that remained
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(Amendment No. 4) Ordinance strengthened protections for
the right of association and collective bargaining by providing a
right of reinstatement to employees showing wrongful discharge
for union activities. 447 The Employee's Right to Representation,
Consultation, and Collective Bargaining Ordinance ("Collective
Bargaining Ordinance") implemented the right of collective bar-
gaining by laying out a specific guidelines for representation and
consultation.448 Although each of these ordinances provided
new local statutory mechanisms for workers, they did not, by
themselves, expand the rights of workers. Rather, the legislation
was intended to fulfill obligations under the ICCPR, ICESCR,449
and the applicable ILO Conventions.45 °
Two weeks after the reversion, the new Provisional LegCo
4511suspended all three ordinances, citing an alleged need "to re-
view" the provisions.45 2  Three months later the Provisional
LegCo passed the Employment and Labour Relations (Miscella-
neous Amendments) Bill of 1997 ("ELRB") repealing the princi-
largely unchanged from its original enactment in 1927. See HONG KONG HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE UN UNDER ICESCR, Chapter 5, 1 67.
447. See Employment (Amendment No. 4) Ordinance 1997 (Appendix 43) (pro-
viding for protection against discrimination on ground of employee's participation in
trade union activities).
448. See Trade Unions (Amendment No. 2) Ordinance 1997 (Appendix 44) (pro-
viding for Collective Bargaining that: "Unions which organize more than 15% of the
workforce of enterprises with more than 50 employees, when authorized by over half of
the workforce, have the right to represent the workforce in negotiations with manage-
ment").
449. See ICESCR, supra note 10, at art. 5(2) (stating that no restriction upon or
derogation from any fundamental human rights recognized or existing in any country
in virtue of law, conventions, regulations, or customs shall be admitted on pretext that
ICESCR does not recognize such rights or that it recognizes them to lesser extent.); see
also, ILO Convention #87, supra note 433, at art. 1 (noting that each member of ILO
for which this Convention is in force undertakes to give effect all its provisions); ILO
Convention #98, supra note 435, at art 4 (stating that measures appropriate to national
conditions shall be taken, where necessary, to encourage and promote full develop-
ment and utilization of machinery for voluntary negotiation between employers and
employees' organizations, with view to regulation of terms and conditions of employ-
ment by means of collective agreements.); ILO Convention #154, supra note 436, at art.
5 (stating that measures adapted to national conditions shall be taken to promote col-
lective bargaining).
450. See ICESCR, supra note 10, at art. 8 (protecting trade unions and employees'
right to strike).
451. Legislative Provisions (Suspension of Operation) Ordinance 1997, Ordinance
No. 126 of 1997, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
GAZETrE, July 18, 1997, Legal Supplement No 1, A329.
452. HRC Report, supra note 445.
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ple provisions of the June 1997 ordinances.453 The ELRB reim-
posed portions of the old Trade Union Ordinance that re-
stricted the use of union funds for political purposes and
prohibited persons outside a union's enterprise or sector to sit
on its executive committee,454 eliminated the right of reinstate-
ment provided in the Employment Ordinance, and repealed the
Collective Bargaining Ordinance in its entirety. 455
The Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions
("HKCTU")456 immediately challenged the ELRB before the
ILO's Committee on Freedom of Association.457 The HKCTU
argued generally that the ELRB constituted a violation of Hong
Kong's commitments under Conventions Nos. 87, 98, and 154
because the June 1997 Ordinances repealed by the ELRB were
implementing legislation required to give the Conventions full
effect.45 8 The HKCTU further alleged specific violations of these
453. Employment and Labor Relations (Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill October
29, 1997.
454. Andrew Byrnes, Johannes Chan, and Py Lo, BAsic LAw AND HUMAN RIGHTS
BULLETIN, Mar. 1999, at 74. The additional effect of the Employment and Labour Rela-
tions Bill of 1997 ("ELRB") with Trade Unions included; that first level unions still had
the requirement that union officers be engaged in trade, industry, or occupation of
their employing union; and that the restrictions of trade unions funds for political pur-
poses was re-instated.
455. See id. "To repeal the Employment Ordinance, thus limiting civil remedies
for anti-union discrimination to cases involving dismissal and permitting reinstatement
only if both employer and employee agreed . . . To repeal the Collective Bargaining
Ordinance thus removing the procedure for collective bargaining that had been laid
down in that Ordinance." Id.
456. The Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions ("HKCTU") is an independ-
ent trade union established in 1990. It currently represents approximately 140,000
members in 42 affiliates. See Hong Kong Conference Trade Union (visited on Nov. 24,
1999) <http://www.hk-labour.org.hk> (on file with the Fordham International Law Jour-
nal). The HKCTU's primary functions including assisting workers to organize unions
and negotiate with employers for better employment terms, providing trade union edu-
cation, providing legal counsel for workers in labor disputes, seeking better worker leg-
islation, and establishing solidarity exchanges and cooperation with the international
democratic trade union movement. Id.
457. ILOLEX Case No. 1942, Report in Which the Committee Requests To Be Kept In-
formed of Developments Complaint Against the Government of China: Hong Kong Special Ad-
ministrative Region Presented by the Hong Kong Confederation Of Trade Unions, 1997, Com-
plainants' Allegations, 238-49 [hereinafter ILOLEX Case No. 1942].
458. See id.; see also, ICESCR, supra note 10, at art. 8 (protecting trade unions and
employees' right to strike). The HKCTU further argued that because the June 1997
Ordinances implemented the Conventions and pre-dated the reversion, their provi-
sions were "in force in Hong Kong" within the meaning of Article 39 and their repeal
other than by amendment violates the Basic Law.
96 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
Conventions.459
Regarding collective bargaining, the complaint alleged that
the ELRB violated Convention 154 and Articles 2 and 4 of Con-
vention No. 98 by repealing the Collective Bargaining Ordi-
nance in its entirety. The complaint maintained that the Collec-
tive Bargaining Ordinance was important because it established
objective criteria for the recognition of worker representatives
and unions. Without those criteria, employers may effectively
and without penalty deny recognition of workers' groups and re-
fuse negotiations with them. This constitutes interference in vio-
lation of Convention No. 98 Article 2,460 and Article 4,461 and
frustrates the purpose of Convention No. 154.
In its response to the complaint, the HKSAR argued gener-
ally that the June 1997 ordinances were never "in force" within
the meaning of Basic Law Article 39 because they had been
rushed through in the final sitting of the expiring LegCo.4 6 2
The HKSAR also argued that the ELRB was permissible because
the provisions repealed were not necessary implementations of
ILO Convention obligations. 463  The HKSAR argued that the
459. The complaint alleged, for example, that by reimposing limits on union polit-
ical spending and on election of cross-sector individuals to individual union executive
committees, the ELRB constitutes an improper intrusion into union activity and a re-
traction of protections in violation of Convention # 87, Article 3. The complaint also
alleged that the HKSAR violated Convention # 98, Article 1 by repealing the portion of
the Employment Ordinance that provided the right of reinstatement to workers show-
ing wrongful discharge for union activity. Article I states that "workers shall enjoy ade-
quate protection against acts of anti-union discrimination in respect to employment."
The complaint argued that the surviving remedies-limited monetary compensation
and reinstatement on mutual consent-are insufficient because they still allow an em-
ployer intent on obstructing union activity to remove organizers from the workplace.
See ILOLEX Case No. 1942, supra note 457, Complainants' Allegations, 238-49.
460. See ICESCR, supra note 10, at art. 2 (stating "workers' and employers' organi-
zations shall enjoy adequate protection against any acts of interference by each other or
each other's agents or members in their establishment, functioning or administra-
tion.")
461. Id. at art. 4 (requiring government to take measures "to encourage and pro-
mote the full development and utilization of machinery for voluntary negotiation be-
tween employers or employers' organization and workers' organizations, with a view to
the regulation of terms and conditions of employment by means of collective agree-
ments.").
462. Of course, the 1995 LegCo would not have been expiring had Beijing not
rejected a "through-train" procedure for legislators as was provided for the judiciary.
ILOLEX Case No. 1942, supra note 457, The Government's Reply, 250-60.
463. Regarding the specific allegations of the Complaint, the HKSAR argued that
the restrictions on use of union funds, affiliations, and election of officers in the ELRB
do not violate Convention No. 87, Article 3 because they merely reinstate permissible
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existence of the LAB and the Labour Department's Workplace
Consultation Promotion Unit (established in April 1998) fully
satisfied Hong Kong's obligations to "encourage and promote
'voluntary' negotiations. "4
64
On November 18, 1998, the Committee on Freedom of As-
sociation of the ILO ("ILO Committee") reported its conclusion
and recommendations in the matter.465 The ILO Committee
recommended repealing parts of the ELRB and reinstating spe-
cific parts of the June 1997 Ordinances. Specifically, the ILO
Committee recommended that the HKSAR take steps to repeal
sections 5, 8, and 9 of the ELRB to remove restrictions on elec-
tion of union officers and the use of union funds.466 The ILO
Committee further recommended that the HKSAR review the
ELRB with a view to ensuring that provision is made in legisla-
tion for protection against all acts of anti-union discrimination
and the possibility of the right to reinstatement. 467 Finally, the
ILO Committee requested the HKSAR to give serious considera-
tion to the adoption in the near future of legislative provisions
laying down objective procedures for determining the represen-
tative status of trade unions for collective bargaining purposes
that respect freedom of association principles.468
The HKSAR has disputed any need to implement the legis-
lative changes called for in the ILO Committee's conclusion and
reservations in effect since 1963. Regarding reinstatement and collective bargaining,
the HKSAR argued that Conventions Nos. 98 and 154 require neither mandatory rein-
statement nor mandatory collective bargaining. The HKSAR argued that reinstatement
on consent and "voluntary" negotiation at the level of the individual enterprise (as op-
posed to the sector or industry level) were permissible, and indeed preferred. More-
over, the HKSAR argued that the ELRB did not violate the Conventions because the
repealing legislation had been ratified by the LAB on behalf of workers and employers.
Id.
464. See ILOLEX Case No. 1942, supra note 457, The Government's Reply, 252.
The government argued that
the LAB has proved to the cornerstone of Hong Kong's harmonious labour
relations... ha[vingl an impressive and proven track record and... contrib-
uted greatly to improving labour rights and benefits in Hong Kong over the
past five decades. The proposals to repeal two and amend one of the three
labour-related Ordinances in question were drawn up on the basis of the rec-
ommendations of the LAB. As such, it represented a reasonable balance be-
tween the interests of employers and employees.
Id.
465. ILOLEX Case No. 1942, supra note 457.
466. See id., Committee Recommendations, (a) & (b), 271.
467. See id., Committee Recommendations, (c), 271.
468. See id., Committee Recommendations, (d).
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recommendations. 469 Nevertheless, the ILO Committee's deci-
sion is significant in two respects. First, it is an authoritative de-
termination that the repeal of the June 1997 ordinances was con-
trary to Hong Kong's international legal commitments. Second,
and perhaps more significantly, the decision obligates the HK-
SAR to submit regular follow-up reports on their efforts to imple-
ment the ILO Committee's recommendations. 470 This situation
will bring their progress to the further attention of the Commit-
tee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recom-
mendations, and afford interested parties an opportunity to
comment.
471
Locally, Lee Cheuk Yan, Legislative Councilor and General
Secretary of the HKCTU, has tried to force the administration to
act on the ILO's recommendations by attempting to introduce
legislation that would restore certain provisions eliminated by
the ELRB. His proposed Employment Bill472 seeks to strengthen
the right to file a claim at the Labour Tribunal for acts of anti-
union discrimination as well as strengthening available remedies
to include "employment, promotion, reinstatement without
prior mutual consent, compensation not subject to a ceiling and
possible punitive damages." 47' His proposed Labour Relations
Bill reiterates the rights accorded in the repealed Collective Bar-
gaining Ordinance, including provisions requiring that employ-
ees get paid for time taken to pursue legitimate union activities
and given remedies for an employer's breach of the employee's
right to consultation and collective bargaining.4 74 Both bills
have been stalled and the chance of their passing in the near
future is small. The delegation supports the conclusions and
recommendations of the ILO Committee and urges the HKSAR
to implement the ILO Committee's recommendations calling
469. HK Labor Express, HK Violations of International Labor Conventions 87 &
98 (visited Nov. 24, 1999) <http://www.hk-labour.org.hk/english/eexpressl3-1.htm>
(on file with the Fordham International Law Journal); see ILOLEX Case No. 1942, supra
note 457, Committee Recommendations, (a) and (b) (stating view of government that
mandatory collective bargaining would harm industrial harmony and deter foreign in-
vestment).
470. See ILOLEX Case No. 1942, supra note 457; see also Joint Declaration, supra
note 17, art. 3(5).
471. See ILOLEX Case No. 1942, supra note 457.
472. Employment (Amendment No.2) Bill 1998.
473. Labour Relations (Rights to Representation, Consultation, and Collective Bar-
gaining) Bill (2d Draft) (Nov. 22, 1998).
474. Id.
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for the repeal in the near future of certain provisions of the
ELRB and the reinstatement of the principle provisions of the
June 1997 ordinances.
B. Equality and Anti-Discrimination
Anti-discrimination protection is another area in which
Hong Kong's international obligations have been less than fully
met. Hong Kong enacted its first anti-discrimination ordinances
in 1995, addressing discrimination in the areas of gender and
disability.475 Although these ordinances survived the provisional
LegCo's attack on labor rights, the HKSAR administration's lim-
ited implementation of the spirit of the 1995 ordinances and its
resistance to the enactment of legislation prohibiting racial dis-
crimination cast doubt on its commitment to eliminating dis-
crimination.
1. Applicable Law
Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights pro-
vides that everyone is entitled to all of the rights and freedoms
set forth therein "without discrimination of any kind, such as
race, colour, sex .... [or] national or social origin. '"476 Article
2(1) of the ICCPR and Article 2(2) of the ICESCR employ the
same essential language.4 7 7 Article 3 of both the ICCPR and the
ICESCR also requires states to "undertake to ensure the equal
right of men and women" to the enjoyment of the rights respec-
tively set forth therein.478 ICCPR Article 26 further requires par-
ties to incorporate these principles of equality and anti-discrimi-
nation into their domestic legal framework. Article 26 states,
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without
any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this
respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guaran-
tee to all persons equal and effective protection against dis-
crimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex,. . . [o]r
475. Sex Discrimination Ordinance, 1995, ch. 48 [hereinafter SDO]; Disability Dis-
crimination Ordinance, 1995, ch. 487 [hereinafter DDO]. The next year, the Hong
Kong government passed the Family Status Discrimination Ordinance. See Family Sta-
tus Discrimination Ordinance, 1997 [hereinafter FSDO].
476. Universal Declaration, supra note 6.
477. See ICCPR, supra note 8, at art. 2(1); see ICESCR, supra note 10, at art. 2(2).
478. ICCPR, supra note 8, at art. 3; ICESCR, supra note 10, at art. 3.
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national or social origin.4 79
Both covenants further require parties to promote respect for
the rights enumerated therein,8 0 to provide adequate remedies
for violations of those rights,48 ' and to report to the respective
international committee their progress in implementing the
Conventions.8 2 Article 2(2) of the ICCPR requires states "to
adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to
give effect" to the rights recognized therein.48 ' Article 2(3) (b)
further requires parties "to develop the possibilities of judicial
remedy."48
4
Hong Kong is also bound by two international human rights
treaties specifically created to promote equality of gender and
race: the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women48 5 ("CEDAW") and the Convention
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination48 6 ("CERD"). Signa-
479. ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 26.
480. Id. at art. 2; ICESCR, supra note 10, at art. 2.
481. See ICCPR, supra 8, art. 2(3) (a) (finding States Parties undertake to "ensure
that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have
an effective remedy").
482. ICESCR, supra note 10, at art. 16; ICCPR, supra note 8, at art. 40.
483. ICCPR, supra note 8, at art. 2(2).
484. Article 2(3) (b) makes it clear that each State Party to the present Covenant
undertakes to "ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right
thereto determined by competent authority provided for by the legal system of the
State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy." Id. at art. 2(3) (b).
485. Convention for the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Wo-
men ("CEDAW"), Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, pmbl. [hereinafter CEDAW] (avail-
able at United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, International Human
Rights Instruments <http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/final/ts2/newfiles/part~boo/
iv boo/iv_8.html>). The United Kingdom, having ratified CEDAW on April 7, 1986,
extended it to Hong Kong on October 14, 1996. See Centre for Comparative and Public
Law ("CCPL") of the University of Hong Kong, CEDAW in Hong Kong (last modified
Mar. 16, 1999) <http://www.hku.hk/ccpl/cedaw.htm> (on file with the Fordham Inter-
national Law Journal). The United Kingdom has entered reservations to Articles 1, 2, 9,
11, 13, 15, and 16 of CEDAW. See United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women
(visited July 30, 1999) <gopher://gopher.un.org/00/ga/cedaw/CEDAWSP2.EN> (on
file with the Fordham International Law Journal). China ratified CEDAW on November 4,
1980 and extended application to Hong Kong after the handover. On June 10, 1997,
the Chinese Government notified the U.N. Secretary-General that CEDAW "will apply
to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region with effect from July 1 1997 with cer-
tain reservations." See CCPL, supra note. China has entered one reservation to Article
29(1) of CEDAW. United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, supra.
486. See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination ("CERD"), open for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 13, 5 I.L.M. 352
(entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter CERD]. The United Kingdom, having
ratified CERD on October 11, 1966, had extended it to Hong Kong, with certain reser-
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tories to CEDAW agree "to adopt the measures required for the
elimination of [gender] discrimination in all its forms and mani-
festations."48 7 The instrument enumerates the measures govern-
ments should take to eliminate discrimination "in the political,
social, economic and cultural fields. ' 488 As with the ICCPR and
the ICESCR, CEDAW requires parties to promote respect for the
rights enumerated therein,4" 9 to provide adequate remedies for
violations of those rights, and to report their progress in imple-
menting the Convention.490 China submitted its first report on
the HKSAR to the CEDAW Committee on November 25, 1998.491
Hearings discussing the report were held in New York in January
1999.
Similarly, parties to CERD agree to "prohibit and bring to
an end, by all appropriate means including legislation as re-
quired by circumstances, racial discrimination by any persons,
group or organization. "492 Like CEDAW, CERD requires parties
to promote respect for the rights enumerated therein,493 to pro-
vide adequate remedies for violations of those rights,49 4 and to
report their progress in implementing CERD.4 95 China filed its
most recent report under CERD on January 15, 1996. Hearings
discussing the report were held at the Forty-ninth Session on Au-
gust 9, 1996.
Although Article 39 of the Basic Law incorporates the
ICCPR and ICESCR and indicates that they "shall be imple-
mented through the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administra-
vations, on March 7, 1969 and entered into force there on April 6, 1969. China ratified
CERD on January 28, 1982, and extended its application to Hong Kong after the
handover. China adopted the reservations of the United Kingdom (reservations 4, 15,
20) and added a reservation (reservation 22) of its own. Id. On June 10 1997, the
Chinese Government notified the United Nations Secretary-General that CERD "will
apply to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region with effect from July 1 1997 with
certain reservations."
487. CEDAW, supra note 485, at pmbl.
488. Id. at art. 3.
489. Id. at art. 2.
490. Id. at art. 18.
491. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Treaty Bodies
Database (visited July 30, 1999) <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf> (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal).
492. See CERD, supra note 486, at art. 2.
493. Id.
494. Id. at art. 6.
495. Id. at art. 9.
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tive Region," '496 the Basic Law does not include an express en-
dorsement of anti-discrimination principles. 49' Basic Law Article
25 provides that "[a]ll Hong Kong residents shall be equal
before the law," '49 8 but creates no remedy for residents who suf-
fer official discrimination and fails altogether to address private
acts of discrimination. BORO does include several provisions
addressing equality and discrimination. Addressing gender, Ar-
ticle 1(2) states that "[m]en and women shall have an equal
right to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in
this Bill of Rights."4 99 Article 19 provides for equal rights in the
dissolution of a marriage.50 0 BORO is weaker on racial discrimi-
nation, however, with Article 22 providing limited protection
against discrimination on any grounds such as race or color.
The protections of BORO do not extend to private sector acts.51
The Sex Discrimination Ordinance ("SDO"), enacted on
July 14, 1995, was Hong Kong's first anti-discrimination legisla-
tion forbidding discrimination in the private sector.50 2 The SDO
defines conduct constituting unlawful discrimination based on
gender, marital status, or pregnancy. 03 It includes specific
prohibitions on discriminatory hiring and employment prac-
tices, sexual harassment in the workplace, 5  discrimination in
education, 50 6 and "discrimination in provision of goods, facilities
496. See Basic Law, supra note 10, at art. 39.
497. See id. at ch. III, arts. 24-42. This sets forth the "Fundamental Rights and
Duties of the Residents" of the HKSAR and contains 18 articles, none of which endorse
anti-discrimination principles directly.
498. Id. at art. 25.
499. See Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance , art. 1(2) (1991) [hereinafter
"BORO"].
500. Id., art. 19(4), art. 22.
501. Id. at §§ 7(1) & (2).
502. See SDO, supra note 475, at ch. 480. The Sex Discrimination Ordinance
("SDO") was passed by the LegCo that was elected in 1995. Along with the SDO, the
1995 LegCo passed the Disability Discrimination Ordinance ("DDO"). See DDO, supra
note 475, at ch. 487. The LegCo passed the Family Status Discrimination Ordinance
("FSDO") the next year. See FSDO, supra note 475. For a discussion of the effect of
these ordinances, see Carole J. Petersen, The Development of Anti-Discrimination Law in
Hong Kong, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L 335 (1996); Carole J. Petersen, Hong Kong's First
Anti-Discrimination Laws and Their Potential Impact on the Employment Market, 27 HONG
KONG L.J. 324 (1997).
503. SDO, supra note 475, at ch. 480, §§ 5-8.
504. Id. at art. 11.
505. Id. § 24.
506. Id. § 25.
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or services. 5 0 7
The SDO is enforced by an independent Equal Opportuni-
ties Commission °. ("EOC") charged with investigating "com-
plaints related to any act alleged to be unlawful by virtue of the
... [anti-discrimination] ordinances, 50 9 and to effect settlement
conciliation."510 Under the SDO, the EOC may also initiate its
own formal investigations, 511 but remedies in EOC proceedings
are limited to party conciliation and the issuance of enforcement
notices. 512 Victims of sex discrimination may also file a civil com-
plaint in the District Courts.51 3 Complainants in the District
Courts may seek equitable and monetary relief, which the EOC
is not authorized to order,514 with monetary awards of up to
HK$150,000.515
507. SDO, supra note 475, § 28. The majority of the complaints brought under the
SDO to date allege violations in the employment context rather than with sexual harass-
ment or other types of discrimination in education or the provision of goods and serv-
ices. See Equal Opportunities Commission ("EOC"), Statistics on Inquiries and Complaints
<http://www.eoc.org.hk/statistic/estate2.html> (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal) (indicating that from Jan. 1, 1999 to Mar. 31, 1999, 72 of 87 complaints
under SDO dealt with employment).
508. See SDO, supra note 475, § 63(7) (stating "The Commission shall not be re-
garded as a servant or agent of the Government or as enjoying any status, immunity or
privilege of the Government.").
509. The EOC is comprised of a Chairperson and 16 members. See EQUAL OPPOR-
TUNITIES COMMISSION, 1997-8 ANNUAL REPORT 67 (1998). Between April 1, 1997 and
March 31, 1998, the EOC concluded investigations on 139 of the 227 cases it handled.
Id. at 11. Seventy-one of those cases proceeded to conciliation with 55 of those cases
being conciliated successfully. Id. During that time period, the EOC operated on a
budget of HK$35,782,400. Id. at 54. It processed 90 claims under the SDO, 136 under
the DDO and one under the FSDO. Id. at 11.
510. See Equal Opportunities Commission Website, Position Paper on Legislative
Means, (visited Nov. 23, 1999) <http://www.eoc.org.hk/> (on file with the Fordham In-
ternational Law Journal). The FSDO and DDO give the EOC responsibility for adminis-
tering the ordinances. See FSDO, supra note 475, §§ 44-52.
511. SDO, supra note 475, § 70.
512. Id. §§ 77, 84.
513. Id. § 76.
514. Id. §§ 76(1) (c) & (3) ("Proceedings [for unlawful acts under the SDO] shall
be brought in the District Court but all such remedies shall be obtainable in such pro-
ceedings as, apart from this subsection and § 75(1), would be obtainable in the High
Court.").
515. Id. Initial figures indicate that few complainants have filed claims in the Dis-
trict Court with the assistance of the EOC. Id. §§ 76(1) (c), 85. As of April 1999, the
EOC assisted complainants in only two cases taken to completion. One case was
brought under the DDO and one, a sexual harassment case in a university, under the
SDO. See EOC Welcomes Judgements in Discrimination Cases, EOC NEWS (EOC), Apr. 1999,
at 8.
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There is currently no local ordinance prohibiting acts of ra-
cial discrimination by private parties.
C. Areas of Concern: Gender
Although the enactment of the SDO was a significant first
step in promoting gender equality, a much more substantial
commitment to enforcement is needed to ensure that the step is
not merely symbolic. The most significant obstacle to effective
enforcement of the SDO may be the HKSAR administration's
unwillingness to acknowledge the scope of the problem. The
administration cites low numbers of complaints to the EOC as
evidence that discrimination is not a significant issue.516 Offi-
cials also point to statistics showing that most complaints are re-
solved through "conciliation," indicating that Hong Kong is not
a litigious society and that formal, binding, and punitive reme-
dies are unnecessary.5" 7 This view contrasts sharply with the
opinions of many academics,5 1 8 geographically-elected legisla-
tors, 519 activists, 520 and service providers52' who met with the del-
egation and shared research, case examples, and personal exper-
iences suggesting that gender-based discrimination is a prob-
516. See Interview with David Lam, Secretary Home Affairs Bureau, in Hong Kong
(June 9, 1999) (stating Hong Kong is society in which merit, not gender, determines
way people are treated and that gender discrimination was not significant problem in
HKSAR). Official government reports also deny the existence of any significant prob-
lem. In its 1998 report under CEDAW, for example, China reported that the SDO and
EOC largely satisfied Hong Kong's obligations. See PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, INITIAL
REPORT ON THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION UNDER ARTICLE 18 OF THE
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN,
(Nov. 25, 1998).
517. Interview with David Lam, Secretary Home Affairs Bureau, in Hong Kong
(June 9, 1999).
518. See Interview with Dora Choi, Chinese University, in Hong Kong (June 8,
1999) (stating that EOC does not perform even its relatively limited function nearly as
well as it should, because it does not advocate enough).
519. See Interview with Cyd Ho, Member of Legislative Council and The Frontier,
in Hong Kong (June 1, 1999) (stating that Hong Kong government cannot address
issues not covered by SDO, including violence against women and care for elderly wo-
men who have not worked without institution of women's bureau).
520. See Interview with Lam Ying Hing, Hong Kong Women Worker Association, in
Hong Kong (June 3, 1999) (stating that government has not dealt with problems faced
by unemployed women who formerly worked in Hong Kong factories that have closed).
521. See Interview with Tsang Kar-yin, Association for the Advancement of Femi-
nism, in Hong Kong (June 10, 1999) (criticizing EOC for failing to reach large numbers
of women, most of whom do not have clear understanding of what discrimination is,
who do not have access to educational programs provided by EOC).
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lem. 522
Determining the level of gender discrimination in Hong
Kong is a complex task and beyond the scope of this Special Re-
port. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that, whatever the
overall level of gender discrimination, Hong Kong is obliged to
provide adequate remedies for any violation of an individual's
right to be free from discrimination on the basis of gender.
Before this commitment is fully realized, a number of significant
gaps must be filled. Some of these gaps may be addressed within
the current framework through changes in EOC policy. Filling
other gaps will likely require legislative action, including provi-
sions addressing the problems confronted by minority wo-
men. 523
One area in which EOC policy should be strengthened con-
cerns the use of EOC-initiated investigations. The EOC has the
authority under Section 70 of the SDO to initiate its own investi-
gations into possible misconduct. 524 According to critics, the
EOC has not been active enough in the use of this power.5 25
EOC statistics support this view: EOC records indicate that of
227 cases handled between April 1, 1997 and March 31, 1998,
only one involved an EOC-initiated investigation. 526 This figure
at a minimum suggests a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the
administration of the HKSAR to identify potential situations of
gender-based discrimination.527 Worse, by conveying this lack of
enthusiasm, the administration subtly discourages women from
initiating complaints: women already facing family, cultural, or
522. Factors in Hong Kong that contribute to sex discrimination include a lack of
awareness of discrimination that stems from cultural norms ascribing women to the role
of a nurturer. The economic crisis has resulted in high unemployment rates among
women and pressures within households contributing to domestic violence. Interview
with Maryanne King, Director Hong Kong Women Christian Council, in Hong Kong
(June 2, 1999).
523. Notably foreign domestic workers, who often suffer not only from the weak-
nesses of the SDO, but also the lack of protections from private acts of racial/national
origin discrimination.
524. Interview with Tsang Kar-yin, Association for the Advancement of Feminism,
in Hong Kong (June 10, 1999).
525. See, e.g., Interview with Dora Choi, Chinese University, in Hong Kong (June 8,
1999) (discussing reactive rather than active role EOC has taken wherein it does not
initiate actions or investigations without being prompted by complaint).
526. See Interview with Tsang Kar-yin, Association for the Advancement of Femi-
nism, in Hong Kong (June 10, 1999). The investigation, which has not yet concluded,
involves the higher test scores required by girls for admittance to high schools. Id.
527. Id.
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other pressures against prosecuting their rights face the prospect
of seeking assistance from an unsupportive EOC.52 8 Conversely,
the EOC's active use of its independent investigatory powers
would send a message to victims and violators that gender dis-
crimination will not be tolerated, that victims will find support
and assistance in the HKSAR administration, and that violators
will suffer the legal consequences of their actions. Such a
message would have ameliorative as well as deterrent effects.
Another policy area open to improvement concerns educa-
tion and promotion of existing complaint procedures and reme-
dies. 529 In its 1997-98 Annual Report, the EOC acknowledged
that it did not reach out to the community in its first year of
operation. Its mission statement for its second year therefore
promised aggressive public awareness programs.5"' Critics argue
that the EOC failed to meet this objective, noting that current
EOC education programs are directed toward employers only,
and not employees or the general public.531
Although the delegation agrees that education of employers
or other potential violators is vitally important, educating work-
ers about the scope of their rights and the procedures for en-
forcement is also necessary. Without such efforts, the govern-
ment's policy seems tailored to keep the number of complaints
low. This scheme is particularly problematic where the govern-
ment relies on low complaint totals to argue against the exist-
ence of a problem and then fails to use its independent powers
of investigation.53 2
The EOC's conciliation process, used in more than fifty per-
cent of investigated cases, should also be improved in order to
protect workers' rights more effectively. The process is initiated
with a formal complaint, which the EOC then investigates.5 3 Af-
ter the investigation, the EOC's only recourse is to mediate a
528. Id.
529. See id. (stating that EOC has held most training sessions in high end hotels
and similar venues far from where most middle-class or poor women reside or work).
530. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, supra note 509, at 4.
531. Interview with Tsang Kar-yin, Association for the Advancement of Feminism,
in Hong Kong (June 10, 1999); Interview with Dora Choi, Chinese University, in Hong
Kong (June 8, 1999).
532. Interview with Tsang Kar-yin, Association for the Advancement of Feminism,
in Hong Kong (June 10, 1999); Interview with Dora Choi, Chinese University, in Hong
Kong (June 8, 1999).
533. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, supra note 509, at 11.
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conciliation hearing between the parties.534 Although mediation
can be effective under many circumstances, it is not an effective
tool to resolve certain types of disputes arising from alleged vio-
lations of the SDO and may put undue pressures on complain-
ants. 535 Some activists suggest, for example, that a woman who
files a complaint against an employer for sexual harassment may
not feel comfortable confronting the employer face-to-face in
the hearing.536 Others point to potential conflicts posed by the
EOC serving in the dual role of investigator and mediator.
53 7
While recognizing the benefits of communication and non-
confrontational dispute-resolution, the delegation urges the
EOC to adapt the conciliation procedures ensuring that victims
do not suffer any undue pressures and are fully apprised of their
rights and available remedies, including judicial remedies.
D. Areas of Concern: Race
As with gender, the most significant obstacle to eliminating
racial discrimination is official and public indifference to the
problem.538 Most members of the administration, government
officers,539 legislators representing functional constituencies,
and businesspersons 540 do not regard racial discrimination as a
significant problem. Those interviewed by the delegation re-
peatedly cited the results of a 1996 government survey in which
534. Id.
535. Interview with Tsang Kar-yin, Association for the Advancement of Feminism,
in Hong Kong (June 10, 1999).
536. Id.
537. Id. Complainants are generally not permitted to bring counsel with them to
conciliations. If both parties agree to have counsel present, however, then they may
bring attorneys with them. Nonetheless, complainants rarely bring counsel to concilia-
tions. Interview with Fanny Cheung, Equal Opportunities Commission, in Hong Kong
(June 9, 1999).
538. Hong Kong is a multi-racial community. Although 96% of the population is
of Chinese ancestry, over 16 ethnicities are represented in the territory. See HOME AF-
FAIRS BRANCH, GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT, EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES: A STUDY OF DIsCRIMI-
NATION ON THE GROUND OF RACE (Feb. 1997). The largest among them include Fili-
pino, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladesh, Sri Lankans, and Nepalese. Id. In total, there are
roughly 400,000 racial or ethnic minority residents of Hong Kong, of whom a majority
are permanent residents of the HKSAR under the Basic Law or otherwise entitled to
long-term residency. Id.
539. Interview with Mr. David Lam, Secretary Home Affairs Bureau, in Hong Kong
(June 9, 1999).
540. Interview with Dr. Eden Woon, Director of Hong Kong General Chamber of
Commerce, in Hong Kong (June 4, 1999).
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83% of those polled did not consider racial discrimination a sig-
nificant problem and favored public education measures over
legislation to address the issue.54'
In contrast, many academics, popularly elected legisla-
tors,54 2 legal practitioners, 543 activists, service providers544 and in-
dividuals shared research, case examples, and personal exper-
iences suggesting that race-based discrimination is a problem.
Among the most vocal of this group, the Human Rights Monitor
denounced the government's readiness to use the opinions of
the racial majority as an excuse for ignoring discrimination suf-
fered by racial minorities.545 In response to the government sur-
vey, the Human Rights Monitor conducted its own informal sur-
vey polling only members of ethnic minorities.5 46 Their results
contrast sharply with the government's survey. Whereas the HK-
SAR's general population survey found that only a minority
found racial discrimination to be a problem, sixty-seven percent
of the minority respondents to the Human Rights Monitor's sur-
vey reported that they had either experienced or witnessed racial
discrimination. Eighty percent agreed that legislation would be
helpful, and seventy-six percent would support such legisla-
tion. 5 4 7
541. HOME AFFAMRS BUREAU, THE 1996 SURVEY ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (1996).
In an interview, Mr. David Lam, Secretary for the Home Affairs Bureau, supported this
view by stating "there is no obvious problem of any significance that warrants specific
legislation-if people are forced to act towards others in a special way when in the past
their behavior didn't need correction, such unnecessary legislation will only create re-
sentment." Interview with David Lam, Secretary Home Affairs Bureau, in Hong Kong
(June 9, 1999).
542. Interview with Christine Loh, Frontier Party Delegate, LegCo, in Hong Kong
(June 10, 1999).
543. Interview with Vandana Rajwani, Director of Indian Resources Group, in
Hong Kong (June 7, 1999).
544. Interview with Belinda Winterbourne, Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor
(June 7, 1999).
545. See HONG KONG HUMAN RIGHTS MONITOR, THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION ON RA-
CIAL DISCRIMINATION, A SUBMISSION TO THE LEGCO PANEL ON HOME AFFAIRS, (Sept.
1998). In its 1996 Concluding Observations on Hong Kong, the United Nations Com-
mittee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights also criticized the HKSAR's use of the
racial majority opinion, criticizing the government's "step-by-step" approach according
to which legislation for the protection of vulnerable minorities is adopted primarily on
the basis of public opinion surveys, that is based on majority views. U.N. COMMITFEE ON
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, 1996 REPORT ON HONG KONG (1996).
546. See HONG KONG HUMAN RIGHTS MONITOR, supra note 545, at 3.
547. Id. Among those who considered themselves to have personally experienced
or witnessed racial discrimination, the discrimination occurred mostly in employment
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The results of the Human Rights Monitor's survey are rein-
forced by a number of well-publicized incidents of racial discrim-
ination. For example, in the employment area, an eighteen-
year-old university graduate answered a newspaper advertise-
ment for a Native-English speaker to teach spoken English to
kindergartners.5"' The advertisement called for no other qualifi-
cations. The young woman inquired by telephone about the po-
sition and after a brief exchange in which the prospective em-
ployer asked her race-to which she replied she was Indian-
she was told that the school would only hire Caucasian, English-
speakers from England or the United States. 549 Because there is
currently no law prohibiting private employers from basing hir-
ing decisions on race, the young woman had no remedy.1
5 0
In the area of public accommodations, tavern owners in the
Wan Chai district of Hong Kong island were found to be charg-
ing higher admission charges to dark-skinned or Asian clientele
than to fair-skinned Caucasians.551 In response to a public out-
cry, Secretary for Home Affairs David Lan Hong-tsung said he
was surprised by the incident, but there was no need to intro-
duce legislation against racial discrimination.552 In a similar inci-
dent, certain hotels were exposed for charging Asian tourists
higher rates than Americans or Europeans.553 As in the employ-
ment situation, the victims of the discrimination had no legal
recourse.
The HKSAR administration itself has been accused of dis-
criminatory customs and immigration policies targeting
Nepalese and Thai travelers. In October 1998, the HKSAR ad-
ministration removed Nepal from the list of countries whose citi-
(45%), admission to facilities (33%), sales or delivery of goods or services (20%), gov-
ernment services (16%), home purchase or rental (15%), medical care (12%), access to
education (6%), business investment (5%), and other settings like social occasions
(12%). Id.
548. Lucia Palpal-latoc, Laws Against Racial Discrimination Not Necessary, School Job
Applicant Fails on Skin Color, HONG KONG STANDARD, Apr. 25, 1998.
549. Id.
550. Lucia Palpal-latoc, Schools' Policy on Teachers Discriminates Against Asians, Apr.
25, 1998, HONG KONG STANDARD, at 1.
551. Lucia Palpal-latoc, Disco Accused of Unfair Entry Policy, Apr. 25, 1998, HONG
KONG STANDARD, at 1.
552. Id.
553. HONG KONG HuMAN RIGHTS MONITOR, RACE DISCRIMINATION IN HONG KONG
(Feb. 1998).
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zens could enter Hong Kong without a visa.554 The HKSAR ad-
ministration claimed it was trying to curb an increase in the use
of forged travel documents and abuse of visa-free visitation
rights.555 Nepalese sources, however, charged that HKSAR offi-
cials were trying to curb the growth of the Nepalese population
in Hong Kong by deterring new arrivals.556 They further
charged HKSAR officials with using improper immigration
searches on Nepalese visitors, again in an effort to deter new ar-
rivals.557
The most visible evidence both of the multi-ethnic character
of Hong Kong society and the often marginal status of minority
groups is the large population of foreign domestic workers in
Hong Kong. These workers are usually vulnerable to exploita-
tion because of language and communication barriers, lack of
familiarity with local circumstances, and ignorance of available
assistance or remedies.558 In addition to the lack of protections
from private acts of racial/national origin discrimination, they
554. Visa-free access for visitors from Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan was also cur-
tailed, cutting the visa-free entry period from three months to two weeks. See Glenn
Schloss, Consuls-general Express Their Fears, Allegations of Racism in Visa Ruling Rejected, S.
CHINA MORNING PosT,Jan. 27, 1999, at 2. Nepalese had long served the British in Hong
Kong as Gurkha soldiers. As agreed with China and Britain, Gurkha families born
before December 1982 were given permanent residents with the British Nationalities in
Overseas. The policy provided Nepalese permanent residents to interact freely with
their families, relatives, and close friends from Nepal. See Far East Overseas Nepalese
Association, Press Statement, Apr. 4, 1999 (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal).
555. Interview with Mr. David Tong, Assistant Director of Immigration Depart-
ment, in Hong Kong (June 4, 1999). See also Glenn Schloss, supra note 135 (quoting
Immigration Department Director Ambrose Lee Siu-kwong stating "the decision was
made primarily on immigration grounds; it has nothing to do with race or nationality").
556. The Nepalese in Hong Kong is believed to have grown from just a few hun-
dred in the early 1990s to 17,400 at the end of 1998, making it the tenth largest foreign
[ethnic] group. See Glenn Schloss, Mushrooming Nepalese Community 'Prompted Removal of
Visa-Free Access', S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 21, 1999, at 4.
557. Government figures show that of the 8785 visitors searched over the period of
February 1998 to January 1999, 1565 (11.3%) were Nepalese, whereas Nepalese ac-
counted for only 0.5% of all visitors. See Christine Loh, Eliminate Discrimination at Cus-
toms Airport Command, Press Release, Mar. 23, 1999 (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal). Secretary for Security Regina Ip Lau Suk-yee defended the searches
as efforts to detain drug couriers and that some prior couriers were Nepali. See Glenn
Schloss, Customs Officers Accused of Racism in Body Searches, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar.
11, 1999, at 2. Government figures, however, cast doubt on this explanation. In 1996,
11 Nepalese were found with drugs in their possession, and only four in 1997. In 1998,
none of the three persons found possession drugs were Nepalese. See Loh, supra note.
558. See Loh, supra note 557.
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suffer from the added vulnerability created by the HKSAR's im-
migration policy known as the "two week rule." Because of this
vulnerability, they often endure low wages, poor living, and
working conditions5 5 9 and even physical and sexual abuse.
The HKSAR's policy for foreign domestic workers applies to
those who are not residents of China, Macau, or Taiwan and are
employed in Hong Kong under a standard two-year employment
contract to perform duties such as domestic cooking, household
chores, baby-sitting, and child minding.560 The "two week rule"
applies to those whose contracts are terminated prematurely.5 6 '
The rule requires them to leave Hong Kong within two weeks. 62
Introduced in early 1987, the rule was intended to curb various
abuses such as 'Job-hopping," whereby workers deliberately ter-
minated their contracts in order to change employers and stay
on indefinitely in Hong Kong. In practice, however, the rule
provides unscrupulous employers with a unilateral threat of de-
portation over any worker who objects to low wages, poor condi-
tions, or abuse. Even workers willing to institute proceedings in
the Labour Tribunal are vulnerable to this threat because,
although they may secure extensions of the two week period dur-
559. Although the standard employment contract of foreign domestic helpers
specifies certain conditions of work and living to be provided by the employer, such as
level of salary, provision of suitable and furnished accommodation, food free of charge,
and free medical treatment, these terms are frequently breached by employers. This
situation is especially problematic where workers lack English proficiency, insofar as
translations of the standard domestic worker employment contracts and accompanying
explanatory notes are difficult to obtain. See HONG KONG HUMAN RIGHTS MONITOR,
BRIEFING PAPER FOR THE COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION ON
THE THIRTEENTH PERIODIC REPORT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM IN RESPECT OF HONG KONG
UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION (visited Apr. 10, 1999) <http://www.lawhk.hku.hk/demo/unhrdocs/
cerdEXS.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
560. See HONG KONG HUMAN RIGHTS MONITOR, SUBMISSION TO THE UNITED NA-
TIONS ON HKSAR UNDER THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RA-
CLAL DISCRIMINATION (1998).
561. A change of employment upon premature termination of contract is permit-
ted on an exceptional basis, for example, circumstances where the employer has emi-
grated or has become insolvent or the foreign domestic helper has been abused or
exploited by the employer. See HONG KONG HUMAN RIGHTS MONITOR, supra note 559.
562. See HOME AFFAIRS BUREAU, supra note 541, at 15. The Hong Kong Judicial
Committee, while recognizing past abuse of the former policy of permitting foreign
workers an unrestricted six-month stay after termination of employment, see HONG
KONG HUMAN RIGHTS MONITOR-UNITED KINGDOM, FOURTEENTH PERIODIC REPORT IN RE-
SPECT OF HONG KONG UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF
ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (1996).
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ing labour proceedings, the rule does not permit them to work
legally in Hong Kong during the two weeks or any extension
thereof.56 This rule creates the untenable situation where a
worker suffering poor conditions or abuse is forced to endure
the conditions or risk homelessness (because most domestic
helpers live in the home of the employer), financial collapse,
and either deportation or weeks or months of uncertainty as pro-
ceedings to validate the complaint take place.
The "two week rule" has been the subject of international
attention and criticism in the past. The United Nations Commit-
tee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognized this is-
sue as a matter of concern in its Concluding Observations in De-
cember 1994. This committee recommended that the HKSAR
administration should review the employment conditions of for-
eign domestic helpers to provide the full enjoyment of rights
under the ICESCR.564 It further recommended the abolition of
the "two week rule" because it caused serious impairment of the
foreign domestic helper's economic, social, and cultural
rights. 565
This account of racial and ethnic discrimination in Hong
Kong is admittedly anecdotal and cannot definitively establish
the rate or pattern of such discrimination in Hong Kong. Never-
theless, as with gender discrimination, whatever the actual level
of racial discrimination, Hong Kong has an obligation under in-
ternational law to provide an adequate remedy for any and all
acts of race discrimination. The current law falls far short of that
standard in that there is no remedy whatsoever for private acts of
discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity.
In response to calls for the passage of a race discrimination
ordinance along the lines of the SDO, the HKSAR administra-
tion has adopted what it calls a step-by-step approach:
Anti-discrimination legislation is a new area of law in Hong
Kong, which has far-reaching implications for the community
563. See HONG KONG HUMAN RIGHTS MONITOR, supra note 560 (noting that work-
ers are given "visitor" status during legal proceedings challenging their contract termi-
nation, and that "visitors" are not permitted to work legally).
564. See U.N. COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, REPORT ON
HONG KONG UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL
FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (Dec. 1994); see also, HONG KONG HUMAN RIGHTS
MONITOR, supra note 560.
565. See HONG KONG HUMAN RIGHTS MONITOR, supra note 562.
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as a whole. The Hong Kong Government accordingly main-
tains its view that a step-by-step approach allowing both the
government and the community thoroughly to assess the im-
pact of such legislation in the light of experience offers the
most suitable way forward.5 6 6
The intent behind the policy is to give Hong Kong time to de-
velop experience with the SDO, family status, and disability ordi-
nances before moving to confront other areas such as race or
age discrimination.
In the meantime, the HKSAR administration claims to pur-
sue a policy of public education and voluntary compliance; how-
ever, there is little evidence of any serious efforts in this area.
For example, when asked by Legislative Councilor Christine Loh
to provide details on funding for anti-discrimination programs
in the years 1999 to 2000 and procedures for grant making to
community service providers, the administration's written re-
sponse stated only that the administration "would be formulat-
ing a suitable programme of activities for implementation in
1999/2000 and they would be looking into funding arrange-
ments .... "567
With respect to voluntary compliance, the administration
did release a Code of Practice Against Discrimination in Employ-
ment Areas on the Ground of Race ("Anti-discrimination Code")
in November 1997.568 This voluntary code is designed to en-
courage employers and staff to "examine their conduct, under-
stand what practices are discriminatory, and to stop them.
569
The Anti-discrimination Code covers terms and conditions of
employment, selection, recruitment, interviewing, promotion,
grievances, and dismissal procedures.5 70 The Anti-discrimina-
tion Code, however, contains no grievance procedures for vic-
tims, no reporting requirements, and no remedies, binding or
566. Government 'Turning Blind Eye' to Racial Discrimination, HONG KONG STANDARD,
Jan. 20, 1999, at 1.
567. HONG KONG HUMAN RIGHTS MONITOR, CAMPAIGN FOR LEGISLATION AGAINST
RAciAL DISCRIMINATION, (visited May 9, 1999) <http://www.freway.org.hk/hkhrm/eng-
lish/reports/enw/enw0199d.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal)
(paraphrasing written reply of Peter Lo, Acting Secretary for Home Affairs Bureau).
568. HONG KONG HOME AFFAIRS BUREAU, CODE OF PRACrICE AGAINST DISCRIMINA-
TION IN EMPLOYMENT ON THE GROUND OF RACE (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal).
569. Id.
570. Id.
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otherwise, and there is little evidence that the Anti-discrimina-
tion Code has had any effect. Indeed, critics of the Anti-discrim-
ination Code point out that not only is it voluntary, but it also
contains a statement essentially releasing employers from even a
moral obligation to comply.571 This provision states that the
"Government recognizes that it may not always be feasible for
everyone to follow all the good practices recommended in this
Code."
The step-by-step approach is problematic on several levels.
First, it sanctions an arbitrary hierarchy of rights; an effective
"queue" for victims of discriminatory conduct that allows redress
for gender-based claims, for example, but not race-based claims.
Second, it condones a majoritarian attack on core principles of
individual human dignity: because the majority of Hong Kong's
people allegedly are not ready to recognize the equality of racial
minorities, the administration sacrifices the rights of the minor-
ity. This represents a failure on the part of the administration to
understand principles of equality and anti-discrimination as fun-
damental protections of inherent rights, rather than privileges to
be accorded in due time.572 Such policy squarely conflicts with
Hong Kong's commitments under international law.
While recognizing the value of progressive measures, in-
cluding public education, the U.N. Committee on Economic So-
cial and Cultural Rights has expressed its concern over the ab-
sence of legislation banning racial discrimination. In its 1994
Concluding Observations, the Committee expressed "its concern
571. Interview with Vandana Rajwani, Director of Indian Resources Group, in
Hong Kong (June 7, 1999).
572. Moreover, the legislative process permits a prolonged enactment that would
give businesses and the community time to prepare for any legislation by drafting and
disseminating company policies or procedures and training employees. This method
was used with the SDO. The SDO was presented for first reading at the LegCo nine
months before its enactment, and in its final version included a three year phase-in
period. Finally, the step-by-step approach rests on a faulty and illogical foundation.
HKSAR officials argue that delaying anti-race discrimination legislation indefinitely is
acceptable because the problem is not significant and because Hong Kong needs time
to adjust to existing legislation-legislation that itself ironically addresses the insignifi-
cant problems of gender, family status, and disability discrimination. But if the prob-
lem is not significant, then few claims would be expected and legislation should not
prove disruptive in any fashion requiring prolonged adjustment. A more candid state-
ment of the objection that creating policies and training employees to implement any
legislative scheme would take resources away from income-generating activities; re-
sources that employers do not want to spend, particularly when they do not perceive a
widespread problem.
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that in spite of recent Government initiatives to introduce legis-
lation concerning non-discrimination in relation to sex and disa-
bility, there is an absence of comprehensive legislation providing
protection against discrimination on the grounds referred to in
article 2 of the Covenant. " "' Article 2 includes prohibitions on
discrimination based on race, color, or national origin. In fail-
ing to implement protections in those areas, Hong Kong fails to
satisfy its obligations under the ICESCR.574 Similarly, Hong
Kong's obligations under CERD include an obligation not only
to "prohibit" but affirmatively "to bring to an end, by all appro-
priate means including legislation as required by circumstances,
racial discrimination by any persons, group or organization.
Although CERD does allow consideration of local circumstances,
nothing in Hong Kong's current legal or political order provides
grounds for delay.
E. Conclusions and Recommendations
The delegation recognizes the important steps Hong Kong
has taken in passing the SDO and establishing the EOC. The
delegation concludes, however, that additional measures are
necessary to achieve and maintain gender equality.576 Most
readily achievable are policy changes designed to educate wo-
men about their rights and available remedies and to encourage
the EOC to use its existing powers, especially that of independ-
ent investigation. More involved legislative initiatives should be
considered to address the problems of violence against women
and of foreign domestic workers. Finally, public discussion
should be encouraged on the proposal of a number of Hong
Kong-based human rights organizations and political parties urg-
ing the creation of a Women's Bureau within the HKSAR admin-
istration, charged with analyzing the effect of all government
573. See HONG KONG HuMAN RIGHTS MONITOR-UNITED KINGDOM, supra note 562.
574. As Article 2 of the ICCPR contains essentially the same language, Hong
Kong's failure to implement race discrimination legislation fails to satisfy the ICCPR as
well. Moreover, Article 26 of the ICCPR requires Hong Kong to provide an effective
remedy for violations of the rights therein. Lacking legislation creating a remedy for
private discrimination, Hong Kong arguably violates Article 26 as well. See ICCPR, supra
note 8.
575. See CERD, supra note 486, art. 2(1)(d) (emphasis added).
576. See Initial Report on the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region under Article 18 of
the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, at art. 2,
para. 18 (Nov. 25, 1998).
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policies on women as well as drafting policy proposals to pro-
mote gender equality.577
The delegation is concerned by the absence of legal protec-
tions for racial minorities and urges the government of Hong
Kong to adopt legislation in the near future. Such legislation
could be modeled on the SDO, or on the proposed bill of Legis-
lative Councilor Christine Loh. As noted above, implementation
could be phased in, as with the SDO. And as noted above with
regard to the SDO and EOC, educational initiatives developed to
promote racial equality and understanding between all races
should accompany legislation.
CONCLUSION
In this time of transition for Hong Kong, the resolve of the
577. See CEDAW, supra note 485; see also The Democratic Party of Hong Kong, The
Initial Report on Hong Kong SAR Under CEDAW by the Democratic Party, Hong Kong, Conclu-
sion, Jan. 1999 (visited Apr. 25, 1999) <http://www.hku.hk/ccpl/cedawweb/DP.html>
(on file with the Fordham International Law Journal); see HONG KONG HUMAN RIGHTS
MONITOR, supra note 567, at part II(A) (2); The Frontier, HKSAR Under Article 18 of
CEDAW, Conclusion (visited Apr. 25, 1999) <http://www.hku.hk/ccpl/cedawweb/
Frontier.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal). Advocates argue
that the proposed Women's Bureau would allow the government to address more effec-
tively areas of gender discrimination not covered by the narrow mandates of SDO or
and EOC, including private sector conduct. For example, advocates suggest that a Wo-
men's Bureau would help promote policies and legislation intended to curb violence
against women. The CEDAW Committee expressed concern about services provided by
the HKSAR for victims of domestic abuse as well as the HKSAR's apparent failure to
examine the problem of sexual violence. It was similarly concerned about the HKSAR's
failure to mention sexual violence against women in its report to the CEDAW Commit-
tee. See CEDAW, supra. Advocates in Hong Kong suggest that a Women's Bureau might
deal with these issues by promoting anti-stalking laws, laws expanding the definition of
rape and criminalizing marital rape, and laws mandating counseling for abusers and
the reporting of domestic violence. Harmony House, Submission to the CEDAW Committee
on the Initial Report on Hong Kong Under CEDAW by Non Government Organizations, Article
5(C)(1) (visited Apr. 25, 1999) <http://www.hku.hk/ccpl/cedaweb/CEDAW4.html>
(on file with the Fordham International Law Journal). Others suggest a Women's Bureau
might initiate policies to train police, medical professionals, and social workers to deal
with victims of domestic or sexual violence, and help to establish shelters to protect
victims of sexual violence and a 24-hour rape crisis hotline. Harmony House, supra
note; Association Concerning Sexual Violence Against Women, Submission to the CEDAW
Committee on the Initial Report on Hong Kong Under CEDAW by Non Government Organiza-
tions, Article 5(6) (visited Apr. 25, 1999) <http://www.hku.hk/ccpl/cedaweb/
CEDAW4.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal); Hong Kong Wo-
men Workers Association, Submission to the CEDAW Committee on the Initial Report on Hong
Kong Under CEDAW by Non Government Organizations, Article 3(5) (visited Apr. 25, 1999)
<http://www.hku.hk/ccpl/cedaweb/CEDAW4.html> (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal).
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HKSAR administration to uphold the rule of law and its commit-
ment to fulfilling its obligations under international law will con-
tinue to be tested. In the Decemer 15, 1999 decision of the CFA
in the case of HKSAR v. Ng Kung Siu and Lee Kin Yun, No. 4 of
1999, HKSAR Court of Final Appeal (Dec. 15, 1999), Chief Jus-
tice Li stated:
Hong Kong is at the early stage of the new order following
resumption of the exercise of sovereignty by the People's Re-
public of China. The implementation of the principle of
"One Country, Two Systems" is a matter of fundamental im-
portance as is the reinforcement of national unity and territo-
rial integrity.
The successful implementation of this principle will safeguard
the HKSAR's status as the premiere example of economic and
political stability in Asia. It is toward this end that the Crowley
Program offers this Special Report, hopeful that in this one
country, these two systems of law can be sustained to advance the
rights and dignity of all men and women in the Hong Kong Spe-
cial Administrative Region and the People's Republic of China
as a whole.
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